Park City Hosp. v. Commission on Hospitals and Health Care, 13439

• Decision Date: 18 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13439,13439
• Citation: 556 A.2d 602,210 Conn. 697
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: PARK CITY HOSPITAL v. COMMISSION ON HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE, et al.

Page 602

556 A.2d 602

210 Conn. 697

PARK CITY HOSPITAL v. COMMISSION ON HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE, et al.

No. 13439.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 12, 1989.

Decided April 18, 1989.

Sigmund L. Miller, with whom was George P. D'Amico, Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff).

Paul J. Lahey, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Clarine Nardi Riddle, Acting Atty. Gen., Joseph I. Lieberman, former Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Walsh and Richard J. Lynch, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee (named defendant).

Arnold Sbarge, West Hartford, with whom was Ellen Conway, Farmington, for the appellee (defendant Medical Management Corp.).

Before ARTHUR H. HEALEY, CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, JJ. COVELLO, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the commission on hospitals and health care (commission). Examination of the record discloses that on November 17, 1982, the defendant Medical Management Corporation (MMC) filed a request with the commission pursuant to General Statutes § 19-73m, ¹ to establish an ambulatory surgical center (Surgicenter) in Bridgeport. The commission conducted hearings on MMC's application on December 21, 22 and 23, 1982. On January 3, 1983, the commission issued its decision approving MMC's application for the Surgicenter. On January 31, 1983, the plaintiff, Park City Hospital, appealed this decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 19a-158 ² and § 4-183. ³ On March 14, 1985, the defendant commission filed its answer in which it denied that the plaintiff was aggrieved.

On August 7, 1985, the plaintiff applied to the trial court for an order to show cause why a stay of the commission's decision should not be granted during the pendency of this appeal. The plaintiff further sought an order restraining MMC from proceeding further with the Surgicenter while the appeal was pending. The trial court, Meadow, J., granted an ex parte order restraining further implementation of the MMC decision pending the outcome of the plaintiff's application for a stay and a restraining order. On August 9, 1985, the trial court rescinded the ex parte order. On August 12, 1985, the plaintiff filed an amended application for a stay and a restraining order making the further claim that its application to the court was made pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183(c). ⁴

On August 15, 1985, hearings commenced on the plaintiff's application for a stay. At that time, the trial court, Burns, J., declared that the proceedings would also embrace the jurisdictional issue of the plaintiff's aggrievement even though no motion to dismiss the appeal was in the file. The hearing was continued to August 27, 1985, and ultimately concluded on October 15, 1985, at which time the parties were given an opportunity to file briefs. On March 5, 1986, the plaintiff withdrew its application for a stay. On March 7, 1986, the trial court filed its memorandum of decision in which it concluded that the plaintiff had not established that it was aggrieved. Since aggrievement is a prerequisite for an appeal to the Superior Court, the trial court concluded that it was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and, therefore, dismissed the action. On the plaintiff's appeal, the Appellate Court (one judge dissenting) found no error in the trial court's proceedings. Park City Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 14 Conn.App. 413, 542 A.2d 326 (1988). We thereafter granted certification limited to the issue of whether the Appellate Court erred in affirming the trial court's dismissal suo motu of the plaintiff's appeal for lack of aggrievement as incident to the plaintiff's application for a stay of execution. We affirm the decision of the Appellate Court.

The plaintiff first argues that its application for a stay of execution and temporary restraining order was preliminary in nature and akin to a proceeding for a temporary injunction. As such, it was not necessary to take up the matter of aggrievement and ultimately to dismiss the appeal. We agree that it was not necessary at this stage in the proceedings to take up the matter of aggrievement but conclude that the court was not in error in doing so.

An application for a stay of execution of an order during the pendency of an appeal calls upon an exercise of the trial court's general equitable powers. "These considerations [in granting a stay] involve essentially the application of familiar equitable principles in the context of adjusting the rights of the parties during the pendency of litigation until a final determination on the merits. See Stocker v. Waterbury, 154 Conn. 446, 451, 226 A.2d 514 (1967); Sisters of St. Joseph Corporation v. Atlas Sand, Gravel & Stone Co., 120 Conn 168, 176-77, 180 A. 303 (1935)." Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 196 Conn. 451, 458, 493 A.2d 229 (1985). "Among the 'equities' to be placed on the scales, of course, are the general equitable considerations which are involved in the issuance of a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo pendente lite." Id., at 460, 493 A.2d 229.

While § 4-183(c) authorizes either the administrative agency or the reviewing court to grant a stay "upon appropriate terms," the Superior Court's exercise of its equitable powers in such instances is in fact much broader, being derived from General Statutes § 52-1. This latter provision authorizes the Superior Court to "administer legal and equitable rights and apply legal and equitable remedies in favor of either party in one and the same civil action [including administrative appeals] ⁵ so that legal and equitable rights of the parties may be enforced and protected in one action." The Superior Court's jurisdiction to act upon an application for a stay and a restraining order, being derived from its general equitable powers as enumerated in § 52-1, did not require the court to determine whether it was dealing with an aggrieved party as a predicate to exercising jurisdiction over the stay proceedings. This is not to say, however, that the court was in error in deciding the issue of aggrievement at this stage in the proceedings.

"Appeals to the courts from decisions of administrative officers exist only under statutory authority. Sheridan v. Planning Board, [159 Conn. 1, 10, 266 A.2d 396 (1969) ]; Bardes v. Zoning Board, 141 Conn. 317, 318, 106 A.2d 160 [1954]; Long v. Zoning Commission, 133 Conn. 248, 252, 50 A.2d 172 [1946]." Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 53, 347 A.2d 89 (1974). In this instance, the statutory authority is General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 4-183(a) which provides in relevant part: "A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review by way of appeal...." (Emphasis added.) We have stated that "[p]leading and proof of aggrievement [is] ... a prerequisite to the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the plaintiff's appeal. Fletcher v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 158 Conn. 497, 501, 264 A.2d 566 [1969]; Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 509, 242 A.2d 705 [1968]." (Emphasis added.) Beckish v. Manafort, 175 Conn. 415, 419, 399 A.2d 1274 (1978).

Ordinarily, a challenge to the court's jurisdiction is raised by the filing of a motion to dismiss. ⁶ However, "[w]henever a lack of jurisdiction to entertain a particular proceeding comes to a court's notice, the court can dismiss the proceeding upon its own motion. ⁷ Marcil v. A.H. Merriman & Sons, Inc., 115 Conn. 678, 682, 163 A. 411 [1932]; Palmer v. Reeves, 120 Conn. 405, 409, 182 A. 138 [1935]; McGee v. Dunnigan, 138 Conn. 263, 268, 83 A.2d 491 [1951]; see Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 662, 145 A.2d 832 [1958]." (Emphasis added.) Masone v. Zoning Board, 148 Conn. 551, 554, 172 A.2d 891 (1961). Thus, although a threshold determination of aggrievement was not necessary in order to take up the application for a stay of execution, the trial court was well within its authority to do so, inasmuch as such a determination impacted upon the court's ultimate jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The plaintiff further claims that it was not given adequate notice that the court was going to consider the matter of aggrievement thereby implicating constitutional questions of procedural due process. We do not agree that this was the case.

The trial court disclosed to the parties on August 15, 1985, that it was going to consider the matter of aggrievement and the court's possible lack of subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's appeal. ⁸ The plaintiff made no objection. Thereafter, the question of aggrievement was pursued not only on August 15, but also in subsequent court proceedings held on August 27 and October 15, 1985. The parties were given an opportunity following the hearings to file briefs on the issue.

In view of the trial court's more than adequate notice, and a full and meaningful opportunity thereafter to be heard on the merits of the aggrievement issue, we conclude that the plaintiff's due process claim is simply without merit. See Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Tucker, 196 Conn. 172, 176-77, 491 A.2d 1084, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920, 106 S.Ct. 250, 88 L.Ed.2d 258 (1985).

The decision of the Appellate Court is...