Parker v. Hospital Authority of City of Bainbridge and Decatur County

Decision Date12 July 1994
Docket NumberNo. A94A0525,A94A0525
Citation446 S.E.2d 766,214 Ga.App. 113
PartiesPARKER v. HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF BAINBRIDGE AND DECATUR COUNTY.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Gilbert J. Murrah, Bainbridge, for appellant.

Smith & Perry, Ralph C. Smith, Jr., Bainbridge, Alston & Bird, Theodore E.G. Pound, Atlanta, Alexander & Vann, William U. Norwood III, Thomasville, Tillman, McTier, Coleman, Talley, Newbern & Kurrie, Wade H. Coleman, Edward F. Preston, Valdosta, for appellee.

HAROLD R. BANKE, Senior Appellate Judge.

The appellant, Teresa Parker, commenced this medical malpractice action against the Hospital Authority of the City of Bainbridge and Decatur County d/b/a Memorial Hospital and Manor, Dr. James Higginbotham, Dr. John Lonas, and two nurses employed by the hospital, alleging negligent treatment of her son which resulted in his death due to an overdose of Dilantin. During trial in the matter, the court directed a verdict for the hospital authority, Dr. Higginbotham, and one of the nurses. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the remaining defendants, and this appeal followed.

On November 6, 1990, after suffering a seizure at school, the appellant's son was transported to the emergency room at Bainbridge Memorial Hospital, where he was first treated by Dr. Higginbotham. At Dr. Higginbotham's request, Dr. Lonas came to the emergency room and took charge of the child's treatment.

After Dr. Lonas initiated a regimen of Dilantin, the child went into cardiac arrest. CPR efforts revived him, but he never regained consciousness and died 12 days later. On the child's death certificate, the medical examiner indicated Dilantin overdose as the cause of death, but that conclusion was based on the medical history, and not the objective autopsy findings.

1. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to exclude for cause two potential jurors, one of whom was related to a member of the hospital board and one of whom indicated that he may have some difficulty hearing the testimony. We find no abuse of discretion.

"Relationship to an employee of a corporation does not in this State render a juror incompetent, as a matter of law, to serve on the trial of a case in which the corporation is a party." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wilson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 116 Ga.App. 193, 156 S.E.2d 463 (1967). See also Pheil v. Southern Bell Tel. etc. Co., 201 Ga.App. 846(1), 412 S.E.2d 609 (1991). Similarly, we conclude that one's relationship to a board member of an entity that is a party to an action does not, as a matter of law, disqualify him to serve as a juror in the case.

With regard to the juror who indicated that he had a hearing deficit, counsel for the appellant merely stated that he had "no objection to the court excusing him if the court desires to do that because of his inability to hear the evidence...." However, when the trial court observed that the juror apparently had understood all the questions during voir dire, counsel raised no objection. That failure to object to the juror's qualification waived any such objection. Blankenship v. State, 258 Ga. 43(2), 365 S.E.2d 265 (1988).

2. The appellant also contends that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for Dr. Higginbotham and the hospital authority.

It was uncontroverted that although Dr. Higginbotham was the first doctor to see the appellant's child, Dr. Lonas assumed control of the child's care and prescribed the Dilantin. After Dr. Lonas took charge of the case, Dr. Higginbotham only monitored the child's respiratory distress, and the appellant's own expert witness was unable to connect that treatment for respiratory distress to the child's death. The appellant having thus failed to establish that Dr. Higginbotham's limited treatment of the child proximately caused the child's death, the trial court properly directed a verdict for Dr. Higginbotham.

The only asserted basis for the hospital authority's liability was that of respondeat superior, with regard to the acts of the nurse who administered the Dilantin and the acts of Dr. Lonas, who had staff privileges at the hospital. "A hospital owes a duty of reasonable care to its patients and is liable for the injuries negligently inflicted upon its patients by the nurses and other employees of the hospital. [Cit.]" Hoffman v. Wells, 260 Ga. 588, 589(2), 397 S.E.2d 696 (1990). However, "[i]f a master lends his servants to another then the master is not responsible for any negligence of the servant committed within the scope of his employment by the other." Id.

In the instant case, the nurse administered the Dilantin and assisted with the care of the appellant's child at the express direction of Dr. Lonas. Under such circumstances, the nurse constituted a "borrowed servant" of Dr. Lonas, and the hospital authority would not be liable for those acts of the nurse involving professional skill and judgment that were done pursuant to Dr. Lonas's instructions. Swindell v. St. Joseph's Hosp., ...

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5 cases
  • Sheriff v. State, S03G0492.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • October 6, 2003
    ...332(6), 411 S.E.2d 511 (1991),4 Bentley v. B.M.W., Inc., 209 Ga.App. 526(4), 433 S.E.2d 719 (1993), and Parker v. Hosp. Auth. of Bainbridge &c., 214 Ga.App. 113(4), 446 S.E.2d 766 (1994),5 the appellate court ruled that the party with the middle argument was entitled to have only one attorn......
  • Brown v. StarMed Staffing, L.P.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 16, 1997
    ...judgment. Case No. A97A0659 2. Citing Hoffman v. Wells, 260 Ga. 588, 589, 397 S.E.2d 696, and Parker v. Hosp. Auth. of the City of Bainbridge, etc., 214 Ga.App. 113, 114(2), 446 S.E.2d 766, the hospital contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment based on the "......
  • Chybicki v. Coffee Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 27, 2021
    ...Accordingly, the hospital cannot be held liable for his conduct under a theory of respondeat superior, Parker v. Hosp. Auth. , 214 Ga. App. 113, 114 (2), 446 S.E.2d 766 (1994), overruled on other grounds, Sheriff v. State , 277 Ga. 182, 188 (2), 587 S.E.2d 27 (2003), and the trial court did......
  • Chybicki v. Coffee Reg'l Med. Ctr.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 27, 2021
    ... ... ("the ... hospital") and Myra Belk, R. N. (collectively ... respondeat superior, Parker v. Hosp. Auth. , 214 ... Ga.App. 113, 114 ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Local Government Law - R. Perry Sentell, Jr.
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 47-1, September 1995
    • Invalid date
    ...the burden of proof under the benefit-extraction test. Id. at 768 n.5, 450 S.e.2d at 204 n.5. 181. Id. at 768, 450 S.e.2d at 204. 182. 214 Ga. App. 113, 446 S.e.2d 766 (1994). 183. Id. at 113, 446 S.e.2d at 767. Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in refusing to exclude for cause a pot......

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