Papooshek v. Winona & St. Peter R. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 July 1890
• Citation: 44 Minn. 195
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: MATHIAS PAPOOSHEK <I>vs.</I> WINONA & ST. PETER RAILROAD COMPANY.

44 Minn. 195

MATHIAS PAPOOSHEK vs. WINONA & ST. PETER RAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 25, 1890.

Appeal by the railway company from an order of the district court for Winona county, Start, J., presiding, refusing a new trial after verdict of $100 for the land-owner, on the trial of an appeal from the commissioners' award in condemnation proceedings.

Wilson & Bowers, for appellant.

Tawney & Randall, for respondent.

VANDERBURGH, J.

The defendant instituted condemnation proceedings to acquire the right to build a branch or spur track from its main line or tracks in the city of Winona, along Front street in that city, to secure access to mills and business houses requiring further railway facilities, and for the convenience of shippers doing business over its lines. The Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company had already secured a right of way along the same street; and the defendant had secured the permission of the city council to locate its tracks there, subject to certain conditions and regulations. This case and ten others, embracing similar questions, were tried together in the district court, and are all to be determined by this appeal. The plaintiffs are owners of lots abutting on Front street, and their damages for the appropriation of the street by the defendant railway company were separately assessed by the jury.

Upon the trial, counsel for the defendant objected to the competency of the witnesses Stellwagen and Fuhrman to testify upon the question of damages. We think there was sufficient foundation laid to support the preliminary decision of the court in favor of their competency. Both had lived in the city for many years. Their business was such as to give them an extensive acquaintance with property and its value in the city, and they so testified. They had bought and sold real estate therein, were actively engaged in business, were well acquainted with the real estate in question and the improvements thereon, and had examined and estimated its value. They had special knowledge on the subject which the jury might be supposed not to have, and we think there was no error on the part of the court in allowing them to give their testimony on the question of damages. Bristol Co. Savings Bank v. Keavy, 128 Mass. 298; Jarvis v. Furman, 25 Hun, 391. Where the value of property is in controversy, the opinions of persons acquainted with its value are admissible; but there is no inflexible rule of law defining how much a person must know about property before he can be admitted to give an opinion of its value. He must have some knowledge on the subject, sufficient to enable him to form an estimate of its value; and it is then for the court to determine the preliminary question of his competency, and if the evidence is received the jury will determine the weight and value of it, in view of all the circumstances. Bedell v. Long Island R. Co., 44 N. Y. 367; Lamoille Valley R. Co. v. Bixby, 57 Vt. 563; Mercer v. Vose, 67 N. Y. 56; Whitney v. City of Boston, 98 Mass. 312; Woodruff v. Imperial Fire Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. 138; Stevens v. City of Minneapolis, 42 Minn. 136, (43 N. W. Rep. 842;) Jarvis v. Furman, 25 Hun, 391; Lawson, Exp. Ev. 436.

Upon the cross-examination of the witness Stellwagen, he was examined at considerable length in respect to the relative amount of business, and the extent of territory tributary to the respective lines of railway owned and operated by the Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company and the defendant. Under the circumstances, we do not think it was substantial error, or prejudicial to the defendant's case, that the court set a limit to the examination, and sustained the objection of plaintiff to the question in which the witness was asked to name one state or territory in which the one company had not as much trackage for marketing flour and...