Panama City Airport Bd. v. Laird

Decision Date31 October 1956
Citation90 So.2d 616
PartiesPANAMA CITY AIRPORT BOARD, a body politic, Appellant, v. W. H. LAIRD et al., Appellees.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Liddon, Isler & Welch, Panama City, for appellant.

J. M. & H. P. Sapp and Davenport & Johnston, Panama City, for appellee.

HOBSON, Justice.

Appellant, the Panama City Airport Board, organized under Chapter 23465, Laws of Florida 1945, filed a petition in the circuit court seeking to condemn certain real property owned by defendant-appellees. The petition set forth that the land sought to be condemned was a tract 100 feet in width and 2,640 feet in depth, and that such area was to be used as an approach or clear zone area for the runway at Fannin Field. A motion to dismiss this petition was granted upon the sole ground that Chapter 23465, Laws of Florida 1945, does not, in its title, include a grant of power of eminent domain outside the city limits of the City of Panama City, as required by Article 3, Section 16, of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A.

The question raised on this appeal is whether or not the petitioner possesses the substantive right to maintain an action to condemn land outside the city limits of the City of Panama City and within 15 miles thereof.

In order to consider the question immediately involved, it is necessary to outline the statutory framework from which a municipality derives the power of eminent domain for the purpose of creating or enlarging airport facilities. The general enabling act is Chapter 332, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., known as the 'Airport Law of 1945', Chapter 22846, Laws of Florida 1945. Pertinent portions of this act, for our purposes, are the following:

'332.02 Acquisition of real property for airports

'(1) Every municipality is hereby authorized through its governing body, to acquire property, real or personal, for the purpose of establishing, constructing, and enlarging airports and other air navigation facilities and to acquire, establish, construct, enlarge, improve, maintain, equip, operate, and regulate such airports and other air navigation facilities and structures and other property incidental to their operation, either within or without the territorial limits of such municipality and within or without this state; * * *.

(2) Property needed by a municipality for an airport or restricted landing area, or for the enlargement of either, or for other airport purposes, may be acquired by purchase, gift, devise, lease or other means if such municipality is able to agree with the owners of said property on the terms of such acquisition, and otherwise by condemnation in the manner provided by the law under which such municipality is authorized to acquire like property for public purposes, full power to exercise the right of eminent domain for such purposes being hereby aranted every municipality both within and without its territorial limits, as specified in and including all the powers, rights, and privileges of chapters 73 and 74. If but one municipality is involved and the charter of such municipality prescribes a method of acquiring property by condemnation, proceedings shall be had pursuant to the provisions of such charter and may be followed as to property within or without its territorial limits. * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)

'332.03 Same; establishment of airports, etc., declared public power

'The acquisition of any lands for the purpose of establishing airports or other air navigation facilities; the acquisition of airport protection privileges; the acquisition, establishment, construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipment, and operation of airports and other air navigation facilities, and the exercise of any other powers herein granted to municipalities, are hereby declared to be public, governmental and municipal functions, exercised for a public purpose, and matters of public necessity, and such lands and other property easements and privileges acquired and used by such municipalities in the manner and for the purposes enumerated in this chapter shall be and are hereby declared to be acquired and used for public, governmental and municipal purposes and as a matter of public necessity.'

It will be noted that these statutory sections provide a clear delegation of authority to acquire property by eminent domain both within and without the territorial limits of the municipality involved.

Referring to the Panama City Charter, we find the following provision:

'Sec. 10. That the said City is hereby delegated authority to exercise the right and power of eminent domain, that is the right to appropriate property within or without the territorial limits of said City, except State or Federal, for the following uses and purposes: * * * and other municipal purposes'. Chapter 11678, Laws of Florida 1925, Ex. Sess.

Reading the sections of Chapter 332, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which we have quoted, with Section 10 of the City Charter, there can be no doubt, and we do not understand it to be contended otherwise, that the City itself possessed the power to take the property involved in this litigation by eminent domain for the purposes indicated in the petition. This brings us squarely to the question of whether or not petitioner acquired the same power. We are of the opinion that it did.

The title of the act which created the Panama City Airport Board, Chapter 23465, Laws of Florida 1945, reads in part as follows:

'An Act to Create a Board to be Known As the Panama City Air Port Board; Declaring Said Corporation to be a Public Agency of the City of Panama City, Florida; to Provide for the Powers and Duties of Such Board; * * * to Provide for the Exercise of Such Powers, Including the Right to Acquire Property by Purchase, Lease, Eminent Domain, * * * to Grant the Power to Acquire, Construct, Maintain and operate Air Port Facilities, Warehouses, Hangers, Repair Facilities, Seaplane Bases, and All Other Facilities incident to the Operation of an Air Port * * *; to Declare Said Board to Be an Agency of the City of Panama City, Florida; * * * to Define Further the Powers of Said...

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1 cases
  • Overstreet v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • December 16, 1993
    ...legislative intent, a statute "should not be considered in isolation and without reference to other statutes," Panama City Airport Board v. Laird, 90 So.2d 616, 619 (Fla.1956), but should be construed with other statutes relating to the same subject matter. Florida Jai Alai, Inc. v. Lake Ho......

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