Parker v. Stage

• Decision Date: 21 November 1977
• Citation: 43 N.Y.2d 128,371 N.E.2d 513,400 N.Y.S.2d 794
• Parties: , 371 N.E.2d 513, 98 A.L.R.3d 328 In the Matter of Angelie C. PARKER, Appellant, v. Harold STAGE, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 794

400 N.Y.S.2d 794

43 N.Y.2d 128, 371 N.E.2d 513, 98

A.L.R.3d 328

In the Matter of Angelie C. PARKER, Appellant, v. Harold STAGE, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 21, 1977.

John D. Bright, Goshen, for appellant.

Luke M. Charde, Jr., Florida, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WACHTLER, Judge.

The question on this appeal is whether the Department of Social Services can compel a father to pay for the support of his 18-year-old daughter after she has left his house, voluntarily and against his wishes, to live with her paramour and have a child. Both the Family Court and the Appellate Division held that, under the circumstances, the father should not be obligated to support his daughter even though she is receiving public assistance. The Commissioner of Social Services has appealed to this court by leave of the Appellate Division.

The facts developed at the Family Court hearing were not disputed. Respondent's daughter was born in September of 1956. Several years later the father and mother were divorced. After the divorce the girl remained in her father's custody. In early 1974 she informed her cousin that she intended to leave home to live with her paramour and have a child. Although neither she nor her boyfriend were employed, she said that she intended to support herself and her child by seeking public assistance. She did not return to school in the fall of 1974. In October, shortly after her 18th birthday, she left home while her father was at work. Nearly two weeks later he was able to locate her with the assistance of the police.

She returned home and for several months resided with her father, but only intermittently. For long periods of time she would "disappear". On each occasion her father accepted her back and continued to support her. He contacted her former guidance counselor and arranged for her to return to school. He informed her of this and continuously urged her to resume her schooling but she refused. She also refused to discuss her goals with him. At one point he helped her to obtain a job, but she quit after four weeks. For a time she was in a job training program but she quit that as well. Finally in the spring of 1975 she took up permanent residence with her paramour who was also unemployed.

In the fall of 1975 respondent's daughter gave birth to a child out of wedlock. She then applied for aid to dependent children and obtained public assistance for her child and for herself, as the mother of an eligible child (Social Services Law, § 349). In February, 1976 the Commissioner of Social Services of Orange County commenced this proceeding in the Family Court to compel the respondent to contribute toward his daughter's support. ^* The proceeding was brought pursuant to subdivision 3 of section 101-a of the Social Services Law which authorizes a social services official to institute a support proceeding against a parent or other responsible relative if the applicant or recipient of public assistance "fails" to do so.

At the conclusion of the hearing the Family Court Judge dismissed the petition on the ground that respondent's daughte by leaving home to live with her paramour and have his child, had "emancipated herself from her father and his household * * * and * * * as a result of that emancipation, the respondent is relieved of any obligation to support" her.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. They noted that in Matter of Roe v. Doe (29 N.Y.2d 188, 192, 194, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71, 74, 75, 272 N.E.2d 567, 569, 570), we held that when a child of employable age "and in full possession of her faculties, voluntarily and without cause, abandons the parent's home, against the will of the parent and for the purpose of avoiding parental control she forfeits her right to demand support * * * (S)he cannot enlist the aid of the court in frustrating that authority, reasonably exercised, by requiring that her father accede to her demands and underwrite her chosen life style." "Similarly", the Appellate Division held, "the child should not be able to enlist the aid of the Department of Social Services to frustrate reasonably exercised parental authority" (55 A.D.2d 662, 663, 389 N.Y.S.2d 23, 24).

On appeal to our court the commissioner admits that respondent's daughter "willfully abandoned her home with her father" and thus would be unable to compel him to support her if she had brought the suit on her own behalf (Matter of Roe v. Doe, supra ). The commissioner argues however that when the suit is brought by a social welfare official pursuant to section 101 of the Social Services Law the duty to support "is absolute upon a showing of sufficient ability on the part of the parent. There is no other qualification or exception in the statute."

Initially it should be noted that even in a case like Matter of Roe v. Doe (supra), when the suit is brought directly on the child's behalf pursuant to section 413 of the Family Court Act, the father's obligation to support is stated in mandatory terms. Our determination in that case, that a child who voluntarily and without good cause abandons the parent's home " forfeits her right to demand support" is not based on any express statutory exception. It rests on the State policy of fostering "the integrity of the family" by precluding the courts from interfering in the special relationship between parent and child, absent "a showing of misconduct, neglect or abuse" (Matter of Roe v. Doe, supra, 29 N.Y.2d pp. 191, 194, 324 N.Y.S.2d pp. 73, 75, 272 N.E.2d pp. 568, 570). It recognizes that the father's obligation to support includes the right to exercise parental control and guidance even though the child may be old enough "to elect not to comply" (Matter of Roe v. Doe, supra, p. 194, 324 N.Y.S.2d p. 75, 272 N.E.2d p. 570).

The question then is whether a different policy applies when the suit is brought by a public welfare official to compel a father to support a child who would otherwise become a public charge.

It was once the policy of this State to place the financial burden of supporting needy individuals upon designated relatives, rather than the public, in order to reduce the amount of welfare expenditures (see, e. g., Foster, Freed & Midonick, Child Support: The Quick and the Dead, 26 Syracuse L.Rev. 1157, 1162). Thus the common-law obligation to support wife and minor children was expanded by sta...