Paradis v. Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist., Appellate Case No. 2016-001337

• Decision Date: 01 August 2018
• Docket Number: Appellate Case No. 2016-001337,Opinion No. 5583
• Citation: 424 S.C. 603,819 S.E.2d 147
• Parties: Leisel PARADIS, Appellant, v. CHARLESTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, James Island Charter High School, Robert Bohnstengel and Stephanie Spann, in their individual capacities, Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

424 S.C. 603

819 S.E.2d 147

Leisel PARADIS, Appellant,

v.CHARLESTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, James Island Charter High School, Robert Bohnstengel and Stephanie Spann, in their individual capacities, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001337

Opinion No. 5583

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard June 5, 2018

Filed August 1, 2018

Rehearing Denied October 18, 2018

J. Lewis Cromer and James Paul Porter, of Cromer Babb Porter & Hicks, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Bob J. Conley and Emmanuel Joseph Ferguson, of Cleveland & Conley, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondents Charleston County School District and Robert Bohnstengel.

Rene Stuhr Dukes, of Rosen Rosen & Hagood, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondents James Charter High School and Stephanie Spann.

LOCKEMY, C.J.:

In this civil case, Leisel Paradis appeals the circuit court's order granting Charleston County School District's, James Island Charter High School's, Robert Bohnstengel's, and Stephanie Spann's (collectively, Respondents) motions to dismiss her lawsuit asserting claims for defamation and civil conspiracy. We affirm.

FACTS

Paradis was employed as a teacher at James Island Charter High School (JICHS), which is located within the Charleston County School District. Bohnstengel was the principal at JICHS during part of the 2013-14 school year and Spann was the assistant principal at JICHS during the 2013-14 and 2014-15 school years.

At the close of the 2012-13 school year, Paradis received notice she would be placed on an evaluation protocol to correct deficiencies identified by school administrators. After two years of evaluations, Respondents determined Paradis did not correct the identified deficiencies and terminated her. Thereafter, Paradis filed this action alleging claims for defamation and civil conspiracy. Respondents moved to dismiss her complaint. The circuit court granted the motions. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), SCRCP, the trial court should consider only the allegations set forth on the face of the plaintiff's complaint." Plyler v. Burns , 373 S.C. 637, 645, 647 S.E.2d 188, 192 (2007). "A 12(b)(6)[, SCRCP] motion should not be granted if ‘facts alleged and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom would entitle the plaintiff to any relief on any theory of the case.’ " Id. (quoting Stiles v. Onorato , 318 S.C. 297, 300, 457 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1995) ). "The question is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief." Id.

DEFAMATION

"The tort of defamation permits a plaintiff to recover for injury to her reputation as the result of the defendant's communications to others of a false message about the plaintiff." McBride v. School Dist. of Greenville Cty. , 389 S.C. 546, 559, 698 S.E.2d 845, 852 (Ct. App. 2010). The plaintiff in a defamation action must prove "(1) a false and defamatory statement was made; (2) the unprivileged publication was made to a third party; (3) the publisher was at fault; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication." Id . at 559-60, 698 S.E.2d at 852 (quoting Fleming v. Rose , 350 S.C. 488, 494, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002) ). "The publication of a statement is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." Id . at 560, 698 S.E.2d at 852 (quoting Fleming , 350 S.C. at 494, 567 S.E.2d at 860 ).

"A statement is classified as defamatory per se when the meaning or message is obvious on its face, and defamatory per quod when the defamatory meaning is not clear unless the hearer knows facts or circumstances not contained in the statement." Id ."Even ‘[a] mere insinuation is actionable as a positive assertion if it is false and malicious and its meaning is plain.’ " Id . (quoting Murray v. Holnam, Inc. , 344 S.C. 129, 139, 542 S.E.2d 743, 748 (Ct. App. 2001) ). "However, when the statement is defamatory per quod, ‘the plaintiff must introduce extrinsic facts to prove the defamatory meaning.’ " Id . (quoting Erickson v. Jones St. Publishers, LLC , 368 S.C. 444, 465, 629 S.E.2d 653, 664 (2006) ).

"Additionally, a statement may be actionable per se or not actionable per se ." Id. "The determination of whether or not a statement is actionable per se is a matter of law for the court to resolve." Id. (quoting Erickson , 368 S.C. at 465, 629 S.E.2d at 664 ). "When the statement is classified as actionable per se , the defendant is presumed to have acted with common law malice, and the plaintiff is presumed to have suffered general damages." Id. "When the statement is not actionable per se , ‘the plaintiff must plead and prove both common law malice and special damages.’ " Id. (quoting Erickson , 368 S.C. at 465, 629 S.E.2d at 664 ). "Common law malice means the defendant acted with ill will toward the plaintiff, or acted recklessly or wantonly, i.e., with conscious indifference of the plaintiff's rights." Id. (quoting Erickson , 368 S.C. at 466, 629 S.E.2d at 665 ). "Slander is actionable per se when the defendant's alleged defamatory statements charge the plaintiff with one of five types of acts or characteristics: (1) commission of a crime of moral turpitude; (2) contraction of a loathsome disease; (3) adultery; (4) unchastity; or (5) unfitness in one's business or profession." Id . at 560-61, 698 S.E.2d at 852 (quoting Goodwin v. Kennedy , 347 S.C. 30, 36, 552 S.E.2d 319, 322-23 (Ct. App. 2001) ).

The circuit court granted Respondents' motions for a directed verdict, finding Paradis's defamation claim was barred by sovereign immunity. The circuit court found the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA) did not waive Respondents' sovereign immunity for performing their statutory duty to assess each teacher's competence. The circuit court also found Paradis's claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to defamation. Finally, the circuit court found Paradis failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for defamation.

"The Tort Claims Act governs all tort claims against governmental entities and is the exclusive civil remedy available in an action against a governmental entity or its employees." Proctor v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Ctrl. , 368 S.C. 279, 290, 628 S.E.2d 496, 502 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Parker v. Spartanburg Sanitary Sewer Dist. , 362 S.C. 276, 280, 607 S.E.2d 711, 714 (Ct. App. 2005) ). "The State, an agency, a political subdivision, and a governmental entity are liable for their torts in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, subject to the limitations upon liability and damages, and exemptions from liability and damages, contained" within the SCTCA. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-40 (2005). However, the General Assembly did not intend to waive all its sovereign immunity. "The General Assembly in this chapter intends to grant the State, its political subdivisions, and employees, while acting within the scope of official duty, immunity from liability and suit for any tort except as waived by this chapter." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(b) (2005). Specifically, the SCTCA provides a "governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from: ... the exercise of discretion or judgment by the governmental entity or employee." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(5) (2005).

We find the circuit court properly dismissed Paradis's defamation claim against Respondents because the actions Paradis alleges were defamatory were discretionary acts by governmental employees. Paradis's complaint alleges she was assaulted by a student in her classroom and told Bohnstengel she planned to file a police report documenting the incident. Paradis claimed Bohnstengel became angry with her and discouraged her from filing a report, as it would harm the school's reputation. Subsequently, Spann recommended Paradis be placed on the SAFE-T/ADEPT evaluation for the 2013-2014 school year based on the number of disciplinary referrals she made. Paradis claimed she was shocked because she had recently passed a separate goals based evaluation.

Spann and another administrator, Maureen Jessup¹ , evaluated Paradis during the 2013-14 school year. Based on their observations, the administrators decided Paradis failed her evaluation. In order to continue working, Paradis was required to undergo the same evaluation during the 2014-15 school year. Spann, Richard Gordon, the new principal at JICHS, and Susan Watson-Bell served as Paradis's evaluators. Paradis claimed the evaluation team periodically changed her requirements and she subsequently failed another evaluation. Paradis was then terminated.²

Paradis's complaint states she "was slandered by oral and written statements as well as by actions of the Defendant District and Defendant JICHS." She further claimed, "These statements and actions, including false accusations that Plaintiff could not effectively teach her students and manage her classroom, injured Plaintiff in her trade business and profession." Furthermore, "By virtue of placing and holding Plaintiff on the evaluation process for two years—which was widely known at JICHS—Plaintiff's credibility as a teacher was diminished greatly."

During the motion hearing Paradis attempted to provide context for her claims. Paradis told the circuit court "there are several things that were defamatory in this case, not only the evaluation itself, but also the act of termination due to the results of the evaluation." Paradis claimed she never should have been placed on the evaluation plan as she passed the previous goals based evaluation.

In essence, Paradis asserts the act of improperly placing her on the SAFE-T/ADEPT evaluation was itself defamation, without requiring any other actions by school employees. Paradis does not indicate any of...