Overstreet v. State
| Decision Date | 16 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 81445,81445 |
| Citation | 629 So.2d 125 |
| Parties | 18 Fla. L. Weekly S637 John OVERSTREET, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and David P. Gauldin, Asst. Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., James W. Rogers, Bureau Chief, Crim. Appeals, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Joe S. Garwood, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
We review Overstreet v. State, 611 So.2d 1262, 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), in which the district court certified the following question to be of great public importance:
PURSUANT TO SECTION 775.084(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, WHEN ADJUDICATION IS WITHHELD AND A DEFENDANT SENTENCED AS A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER TO INCARCERATION FOLLOWED BY PROBATION SUBSEQUENTLY COMMITS A FELONY WHILE INCARCERATED FOR THE PRIOR OFFENSES, CAN THE PRIOR OFFENSES INVOLVING WITHHELD ADJUDICATION BE TREATED AS PRIOR CONVICTIONS FOR PURPOSES OF HABITUAL FELONY OFFENDER SENTENCING?
We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution and answer the question in the negative.
Overstreet committed the instant offense while incarcerated for three 1990 cases, involving multiple felony offenses. The court withheld adjudication on each of the 1990 offenses and sentenced Overstreet as a youthful offender to four years in the Department of Corrections boot camp, to be followed by a two-year probationary period. While he was in boot camp, the State charged Overstreet with aggravated battery on another inmate, and he pled nolo contendere to the reduced charge of aggravated assault. During sentencing, the State introduced copies of the 1990 offenses (in which adjudication was withheld) to establish the predicate for his being sentenced as an habitual violent felony offender. The trial court treated the 1990 offenses as convictions and sentenced Overstreet to a five-year term as an habitual offender, and the district court affirmed.
In construing subsection 775.084(2), Florida Statutes (1991), we must bear in mind that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in a manner most favorable to the accused. Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310 (Fla.1991). The State concedes that a literal reading of subsection 775.084(2) would not include offenses committed during the incarcerative portion of a sentence. 1 Nevertheless, the State contends that the legislature intended to include those individuals who commit a felony before their term of incarceration, community control, or any other sentence has expired and that a literal reading of the section contravenes legislative intent and public policy. We disagree.
Legislative intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute. S.R.G. Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 365 So.2d 687 (Fla.1978). The legislature is assumed to know the meaning of the words in the statute and to have expressed its intent by the use of those words. In the instant case, the plain language of subsection 775.084(2) includes only those offenses occurring while on probation, and nothing in the statute indicates any legislative intent to the contrary. We decline to add words to a statute where, as in this case, the language is clear and unambiguous. "It is a settled rule of statutory construction that unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction, however wise it may seem to alter the plain language." State v. Jett, 626 So.2d 691 (Fla.1993). If the legislature did not intend the results mandated by the statute's plain language, then the appropriate remedy is for it to amend the statute.
Therefore, we answer the certified question in the negative and quash the decision of the district court.
It is so ordered.
While the majority correctly points out that clear and unambiguous statutes are not subject to judicial construction, it is also true that a statute should not be interpreted literally when to do so would lead to an unreasonable conclusion or to a purpose not intended by the legislature. See Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 1051 (Fla.1986); Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla.1984); Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Florida, Inc., 239 So.2d 256 (Fla.1970). In determining legislative intent, a statute "should not be considered in isolation and without reference to other statutes," Panama City Airport Board v. Laird, 90 So.2d 616, 619 (Fla.1956), but should be construed with other statutes relating to the same subject matter. Florida Jai Alai, Inc. v. Lake Howell Water & Reclamation Dist., 274 So.2d 522 (Fla.1973).
In the instant case, "a literal interpretation of [sub]section 775.084(2) would permit [Overstreet] to evade classification as an habitual felon because he was incarcerated with adjudication withheld when he committed the instant felony, as opposed to being on...
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