Parish v. State
Decision Date | 23 April 1993 |
Docket Number | CR-90-1285 |
Citation | 660 So.2d 227 |
Parties | Kelvin Loyce PARISH v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Thomas Brantley of Parkman & Brantley, Dothan, for appellant.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Gilda Branch Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
ON SECOND APPLICATION FOR REHEARING
On September 30, 1992, this court withdrew its opinion of December 27, 1991, and substituted another therefor. This court now withdraws its opinion of September 30, 1992, and substitutes the following therefor:
The appellant, Kelvin Loyce Parish, pleaded guilty to unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of § 13A-12-211, Code of Alabama 1975, and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, that sentence including 5 years' enhancement pursuant to § 13A-12-250, 1 because the offense occurred within three miles of a school. He raises three issues on appeal.
We must reverse the trial court's judgment because the trial court failed to correctly inform the appellant of the minimum and maximum possible sentences.
The relevant portion of the plea colloquy reads as follows:
The appellant was indicted for unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, a Class B felony, which has a sentence range of imprisonment for a minimum of 2 years and a maximum of 20 years. See §§ 13A-12-211 and 13A-5-6(a)(2). Because the sale occurred within three miles of a school, the appellant's sentence must be enhanced by an additional five years' imprisonment. See § 13A-12-250. Therefore, the correct sentence range of which the appellant should have been advised was a minimum of 7 years' and a maximum of 25 years' imprisonment, and not a minimum of 5 years' and a maximum of 20 years' imprisonment as he was advised. See Dixon v. State, 572 So.2d 512, 513 (Ala.Cr.App.1990) ( ). 2
On original submission, we applied Willis v. State, 500 So.2d 1324 (Ala.Cr.App.1986), and held that our review of this argument was procedurally barred because the appellant failed to object on this ground at the guilty plea proceeding, in a motion for a new trial, or in a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Johnson v. State, 480 So.2d 14 (Ala.Cr.App.1985). See also A.R.Cr.P. 14.4(e) ( ). The rationale of Willis can be summarized as follows: "It is for the trial court, which accepted the plea, to consider and correct, in the first instance, any error which may have been committed or any deficiency in the proceedings," 500 So.2d at 1324. For a discussion of this rationale, see id. at 1324-25.
This court has frequently cited both Willis and pre-Willis cases as authority for refusing to review an issue contesting the validity of a guilty plea where that issue was not presented to the trial court. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 605 So.2d 1252 (Ala.Cr.App.1992) ( ); Moon v. State, 580 So.2d 87 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 580 So.2d 87 (Ala.1991) ( ); Ford v. State, 573 So.2d 797, 798 (Ala.Cr.App.1990) (); Bennefield v. State, 552 So.2d 188 (Ala.Cr.App.1989) ( ); Bowen v. State, 536 So.2d 168 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 536 So.2d 168 (Ala.1988) ( ); Phillips v. State, 518 So.2d 833 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), cert. denied, 518 So.2d 833 (Ala.1988) ( ); Benefield v. State, 513 So.2d 107 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) ( ); Johnson v. State (issues regarding correct knowledge of sentence range and of critical elements of charges not properly preserved); and McCoy v. State, 392 So.2d 1287 (Ala.Cr.App.1981) ( ). See also Looney v. State, 563 So.2d 3 (Ala.Cr.App.1989), cert. denied, 563 So.2d 3 (Ala.1990) ( ).
However, the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Rivers, 597 So.2d 1308 (Ala.1991), in effect, announced a different rule regarding preservation of the issue of whether the appellant had been properly advised of the applicable sentence range before pleading guilty. In that case, the appellant, contesting the validity of his guilty pleas in an A.R.Cr.P.Temp. 20 petition, alleged, in part, that "he [had not been] properly informed of the maximum and minimum sentences so as to allow his plea to be knowingly and voluntarily given," id. at 1309. 3 In an unpublished memorandum, we had held that our review of this issue was procedurally barred. 586 So.2d 307. After reiterating that "a defendant must be informed of the maximum and minimum possible sentences as an absolute constitutional prerequisite to the acceptance of a guilty plea," 597 So.2d at 1309, the Rivers court characterized the remaining issue as follows: "The State contends, and the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed, that Rivers failed to preserve the issue of ... the illegality of his sentencing for appeal by failing to raise it at trial," id. at 1310 (emphasis added). The court, in disagreeing with our holding, relied on the following language in Ex parte Brannon, 547 So.2d 68, 68 (Ala.1989) 4:
Finding that the issue was not precluded, the court remanded the case with the instruction that Rivers's convictions be reversed, holding that "[b]ecause Rivers was not informed of the minimum possible sentence in his cases, prior to his plea of guilty, his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given," 597 So.2d at 1310.
Apparently, the Rivers court considered that the trial court's failure to correctly advise Rivers of the minimum possible sentences resulted in the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. 5 This appears to be a departure from case law. As far as we are aware, a lack of information or misinformation about the sentencing consequences of pleading guilty has always been treated in the context of the voluntariness of the plea--not in the context of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83, 84, 277 So.2d 896, 897 (1973) (1969) ppellant argues that he was not advised on the record what the minimum and maximum punishments for his offense would be") .
We note that in situations similar to the one before us--where, in the trial court's colloquy with the defendant and in the explanation of rights form, the appellant was given sentencing misinformation--we have not automatically ordered that the judgment of conviction based upon the appellant's guilty plea be reversed, as the Rivers court instructed, rather, we have remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.
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