Palriwala v. Palriwala Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-P-882.,04-P-882.
• Citation: 834 N.E.2d 1241,64 Mass. App. Ct. 663
• Parties: Satya PALRIWALA & others<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> v. PALRIWALA CORPORATION, trustee,<SMALL><SUP>2</SUP></SMALL> & others.<SMALL><SUP>3</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

834 N.E.2d 1241

64 Mass. App. Ct. 663

Satya PALRIWALA & others¹ v. PALRIWALA CORPORATION, trustee,² & others.³

No. 04-P-882.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued March 11, 2005.

Decided September 30, 2005.

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Shannon M. Fitzpatrick, Boston (Alvin S. Nathanson with her) for the plaintiffs.

John J. O'Connor, Boston, for Bijay Palriwala.

Present: GELINAS, BROWN, & DUFFLY, JJ.

DUFFLY, J.

A jury, asked to render special verdicts pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 49(a), 365 Mass. 812 (1974), found that Satya Palriwala and his wife Sushila had provided services for Satya's older brother, Gauri S. Palriwala, and awarded two million dollars on their claim for quantum meruit damages; the trial judge, concluding that this special verdict was in conflict with the jury's finding that a contract existed between Gauri S. Palriwala and Satya and Sushila, which had not been breached, ordered judgment to issue in favor of the defendant. Judgment entered dismissing the claims of the plaintiffs Mahesh Palriwala and his wife Rekha, based on the jury's findings that a contract existed between them and Gauri S. Palriwala that had not been breached, and also that Mahesh and Rekha were not entitled to recover damages under a theory of quantum meruit.

The defendant asserts as a preliminary matter that the plaintiffs' notice of appeal was timely filed only as to Mahesh. As we will discuss, we think that it was timely as to all four plaintiffs. We conclude that the jury followed the trial judge's instructions and agree with Satya and Sushila that the special verdict in their favor on their claim for quantum meruit damages finds support in the evidence and is not inconsistent. We, therefore, reverse the order that judgment enter in favor of the defendant on the quantum meruit based claims of Satya and Sushila. We affirm the judgments in favor of the defendant on the claims of Mahesh and Rekha.⁴

1. Summary of proceedings. The plaintiffs, Satya and Sushila Palriwala, together with their son Mahesh and his wife, Rekha Palriwala, brought suit in Superior Court against Bijay Palriwala, the executor of the estate of Bijay's father (and Satya's brother), Gauri S. Palriwala (referred to here and in the pleadings as "GS," by which he was known during his lifetime). The gist of the plaintiffs' allegations in their verified complaint is that they had each provided a variety of services over a period of years, as requested by GS — a wealthy businessman who became increasingly more disabled from the effects of childhood polio — who promised them housing and that they would be taken care of financially if they left their homes and employment in India to come to the United States.

The complaint alleges that, on the strength of GS's promises, Satya and his wife, Sushila, moved to Massachusetts in 1979, where Satya began employment with Asiatic, one of GS's businesses; Satya and Sushila lived with GS in his apartment and took care of all of GS's needs until 1982, when they returned to India. Asked by GS to return, they did so in 1984 and provided services as requested until GS was hospitalized in October, 1992. In 1989, in reliance upon similar promises, Mahesh and Rekha left India and joined Mahesh's parents in providing services to GS. It is alleged that GS died in 1996 without making good on his promises.

Counts I through V of the plaintiffs' complaint were dismissed, upon the parties' reported settlement of those claims, before the jury began their deliberations.⁵ The jury returned answers, which are considered special verdicts, on the two remaining counts against the estate: a breach of contract claim (Count VI), alleging the existence of an agreement that the plaintiffs "would move to the United States and work for and take care of GS in return for his providing for them financially," specifically $500,000, as well as a home; and a separate claim for quantum meruit recovery (Count VII), seeking "the reasonable value of [the plaintiffs'] services rendered to the decedent in reliance on his promise that he would provide for them if they left India and came to Massachusetts to work for him and care for his personal needs." The complaint does not specify that Counts VI and VII were pleaded in the alternative.

Following a five-day trial, the jury reported answers to eighteen questions that had been agreed to by the parties and submitted to the jury on a joint special verdict form.⁶ Questions one through thirteen govern the plaintiffs' contract and quantum meruit claims. The jury found that there were contracts between GS and the plaintiffs, but that there had not been a breach.⁷ To the question, "Are the plaintiffs Satya N. and Sushila Palriwala entitled to recover damages under a theory of quantum meruit," the jury responded "Yes." As to damages under this theory the jury responded, "Two Million Dollars plus attorney's fees." Concerning the entitlement of Mahesh and Rekha to quantum meruit damages, the jury answered that they were not entitled.

After the jury were dismissed, the plaintiffs filed a proposed form of judgment based on the special verdict in favor of Satya and Sushila on the claim of quantum meruit recovery. The defendant filed a motion seeking a judgment in his favor on both the contract and quantum meruit counts, arguing that the special verdict that a contract existed that had not been breached was inconsistent as matter of law with the special verdict that Satya and Sushila were entitled to quantum meruit damages for services that had been the subject of the contract.⁸ The trial judge agreed and allowed the motion, noting: "Under the case as pled . . . the finding that a contract existed between the parties precludes a finding for plffs on quantum meruit." A judgment entered dismissing the plaintiffs' action on the merits. This appeal ensued.

2. Discussion. We first address the defendant's claim that only Mahesh filed a timely notice of appeal.

The notice of appeal. The notice of appeal at issue was filed on January 4, 2002, within thirty days from the date judgment entered on December 6, 2001. The notice sets forth as the parties appealing, "Mahesh Palriwala, et al./Plaintiffs." The defendant claims that because the notice did not also specifically name Satya, Sushila, and Rekha, it failed to give proper notice as to them, pursuant to Mass.R.App.P. 3(c), as appearing in 430 Mass. 1602 (1999) (notice "shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal"), and that, consequently, this court lacks jurisdiction over the unnamed parties' appeal. In the circumstances of this case, we think the notice sufficiently specified all four plaintiffs as appealing from the judgment.⁹

We have held that the specificity requirement of rule 3(c) is met if the notice, no matter how inartful, "gives fair notice of the specific individual or entity seeking to appeal." Board of Appeals of Rockport v. DeCarolis, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 348, 351, 588 N.E.2d 1378 (1992), quoting from Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 318, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988). In DeCarolis, we held that a notice was sufficient despite the arguably deficient caption designating the appellant as "Loyd M. Starrett, et als," where the body of the notice referred to "Loyd M. Starrett, et als., the above-named Plaintiffs" and, "LOYD M. STARRETT, et als. as they are member[s] of the ROCKPORT ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS by their attorney," appeared over the attorney's signature line. Board of Appeals of Rockport v. DeCarolis, supra.

Here, the notice, "Mahesh K. Palriwala, et al./ Plaintiffs," is identical to the caption used by the trial court in its judgment which refers (in the body of the judgment) by name to each of the four plaintiffs; the form of judgment had been proposed by the defendant. Additionally, the body of the notice refers to the "plaintiffs" and is signed: "PLAINTIFFS, By their attorneys." The attorneys listed are the same attorneys who filed the complaint on behalf of Satya, Sushila, Mahesh, and Rekha, and represented all four plaintiffs throughout the proceedings below. From these circumstances we think that it would be readily apparent to the defendant that "et al." and "plaintiffs" refer to all four plaintiffs in the original complaint. Thus, "[t]he body of the notice . . . makes plain" who the appellants are. Deveau v. Commissioner of Rev., 51 Mass.App.Ct. 420, 425 n. 10, 746 N.E.2d 565 (2001).¹⁰

This case is unlike Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. at 317-318, 108 S.Ct. 2405, where the term "et al." was held not to satisfy the specificity required by Fed.R.A.P. 3(c) (1979). The named plaintiff in that case, Torres, was one of sixteen plaintiffs who had intervened in a complicated employment discrimination suit against the defendant. Id. at 313, 108 S.Ct. 2405. The notice of appeal contained the caption "et al.," while the body of the notice named fifteen out of the sixteen plaintiffs, leaving out Torres. Id. at 317, 108 S.Ct. 2405. See also Garland v. Beverly Hosp. Corp., 48 Mass.App.Ct. 913, 914 n. 2, 720 N.E.2d 838 (1999) (where action commenced in Superior Court named five other individuals as plaintiffs but the notice of appeal named only Joseph Garland; therefore, he was considered the only appellant). Unlike in Torres or Garland, here there was no significant omission of an appealing party in the body of the notice. The notice gave "fair notice of the specific individual or entity seeking to appeal," Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., supra at 318, 108 S.Ct. 2405, and served, in the circumstances of this case, as the functional equivalent of naming each of the parties to the appeal.

The special jury verdict. The parties jointly proposed the questions on the special verdict form that were submitted to the jury pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 49(a). As was discussed in Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co., KG, 399 Mass. 790, 800, 507 N.E.2d 662 (1987):

"Under rule 49(a), the jurors return answers to each...