Parks v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 05 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 6:15-cv-757-Orl-DAB |
| Parties | MARISSA LAUREN PARKS, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
The Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act (the Act), as amended, Title 42 United States Code Section 405(g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the Commissioner) denying her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under the Act.
The record has been reviewed, including a transcript of the proceedings before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the exhibits filed and the administrative record, and the pleadings and memoranda submitted by the parties in this case. Oral argument has not been requested.
For the reasons that follow, it is ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED.
Plaintiff filed for a period of disability, DIB and SSI benefits on April 13, 2011, alleging an onset of disability on March 16, 2010, due to bipolar disorder, panic attacks with agoraphobia, shingles with postherpetic neuralgia, right shoulder damage with arthritis, right foot bone spur, left knee arthritis with fluid, and heart murmur. R. 320-30, 363. Her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. R. 194-220. Plaintiff requested a hearing1, which was held on June 27, 2013, before Administrative Law Judge John D. Thompson, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as "ALJ"). R. 33-102. In a decision dated July 19, 2013, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled as defined under the Act through the date of his decision. R. 187. Plaintiff timely filed a Request for Review of the ALJ's decision, which the Appeals Council denied on March 12, 2015. R. 1-6. Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on May 12, 2015. Doc. 1.
Plaintiff's medical history is set forth in detail in the ALJ's decision. By way of summary, Plaintiff complained of bipolar disorder, panic attacks with agoraphobia, shingles with postherpetic neuralgia, right shoulder damage with arthritis, right foot bone spur, knee arthritis with fluid, and heart murmur. R. 128. After reviewing Plaintiff's medical records and Plaintiff's testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from a history of bipolar disorder and "rule out posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)2," which were severe medically determinable impairments, but were not impairments severe enough to meet or medically equal one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. R. 175-76. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform medium work, with specific exertional limitations, particularly a restriction to reaching overhead with the right upper extremity on an occasional basis, and a mental functional limitation to perform "simple rote and repetitive tasks in response to oral directives in a work environment in which there are no changes in tasks from one day to the next," no work in proximity to crowds and with any production goals or quotas, and no contact with the general public except sheis able to interact occasionally with others such as co-workers and supervisors up to one-third of the day. R. 180.
Based upon Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ determined that she could not perform past relevant work. R. 186. Considering Plaintiff's vocational profile and RFC, the ALJ applied the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the grids), 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, and, based on the testimony of the vocational expert ("VE"), the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. R. 186-87. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined in the Act, at any time through the date of the decision. R. 187-88.
Plaintiff now asserts three points of error. First, she argues that the ALJ erred by mischaracterizing Plaintiff's severe mental impairments at Step 2 and improperly assessing the psychologist's opinions in formulating Plaintiff's RFC and in finding that she did not meet a listed impairment. Second, she claims the ALJ erred in determining her physical RFC. Third, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by finding she could perform other work in the national economy for representative occupations that have production goals or quotas even though the ALJ precluded such work in the RFC he assigned to Plaintiff. Fourth, she asserts that the ALJ erred in evaluating her credibility. For the reasons that follow, the decision of the Commissioner is is REVERSED and REMANDED.
The scope of this Court's review is limited to determining whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla - i.e., the evidence must do more than merelycreate a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995)(citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) and Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
"If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, this Court must affirm, even if the proof preponderates against it." Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2004). "We may not decide facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner.]" Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; accord, Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) ().
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in properly assessing her mental impairments. Doc. 16. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ mischaracterized her severe mental impairments at Step 2, and then erred by rejecting the testimony of Medical Expert Dr. Adam Cox, Ph.D., and discounting the conclusions of Consultative Examiner Dr. Danna Costa, Phy.D., to find that Plaintiff did not meet a Listed Impairment at Step 3 or have a RFC with mental limitations that precluded work at Step 5. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly gave Dr. Cox's opinions little weight and properly concluded Plaintiff's impairments singly or in combination did not meet or equal a Listing.
The ALJ must follow five steps in evaluating a claim of disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, if a claimant is working at a substantial gainful activity, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, if a claimant does not have any impairment or combination of impairmentswhich significantly limit her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, then she does not have a severe impairment and is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Third, if a claimant's impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, she is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Fourth, if a claimant's impairments do not prevent her from doing past relevant work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Fifth, if a claimant's impairments (considering her residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work) prevent her from doing other work that exists in the national economy, then she is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
The listing of impairments in the Social Security Regulations identifies impairments which are considered severe enough to prevent a person from gainful activity. By meeting a listed impairment or otherwise establishing an equivalence, a Plaintiff is presumptively determined to be disabled regardless of his age, education, or work experience Thus, an ALJ's sequential evaluation of a claim ends if the claimant can establish the existence of a listed impairment. Edwards v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 625, 628 (11th Cir. 1984). However, at this stage of the evaluation process, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that he or she is disabled. Bell v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1986); Wilkinson v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 660, 663 (11th Cir. 1987). In this circuit, a plaintiff must present specific findings that she meet the various tests listed under the applicable listing. Bell, 796 F.2d at 1353. Mere diagnosis of a listed impairment is not enough as the record must contain corroborative medical evidence supported by clinical and laboratory findings. Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991).
Residual functional capacity is an assessment based on all relevant evidence of a claimant's remaining ability to do work despite her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436,1440 (11th Cir. 1997). The focus of this assessment is on the doctor's evaluation of the claimant's condition and the medical consequences thereof. Id. Substantial weight must be givento the opinion, diagnosis and medical evidence of a treating physician unless there is good cause to do otherwise. See Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440; Edwards, 937 F.2d at 583; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).
The Regulations establish a "hierarchy" among medical opinions that provides a framework for determining the weight afforded each medical opinion: "[g]enerally, the opinions of examining physicians are given more...
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