Palmi v. Palmi

• Decision Date: 21 January 1966
• Docket Number: No. 39721,39721
• Citation: 273 Minn. 97,140 N.W.2d 77
• Parties: Stella G. PALMI, Respondent, v. Suio J. PALMI, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 77

140 N.W.2d 77

273 Minn. 97

Stella G. PALMI, Respondent, v. Suio J. PALMI, Appellant.

No. 39721.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 21, 1966.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A division of real property under a divorce decree is final under Minn.St. 518.64 and cannot thereafter be changed, modified, or amended by the trial court when the time for appeal has gone by.

2. In the disposition of property, real or personal, acquired during coverture, the court may upon statutory authority make such disposition as shall appear just and equitable, having regard to the nature and determination of the issues in the case.

3. The division of the property in a divorce proceeding in this state is regulated solely by statute and the applicable decision law.

4. Where divorce judgment is ambiguous or indefinite in its terms, party may move the court for order for its interpretation and clarification, and it is within the province of such court to hear and determine the motion. Such clarification of a judgment ambiguous upon its face involves neither an amendment to its terms nor a challenge to its validity.

5. If a judgment or decree is ambiguous, the whole record may be examined to ascertain its meaning, and that construction will be adopted which makes it such as ought to have been rendered.

6. The district court has inherent power at any time after final judgment to correct its own clerical mistakes so as to make the judgment conform to what the court intended it to be. Divorce decrees should be given that interpretation which will render them reasonable, effective, and conclusive, and which will make them harmonious with facts and law of the case.

Hoag & Edwards, Duluth, for appellant.

Bouschor & McNulty, Duluth, for respondent.

NELSON, Justice.

Appeal from an order construing a divorce decree entered in an action commenced by Stella G. Palmi against her husband, Sulo J. Palmi. The petition for construction of said judgment by Stella G. Palmi was occasioned by her husband's claim that he was entitled to $2,000 plus one-half of the proceeds of any sale of a house owned jointly by the parties.

The original decree provided in part as follows:

'3. That plaintiff is awarded the household goods and furnishings, the Ford pickup, the Ford automobile, and the possession of the family homestead as long as she occupies the same as her home or for the purposes for which it is presently operated; that when plaintiff ceases to occupy said residence as her home, or if she remarries, the defendant shall be entitled to receive the sum of $2,000.00, which is decreed to be a lien upon said homestead, to be paid upon the occurrence of the aforementioned contingencies, the plaintiff not being required to pay said amount or interest thereon as long as she occupies the place as her residence.

'4. That neither party is entitled to alimony or support from the other.'

The following memorandum was attached to the decree:

'While the award of the property to the plaintiff may seem disproportionate in view of the total disability of the defendant and the fact that all property was acquired during coverture, it quite clearly appears that the plaintiff has undertaken responsibility for the support of the family for the period after the total disability of the defendant, which disability was the result of a self-inflicted wound--whether inflicted intentionally or accidentally is unimportant--and during said period has, through her own efforts, discharged substantially all of the medical expenses incurred in connection with such injury, and has kept the family off of the relief rolls during that period. Defendant's necessities are taken care of by his Social Security status, and the award to him of the interest in the home, which is deferred to the expiration of the time when it will be necessary for the support of his children and of the plaintiff, is realistic. Should the plaintiff so desire, there would be no reason why she could not, if possible, raise this amount of money and clear the property, in which event it would be free of this lien.'

The petition for construction was heard by the same judge before whom the original action was tried. Following the hearing an order was entered which provides in part as follows:

'It is ordered that said decree dated December 19, 1960 be construed to direct that defendant have an interest in the proceeds of the homestead of the parties in the gross sum of $2,000.00, which shall constitute his only interest in the said homestead or the proceeds thereof, which homestead was held in joint tenancy prior to the hearing on the complaint of the plaintiff.'

This was accompanied by the following memorandum:

'The decree perhaps might at first glance appear to have some ambiguity inasmuch as it does not recite the situation shown by the testimony that the property was owned in joint tenancy. However, when construed in connection with the memorandum, which was intended to be a part thereof, it would seem most clear that the intention is to give the defendant an interest in the total homestead to the extent of $2,000.00. The last sentence of the memorandum reads: 'Should the plaintiff so desire, there would be no reason why she could not, if possible, raise this amount of money and clear the property, in which event it would be free of this lien.' The Court's reasons for the division of property were clearly set forth in that memorandum and were, as indicated, based substantially upon the fact that the plaintiff had, by her own efforts, not only cared for and supported the children of this marriage, thus discharging an obligation which was primarily that of the defendant, but, in addition, had paid substantially all of the medical expenses incurred on behalf of the husband as a result of the self-inflicted injury. It was the Court's conclusion that except for the extraordinary efforts of the plaintiff, there not only would have been no property in the name of either party, but the parties would unquestionably have had to resort to public assistance. Defendant has his continuing entitlement to Social Security benefits, plus the $2,000.00 remaining from the proceeds of the property, and, except for plaintiff's efforts, would have had no interest in the property.' (Italics supplied.)

The defendant contends on appeal that the judgment is clear and unambiguous upon its face and is therefore not open to interpretation or construction by the court; that it is only where the court finds that a judgment because of its language is of doubtful meaning or open to diverse construction that it may be clarified by the interpretation of the court. He contends that the judgment here took into account all the property owned by the parties. He argues that the order appealed from constitutes an amendment of the divorce decree entered pursuant to a motion to interpret the judgment contrary to Rule 60.02 of Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in part:

'* * * A motion under this Rule 60.02 does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant no actually personally notified as provided in Rule 4.043, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.'

1. The statutes relating to alimony, support money, and division of property in divorce and annulment actions were recordified by L.1951, c. 551 (Minn.St. 518.54 to 518.67). This included the power of the court to alter or change orders or decrees of divorce. Minn.St. 518.64.

Minn.St. 518.64 states:

'* * * Except for an award of the right of occupancy of the homestead, All division of real and Personal property provided by Sections 518.58 and 518.59 Shall be final, and subject only to the power of the court to impose a lien or charge thereon at any time while such property, or subsequently acquired property, is owned by the parties or either of them, for the payment of alimony or support money, or to sequester the...