Parks v. Denver Dist. Court, Second Judicial Dist.
| Decision Date | 04 December 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 25541,25541 |
| Citation | 180 Colo. 202,503 P.2d 1029 |
| Parties | Richard L. PARKS, Petitioner, v. The DENVER DISTRICT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Thompson & Hostetter, Donald P. Hostetter, Denver, for petitioner.
Jarvis W. Seccombe, Dist. Atty., Leonard M. Chestler, Deputy Dist. Atty., Denver, for respondents.
This original proceeding seeks to prohibit determination of the petitioner's competency to stand trial until after a jury resolves the issue raised by the petitioner's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Petitioner was charged in the Denver district court with robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. Thereafter, he entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the offense. After the insanity issue was raised, the court, at the instance of the district attorney, ordered that a trial be held to determine whether the defendant was competent to stand trial and vacated the date set for the trial of the insanity issue. We issued a rule to show cause after a petition for a writ of prohibition was filed. We now discharge the rule.
The facts pointedly indicate why the trial judge ordered that a trial should first be held to determine whether the petitioner was competent to stand trial for robbery and conspiracy. At the time the offenses were perpetrated, the petitioner was an escapee from the Colorado State Hospital at Pueblo. He had been committed to the Colorado State Hospital under two separate orders. One commitment was based upon a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity in the district court of the first judicial district. The other commitment was based upon a finding of the district court of the second judicial district which declared that the petitioner was incompetent to stand trial. Since the time when petitioner was committed, he has not been found to be sane, competent, or restored to reason under either of the committing orders. The psychiatrists two examined the petitioner in connection with this proceeding have again evaluated the defendant's mental condition. Three of the examining physicians voiced the opinion that he was insane at the time the criminal offenses were committed. Two psychiatrists gave no opinion. Three psychiatrists are of the opinion that he is incompetent to stand trial at the present time, while one refused to express an opinion on his competence to stand trial, and one opines that he is competent to stand trial.
The petitioner, in his original proceeding, attacks the constitutionality of our statutes which deal with the mentally deranged person who is accused of a crime. He also claims that his counsel is the sole person who can raise the issue of his competence to stand trial.
The only constitutional question which we must resolve in this case concerns the statutory method used at the time of the hearing in this case to determine the petitioner's competence to stand trial. 1 If the petitioner, or any other defendant, is found to be incompetent to stand trial, he must be committed to the department of institutions, 'there to be treated and confined to the extent necessary for the protection of society until it has been duly determined that he is no longer insane . . ..' 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 39--8--6(2). If a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial later regains his sanity, he must face trial on the merits. Our statutory procedures do not have the infirmities which caused the Supreme Court to condemn the practice followed in Indiana. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), the Court said:
The constitutional weakness in the Indiana statutory procedures was that the accused, who was found to be incompetent, was committed until he regained his competence. Where there is little likelihood that the accused will ever become competent, the Indiana procedure amounts to a sentence of life imprisonment. At the time of the Supreme Court decision, Jackson had already been confined for three and one-half years. The Jackson opinion points out that there had never been a finding that Jackson was dangerous or that further commitment would help him become competent.
In contrast, the Colorado statute provides that the incompetent accused is to be treated and confined only to the extent necessary for the protection of society, which is based partly upon the dangerous propensities of the accused. In Colorado, if a person is found to be incompetent to stand trial, he is committed to the custody of the executive director of the department of institutions, where he remains until he is able to stand trial. He is also to be afforded treatment in an institution for the mentally ill or retarded. The director has the power to establish procedures for periodic evaluation and should provide for review of each case at appropriate intervals if the statutory procedure is to stand constitutional muster. Since the criminal proceeding that brings competency into issue is merely abated, the court which commits the accused retains jurisdiction to oversee his commitment and to protect his constitutional rights and should do so. In fact, it is the trial judge's duty to make periodic checks to determine the status and condition of an incompetent who has criminal charges pending against him under any valid statute. If it becomes apparent that the defendant is unlikely to ever regain competency to stand trial, then civil commitment proceedings should be instituted. Furthermore, custody may be reviewed at the instance of the accused by a writ of habeas corpus.
Colorado procedure contains an additional safeguard. Jackson v. Indiana, Supra, held that a determination of competence to stand trial could not be substituted for the civil commitment procedures which are ordinarily required for the indefinite commitment of a person who has not been convicted of a crime. In Colorado, the crucial criterion for a normal civil commitment proceeding is identical to that which is used in the competency commitment proceeding in a criminal case. The accused who is found to be incompetent is treated and confined only to the extent necessary for the protection of society. 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 39--8--6(2). Substantially equivalent provisions for confinement are set forth in our civil commitment procedure. C.R.S.1963, 71--1--7(2)(b) and (e). The Colorado ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Marshall v. Kort
...proper consideration of the question of eligibility for release." §§ 16-8-115(1) & (2), 8 C.R.S. (1983 Supp.); cf. Parks v. District Court, 180 Colo. 202, 503 P.2d 1029 (1972) (court which commits a person adjudged incompetent to stand trial retains jurisdiction to oversee his commitment an......
-
People v. Chavez
...prosecution has failed to prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. E. g., Labor v. Gibson, supra; Parks v. District Court, 180 Colo. 202, 503 P.2d 1029 (1972); People ex rel. Juhan v. District Court, supra. Even under this interpretation it has been held that a judicially det......
-
People v. Zapotocky
...will be restored eventually to competency and the justification for continued commitment. § 16-8-114.5(2); Parks v. Denver Dist. Court, 180 Colo. 202, 207, 503 P.2d 1029, 1032 (1972). If the defendant is charged with an offense which does not involve violent behavior, the trial court may or......
-
Jones v. District Court In and For Twenty-first Judicial Dist.
...Davis v. State of Alabama, supra. In short, an incompetent person cannot be tried until that condition has abated. Parks v. District Court, 180 Colo. 202, 503 P.2d 1029 (1972). Our statutory procedures provide safeguards to insure against the prosecution of an incompetent defendant. Section......
-
Section 25 DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
...to stand trial from that which determines the validity of a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. Parks v. Denver District Court, 180 Colo. 202, 503 P.2d 1029 (1972); Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 322 P.2d 674, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 922, 78 S.Ct. 1363, 2 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1958). Tria......
-
Criminal Law Newsletter
...(1966). 6. Malinauska v. United States, 505 F.2d 649, 655 (5th Cir. 1974). 7. Parks v. Denver District Court, Second Judicial District, 180 Colo. 202, 503 P.2d 1029, 1032 (1972); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 8......
-
Mental Disabilities Law Issues
...upon a finding of incompetency were challenged as not complying with Jackson in Parks v. Denver District Court, Second Judicial Dist., 180 Colo. 202, 503 P.2d 1029 (1972). The court in Parks found the Colorado procedure to be constitutional since a defendant committed upon a finding of inco......
-
The Definition and Determination of Insanity in Colorado
...87CA1863, annc'd 1/30/92). 17. Id. 18. CRS § 16-8-103(1). 19. People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1981). 20. Parks v. District Court, 503 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1972). 21. CRS § 16-8-103(2). 22. Labor v. Gibson, 578 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1978). 23. A defendant who exercises his right to silence at ......