Parker v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 October 1930
• Docket Number: 13010.
• Parties: PARKER v. JEFFERSON STANDARD LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

155 S.E. 617

158 S.C. 394

PARKER v. JEFFERSON STANDARD LIFE INS. CO.

No. 13010.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 25, 1930

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Greenville County; W. H Townsend, Judge.

Action by John Williams Parker against the Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Wilton H. Earle, of Greenville, for appellant.

Haynsworth & Haynsworth, of Greenville, for respondent.

SMITH A. A. J.

On the 16th day of October, 1916, the respondent issued a policy of insurance upon the life of appellant in the sum of $5,000 payable immediately upon due proof of the death of the insured, with total and permanent disability clauses as follows "Upon receipt of due proof of the total and permanent blindness or deafness of the insured *** or that he has become wholly disabled by bodily injuries, loss of reason or disease, and will be permanently, continuously and wholly prevented thereby from pursuing any and all gainful occupations *** the Company, by endorsement in writing on this contract will, at the option of the insured, either (a) agree to pay for the insured the premiums which shall thereafter become payable during the continuance of such disability *** or (b) The Company will grant an endowment for the face value of the policy, under which no premiums will be required, payable in ten equal annual installments, the first installment to be paid immediately upon receipt of due proof of any such disability or incapacity."

It is not denied that on the 14th day of November, 1924, the appellant, as evidenced by a notation on the policy, secured a loan thereon in the sum of $560, which was outstanding at the time of the trial, with interest paid to date; that on the 20th day of January, 1927, appellant became totally disabled within the contemplation of the disability clause of the policy; that not until the 2d day of April, 1929, was any "due proof" of any such disability or incapacity presented to the company as expressly required by the plain terms of the policy; that annual premiums on said policy were voluntarily paid in full for the years 1927 and 1928 without any notice or demand at those times for the intervening disability, or any act of declaration on the part of the insured indicating an intention to offer "due proof" thereof, or in any way to claim the same. Nor does anything whatever appear in the record upon which any claim of waiver could be even remotely predicated, and such doctrine is not invoked in this case in support of the action.

The contention of the appellant is that, upon filing his claim in April, 1929, he is entitled to the accumulated annual installments of $500 each for the years 1927, 1928, and 1929 under the endowment granted for the face value of the policy payable in ten equal annual installments and a refund of the premiums paid during the years 1927 and 1928, with interest thereon from the date of demand.

Such claim having been denied by respondent, the appellant commenced this action to recover the same on the 1st day of January, 1929. The respondent admitted the execution and delivery of the policy, and relied on the foregoing disability clause as a defense to the action. At the conclusion of the evidence, both parties submitted to the court, the Hon. W. H. Townsend presiding, motions for directed verdicts.

The contention of the respondent was that, while admitting that the evidence showed a total and permanent disability for the three-year period within the contemplation of the provisions and conditions of the policy, yet, under the disability clause relied on, the first installment of $500 was only "to be paid immediately upon receipt of due proof" of the disability or incapacity; that it was admitted that such proof was not submitted until the 2d day of April, 1929; that under the express provisions of the policy the appellant could not recover more than the first installment of $500, which was offset by his indebtedness to the company, as set up in an amended answer; and that the appellant was not entitled to any refund of premiums.

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