Pappas v. Hill-Staton Engineers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 May 1987
• Docket Number: HILL-STATON,No. 73831,73831
• Citation: 358 S.E.2d 625,183 Ga.App. 258
• Parties: PAPPAS et al. v.ENGINEERS, INC. et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 625

358 S.E.2d 625

183 Ga.App. 258

PAPPAS et al. v. HILL-STATON ENGINEERS, INC. et al.

No. 73831.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

May 28, 1987.

Rehearing Denied June 9, 1987.

Certiorari Denied Sept. 8, 1987.

James C. Carr, Jr., Gene Mac Winburn, John J. Barrow, Athens, for appellants.

Robert C. Martin, Jr., Ronald W. Self, Columbus, for appellees.

DEEN, Presiding Judge.

Appellants' son was killed while working in proximity to high-voltage lines owned and maintained by the Troup County Electric Membership Corporation (EMC), not a party to this appeal. The decedent was an employee of appellees Hill-Staton Engineers, Inc. (Hill-Staton), of which appellee Thomas J. Staton was owner and chief executive officer, and was engaged in the duties of his job when the fatal incident occurred. Appellants brought a wrongful death action against Staton, Hill-Staton, and the EMC, alleging negligence and violation of the Crane Act, OCGA § 46-3-30 et seq., against EMC and violation of the Crane Act against Hill-Staton and Staton. The latter two appellees moved for summary judgment on the basis that a cause of action under the Crane Act is barred by the "exclusive remedy" provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, OCGA § 34-9-11. The trial court granted the motion, and the parents, Pappas and Williams, appeal from this judgment, alleging that the trial court erred in holding that the Crane Act is superseded by allegedly conflicting provisions in the Workers' Compensation Act. OCGA § 34-9-1 et seq.

Portions of the Crane Act directly relevant to the issue on appeal are OCGA §§ 46-3-31; 46-3-32; 46-3-33; and 46-3-39. Section 31 of the Crane Act, OCGA § 46-3-30 et seq., provides: "No person or his agent shall require or permit any employee to perform any act prohibited by Code Section 46-3-32 unless and until danger from accidental contact with high-voltage lines has been effectively guarded against in the manner prescribed in Code Section 46-3-32." OCGA § 46-3-32 prescribes certain protective measures to be taken by the owner or operator of the line (here, EMC); OCGA § 46-3-33 mandates that "the person or persons responsible for the work to be done [here, Hill-Staton and Staton] shall promptly notify the owner or operator of the high-voltage lines of the work to be done and [the owner or operator] shall thereupon be responsible for the completion of the safety measures which are required by Code Section 46-3-32...." It is undisputed that neither Staton nor Hill-Staton provided the EMC with the notice required by OCGA § 46-3-33.

Appellees contend, however, that the Crane Act does not apply to any of the defendants because the Workers' Compensation Act bars "all other rights and remedies ..., at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service, or death...." OCGA § 34-9-11. See also Ga.L.1980, p. 1145, § 2; Ga.L.1974, p. 1143, § 1; Ga.L.1972, p. 929, § 1; Ga.L.1920, p. 167, § 12. On its face, then, the exclusive remedy provision is not confined to rights at common law but applies to all rights and remedies which might otherwise be available to the employee as against the employer. The parties to this action have stipulated and agreed that workers' compensation benefits were properly paid by the employer as a result of the death of appellants' son.

The Crane Act imposes certain safety standards not only upon employers of workers performing certain acts in proximity to hazardous high-voltage lines but also upon the owners and operators of those lines. This Act creates a theory of liability against owners and operators for violation of the duties imposed by the Act. Malvarez v. Ga. Power Co., 250 Ga. 568, 300 S.E.2d 145 (1983); Savannah Elec., etc., Co. v. Holton, 127 Ga.App. 447, 193 S.E.2d 866 (1972). Moreover, the Crane Act imposes criminal penalties upon any person who violates any provision of the Act. These functions and purposes of the Crane Act would be unaffected by a ruling that the Workers' Compensation Act bars any action pursuant to this statute against an employer for an injury which is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. Furthermore, the Crane Act may apply to those employers who are excluded from the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. In Savannah Elec., supra, this court declared, "an employer would be negligent per se vis-a-vis an employee if it violated a provision of the Act." Id. at 450, 193 S.E.2d 866. It should be noted that the Savannah Elec. case involved a claim against the owner of the power line and not against the injured employee's employer. Moreover, enforcement of the workers' compensation bar is not inconsistent with our pronouncement in that case. If negligence is shown, an employee may recover damages in tort from an employer not covered by the Workers' Compensation Act. However, the negligence of an employer covered by the Workers' Compensation Act is not actionable since, by statute, the sole remedy available to the injured employee is recovery of workers' compensation benefits.

A survey of other jurisdictions reveals the general rule to be that in the absence of specific statutory provisions making an exception to workers' compensation laws for injuries sustained by failure of the employer to comply with safety laws or regulations, such failure does not affect the rule as to exclusive remedy. 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 928. Generally, the exclusive remedy provision of the workers' compensation laws relieves the employer not only of common law liability but also of statutory liability under state and federal statutes. See, e.g., Crosby v. Regional Utility Bd., 400 So.2d 1024 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (where an action against an employer pursuant to the Florida Hazardous Occupations Act was held to be barred by the exclusive remedy provision of that state's Workers' Compensation Act); Ramos v. Broadway Maintenance Corp., 51 A.D.2d 911, 381 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1976) (where the employee's claim for damages due to the employer's alleged violation of the Labor Law was held to be barred by the New York Workers' Compensation Act); Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967) (where an action by the employee pursuant to the Alaska Defective Machinery Act was held to be barred by that state's Workers' Compensation Act).

In some jurisdictions, exceptions to this general rule are expressly provided by statute. For example, the workers' compensation law of Arizona...