Pardo v. State

• Decision Date: 26 April 2017
• Docket Number: No. 68, 2016,68, 2016
• Citation: 160 A.3d 1136
• Parties: Gabriel F. PARDO, Defendant Below–Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below–Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

160 A.3d 1136

Gabriel F. PARDO, Defendant Below–Appellant,

v.STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below–Appellee.

No. 68, 2016

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: February 22, 2017

Decided: April 26, 2017

Julianne E. Murray, Esquire (argued ), MurrayPhillips, P.A., Georgetown, Delaware for Appellant.

Sean P. Lugg, Esquire, and Andrew J. Vella, Esquire (argued ), Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for Appellee.

Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices.

VALIHURA, Justice:

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 2, 2015, Appellant Gabriel F. Pardo ("Pardo") was convicted of Manslaughter, Leaving the Scene of a Collision Resulting in Death ("LSCRD"), Reckless Driving, and six counts of Endangering the Welfare of a Child. The charges arose from his involvement in a fatal hit-and-run collision with a bicyclist, Phillip Bishop ("Bishop"), on September 12, 2014 at approximately 8:30 p.m. on Brackenville Road in Hockessin. The principal issue raised in this appeal is whether Pardo's conviction for LSCRD violated his Due Process rights, as he contends that the LSCRD statute imposes strict liability. Pardo also contends that the Superior Court erred by adding a voluntary intoxication instruction to the pattern jury instruction for manslaughter, by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, and by denying his request for a missing evidence instruction.

We conclude that the statute governing LSCRD, 21 Del. C. § 4202, does not impose strict liability because it requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had knowledge that he or she was involved in a collision. Because we find Pardo's other arguments without merit, we AFFIRM his conviction and sentence.

II. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pardo received a three-year sentence for his conviction for LSCRD under 21 Del. C. § 4202 (" Section 4202"). Section 4202 provides, in relevant part:

(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in a[ ] collision resulting in injury or death to any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such collision. Said stop should be made as close to the scene of the collision as possible without obstructing traffic more than necessary. The driver shall give the driver's name, address and the registration number of the driver's vehicle and exhibit a driver's license or other documentation of driving privileges to the person struck or the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with and shall render to any person injured in such collision reasonable assistance, including the carrying of such person to a hospital or physician or surgeon for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or is requested by the injured person, or by contacting appropriate law-enforcement or emergency personnel and awaiting their arrival.

(b) Whoever violates subsection (a) of this section when that person has been involved in a collision resulting in injury to any person shall be guilty of an unclassified misdemeanor, be fined not less than $1,000 nor more than $3,000 or imprisoned not less than 1 year nor more than 2 years.

(c) Whoever violates subsection (a) of this section when that person has been involved in a collision resulting in death to any person shall be guilty of a class E felony. The provisions of § 4206(a) or § 4217 of Title 11 or any other statute to the contrary notwithstanding, the sentence for such offense shall include a period of incarceration of not less than 1 year and the first 6 months of any sentence imposed shall not be suspended.¹

Pardo argued to the trial court that Section 4202 unconstitutionally imposes a felony conviction and a minimum mandatory period of imprisonment without requiring the State to prove the defendant's mental culpability. The Superior Court disagreed, concluding that Section 4202 constitutionally imposes strict liability.² The Superior Court held, in the alternative, that the statute is constitutional as applied to Pardo, reasoning that Pardo "knew he was in a collision" and "knowingly and intentionally left the scene of the collision without first determining whether anyone was injured or killed."³

On appeal, Pardo contends that Section 4202, as a strict liability statute, is unconstitutional under a test set forth in Morissette v. United States because conviction results in a relatively large penalty and "gravely besmirche [s]" one's reputation.⁴ We observe at the outset that this Court has not addressed the constitutionality of Section 4202 directly, and the issue of the mental state required, if any, is one of first impression.

Both Pardo and the State suggest that our analysis in Hoover v. State ,⁵ which involved another provision of the Motor Vehicle Code, should guide our resolution of the issues involving the mental state required in Section 4202. In Hoover , we considered two certified questions of law, namely, (1) whether the "general liability provisions" of 11 Del. C. § 251(b) applied to 21 Del. C. § 4176A, which penalizes the operation of a motor vehicle causing death (" Section 4176A"), and (2) whether Section 4176A was unconstitutionally vague. Section 4176A provided in part:

(a) A person is guilty of operation of a vehicle causing death when, in the course of driving or operating a motor vehicle or OHV in violation of any provision of this chapter other than § 4177 of this title, the person's driving or operation of the vehicle or OHV causes the death of another person.⁶

This Court found that the plain language of Section 4176A reflected the General Assembly's unambiguous intention not to provide a requisite mental state for committing that offense. We observed that Section 4176A is an unclassified misdemeanor in the motor vehicle code and simply requires an underlying violation of the motor vehicle code. We concluded that the General Assembly's intent was to create an offense premised on a lower level of culpability than that required for vehicular homicide (requiring criminally negligent driving or operation of a motor vehicle), criminally negligent homicide (requiring criminal negligence), and manslaughter (requiring recklessness).⁷ Applying Section 251(b) would have defeated the legislative purpose of establishing a lower level of culpability. Accordingly, in applying 11 Del. C. § 251(c) (concerning strict liability offenses), we concluded that "the General Assembly's intent to impose strict liability for deaths proximately caused by a moving violation of the Motor Vehicle Code ‘plainly appears' in both the unambiguous language of the statute and its legislative history."⁸

In considering the second certified question as to whether Section 4176A was unconstitutionally vague for failing to specify the state of mind required to find an actor guilty, citing Morissette ,⁹ we held that, because Section 4176A"is part of the state's motor vehicle code, it falls within the class of statutes that relate to the public safety and welfare and need not require a specific state of mind."¹⁰ However, because the question was not before us, we expressly did not address whether the penalty provisions of Section 4176A (an unclassified misdemeanor) were unconstitutionally excessive as a strict liability offense.¹¹ Pardo now contends on appeal that, like Section 4176A, Section 4202 is a strict liability statute, but that this Court has not yet addressed the constitutionality of a strict liability crime that results in a felony conviction with minimum mandatory imprisonment.¹²

In response, the State argues that Section 4202 is not a strict liability statute because it applies only where a defendant has knowledge that a collision occurred. At oral argument, Pardo argued that if the State is correct that Section 4202 does require knowledge, then, in addition to proving that the defendant knew that a collision occurred, the State must also prove the defendant's knowledge that the collision resulted in personal injury or death.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Scope and Standard of Review

"Subject to State and Federal Constitutional limitations, ‘the creation and definition of crimes under Delaware law is a matter for legislative enactment either through the Criminal Code or by another law.’ "¹³ "We review claims challenging the constitutionality of a statute de novo [.]"¹⁴ When exercising this review, "there is a strong presumption that a legislative enactment is constitutional."¹⁵ Accordingly, "[w]e resolve all doubts in favor of the challenged legislative act."¹⁶ In addition, "we review legal rulings, including the interpretation of statutes, de novo ."¹⁷ "Where a statute contains unambiguous language that clearly reflects the intent of the legislature, then the language of the statute controls."¹⁸ We "read each [relevant] section [of the statute] in light of all of the others to produce a harmonious whole.' "¹⁹

B. Section 4202 Does Not Impose Strict Liability

We affirm the Superior Court's conviction and sentence on its alternate ground that Section 4202 is not a strict liability statute. In this case, the absence of express language specifying a mental state, such as knowledge, does not mandate a conclusion that none is required and that the offense is a strict liability offense.²⁰ Rather, determining the mental state required requires construction of the statute and inference of the General Assembly's intent.²¹ The plain language of the relevant statutory provisions is our starting point.

In determining whether the General Assembly intended to impose strict liability for LSCRD, we look first to Section 251 of Title 11, which addresses the proof of state of mind required unless otherwise provided, as well as strict liability. Section 251 provides:

(a) No person may be found guilty of a criminal offense without proof that the person had the state of mind required by the law defining the offense or by subsection (b) of this section.

(b) When the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of an offense is not prescribed by law, that element is established if a

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