Parker v. State

Decision Date25 May 2012
Docket NumberNo. SC08–1385.,SC08–1385.
Citation89 So.3d 844
PartiesJ.B. PARKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Baya Harrison, III, Monticello, FL, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Lisa–Marie Lerner, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

J.B. Parker was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1982 murder of Frances Slater. This Court affirmed Parker's convictions and sentence of death on direct appeal. Parker v. State (Parker I), 476 So.2d 134, 140 (Fla.1985). In 1998, Parker was granted a new penalty phase due to the State's suppression of exculpatory evidence that suggested a codefendant, and not Parker, shot the victim. State v. Parker (Parker V), 721 So.2d 1147, 1147, 1149–50 (Fla.1998). After the new penalty-phase proceeding, Parker was again sentenced to death, and this Court affirmed his sentence on direct appeal. Parker v. State (Parker VI), 873 So.2d 270, 275 (Fla.2004). In the current proceeding, Parker filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, raising issues concerning the new penalty phase. The postconviction court denied Parker's motion, and Parker has appealed that denial to this Court. Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence of death, this Court has jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Parker raises claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the penalty phase, that the State withheld favorable information, that the State made a false statement during trial, and that the postconviction court erred during the evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion. We conclude that Parker's counsel was deficient for stipulating to the admissibility of a statement Parker made to law enforcement on May 7, 1982. We also conclude that the State withheld favorable information, specifically the complete terms of a cooperation agreement with codefendant Terry Johnson. However, because Parker has failed to demonstrate prejudice on these claims and his remaining claims are without merit, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

J.B. Parker is one of four defendants convicted of the murder of eighteen-year-old Francis Slater and is one of the three defendants sentenced to death for the murder. Parker's case has had a long procedural history. A brief summary of the facts as presented at Parker's first trial are set forth in Parker V, 721 So.2d at 1148, as follows:

Parker was convicted of kidnaping, robbery with a firearm, and first-degree murder. Briefly, the testimony at trial reflected the following. In 1982, Parker and three other defendants, John Earl Bush, Alphonso Cave, and Terry Wayne Johnson, robbed a convenience store. Money was taken from the store and the female store clerk (the victim) was also taken from the store and placed in Bush's car. The victim was later found dead; she had been shot and stabbed. Death was caused by a gunshot wound to the back of the head. Bush's girlfriend [Georgeann Williams] testified that Parker had admitted to her that he shot the victim and that Bush had stabbed her. The girlfriend's mother and sister testified that she told them of Parker's confession. Parker's pre-trial statements to police regarding the crime were also introduced and Parker also testified at trial. In those statements, he implicated himself in the crimes but denied being the shooter.

After the trial, Parker was sentenced to death, following an eight-to-four jury recommendation of death. Parker I, 476 So.2d at 136. This Court affirmed Parker's convictions and sentence on direct appeal. Id. at 140.

Two of Parker's codefendants, John Bush and Alphonso Cave, were convicted of first-degree murder in separate trials and sentenced to death. Bush v. State, 461 So.2d 936 (Fla.1984); Cave v. State, 727 So.2d 227, 228 (Fla.1998). The other participant, Terry Johnson, was convicted of kidnapping and felony murder and sentenced to life in prison. Johnson v. State, 484 So.2d 1347 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Bush was executed in 1996. Cave remains on death row.

Parker's first motion for postconviction relief was denied, and the denial was affirmed by this Court. Parker v. State (Parker II), 542 So.2d 356 (Fla.1989). This Court also denied Parker's habeas corpus petition. Parker v. Dugger (Parker III), 550 So.2d 459 (Fla.1989). Parker's federal habeas corpus petition was also denied. Parker v. Singletary (Parker IV), 974 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir.1992).

The Newly Discovered Evidence Leading to a New Penalty–Phase Proceeding

After discovering evidence that had been withheld by the State, Parker filed a successive motion for postconviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence and a Brady1 violation. Parker V, 721 So.2d at 1149. The circuit court found that the State had withheld evidence favorable to Parker, which indicated that codefendant Bush stabbed the victim and that codefendant Cave shot her.

This favorable information stemmed from a resentencing proceeding involving codefendant Cave. In that proceeding, the State introduced testimony from Michael Bryant, who testified that he shared a cell with Cave and overheard a conversation between Bush and Cave suggesting that Bush stabbed the victim and that Cave shot her. Id. at 1149. Later, Cave told Bryant that if he told anyone, he would see that Bryant was “taken care of.” Cave also beat Bryant, sending him to the hospital. Id. Bryant reported the assault to Lieutenant Art Jackson and told him of the conversation that he had overheard. Jackson also testified at Cave's resentencing and corroborated Bryant's testimony. See id. None of this information had been disclosed to Parker. Id. at 1149.

After an evidentiary hearing in Parker's case, the trial court determined that a new penalty-phase proceeding was warranted but that a new guilt-phase proceeding was not. Id. This Court agreed. Id. at 1147. In upholding the trial court's grant of a new penalty phase, this Court reasoned:

This evidence would have assisted in impeaching the testimony of Bush's girlfriend, which was the sole evidence to show that Parker was the shooter. Further, Parker would have been able to use this evidence to show that the State introduced this evidence in Cave's resentencing to prove that Cave, rather than Parker, was the shooter. Under these circumstances, we must agree with the trial judge's conclusion that confidence in the jury's recommendation of death has been undermined, especially given that the jury recommendation for death in Parker's case was eight-to-four and that codefendant Johnson, who was not identified as the shooter by the State, received a life sentence even though he participated in the crime.

Id. at 1151 (emphasis added).

The New Penalty–Phase Proceeding

At Parker's new penalty-phase proceeding, the following evidence was introduced by the State, which relied primarily on the testimony of codefendant Johnson and a statement made by Parker to Detective David Powers on May 7, 1982:

[T]he State presented witnesses to establish the facts of the original crime and Parker's culpability, including codefendant Johnson, who recounted the events leading to Slater's murder.

Johnson testified that the first time the defendants went to the convenience store, all four went in to buy potato chips and that when they returned to the store later that evening, Parker went into the store with Cave and Bush to commit the robbery. Johnson also testified that when they arrived at the location where Slater was killed, Parker took the gun from Cave. Johnson stated that he heard a shot but did not know who shot Slater, that after the murder Parker told Bush to get rid of the knife, and that the four later split the money taken from the store.

The State also introduced a statement made by Parker on May 7, 1982, when he went with Detective David Powers to the area where the victim was killed. During this time, Parker stated that Bush both stabbed and shot the victim, indicated where Bush had thrown the knife after the murder, and recounted that the four defendants discussed killing a sheriff's deputy, Timothy Bargo, who stopped the car in which they were riding on the night of the murder.

Parker VI, 873 So.2d at 275. The State also presented testimony from Georgeann Williams, who testified that she was dating codefendant Bush at the time of the crime and visited him when he was in jail after being arrested. After she spoke with Bush about what happened during the crime, she also visited Parker, whose cell was nearby. Parker told Williams that Bush stabbed the victim and that Parker shot her. Parker told Williams that it would be her word against his if she repeated what he told her. He also told Williams that Bush had a record and that it would be blamed on Bush.

Parker presented the following evidence, including testimony from Richard Barlow, the prosecutor during Cave's resentencing:

Parker presented several witnesses in mitigation. Of significance for the purposes of Parker's appeal is the testimony of Richard Barlow, who was the prosecutor during Cave's 1993 penalty phase. Barlow stated that he relied on the testimony of Michael Bryant, who was in the same cell as Cave at the Martin County [J]ail, to establish that Cave was a principal in Slater's murder. Barlow testified that Bryant went to Arthur Jackson, who was running the jail at the time, and told Jackson that he overheard a conversation between Cave and Bush, in which Cave admitted that he “popped a cap” in the back of Slater's head.

In addition, portions of Michael Bryant's testimony given during Cave's 1993 penalty phase were read into the record. Bryant testified about the conversation he overheard between Cave and Bush:

Well what I overheard, Bush was a couple of cells down and what it was, you know, they started talking about it and Bush told Cave, says, we wouldn't...

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