Parole Com'n v. Cooper
| Decision Date | 25 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 90237,90237 |
| Citation | 701 So.2d 543 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly S582, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S724 PAROLE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. Mark COOPER, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
William L. Camper, General Counsel, and Bradley R. Bischoff, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
Mark Cooper, Moore Haven, pro se.
Alan H. Schreiber, Public Defender, and Diane M. Cuddihy, Assistant Public Defender, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Fort Lauderdale, for Respondent.
We have for review Cooper v. Florida Parole Commission, 691 So.2d 521, 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), in which the district court certified the following question to be of great public importance:
WHEN AN INMATE WHO IS SERVING CONCURRENT SENTENCES IS RELEASED AFTER ACCRUING SUFFICIENT GAIN TIME AND HIS RELEASE ON ONE OR MORE OF THOSE SENTENCES IS CONDITIONAL UNDER SECTION 947.1405, FLORIDA STATUTES, IS HIS RELEASE STATUS REVOKED AS TO ALL THE CONCURRENT SENTENCES, INCLUDING THE SENTENCES IMPOSED FOR OFFENSES THAT DID NOT QUALIFY FOR CONDITIONAL RELEASE?
We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed, we answer the question in the negative.
This case involves an interpretation of The Conditional Release Program Act. At the time Mark Cooper committed his offenses, the Act provided in pertinent part as follows:
Any inmate who is convicted of a crime committed on or after October 1, 1988, which crime is contained in category 1, category 2, category 3, or category 4 of Rule 3.701 and Rule 3.988, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and who has served at least one prior felony commitment at a state or federal correctional institution or is sentenced as a habitual or violent habitual offender pursuant to s. 775.084 shall, upon reaching the tentative release date or provisional release date ... be released under supervision ....
§ 947.1405(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1992) (emphasis supplied). In essence, this statute requires that any inmate who is convicted of a category 1, 2, 3, or 4 crime and who has served time for at least one prior felony or is sentenced as a habitual or violent habitual offender, is to be released on the inmate's tentative or provisional release date subject to specific terms and conditions. "Tentative release date" is the date projected for a prisoner's release due to accumulated gain-time. § 947.005(6), Fla. Stat. (1991). "Provisional release date" is the date projected for a prisoner's release pursuant to the statute under which provisional credits are granted. § 947.005(7), Fla. Stat. (1991). The Act further provides that violation of one or more conditions of release will result in the revocation of gain-time and reincarceration.
On September 1, 1995, Mark Cooper received concurrent sentences in two separate cases:
(I) violation of probation on a conviction for grand theft (category 6 offense)--four year sentence; and
(II) robbery (category 3), battery on a law enforcement officer (category 4), and resisting arrest with violence (category 4)--20 months.
The sentence in case I did not fall under the provisions of the Act; the sentences in case II fell under the provisions of the Act.
In case I, with credit for time served but with no additional credit, Cooper's term was to expire on December 8, 1997. In case II, his terms, with credit for time served but no additional credit, were fully served on May 30, 1996 (no gain-time accrued in calculating this release date).
Cooper was conditionally released on June 1, 1996. This was one day after he fully completed the sentences in case II. Based on the calculated expiration date (maximum release date) of case I, the conditional supervision was to terminate on December 8, 1997. On June 2, 1996, he was arrested for resisting a merchant and disorderly conduct. Based on that arrest, Cooper was found to have violated the conditions of his conditional release and he was reincarcerated.
Subsequently, Cooper filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, claiming that his awarded gain-time in case I should not have been revoked because it involved a category 6 offense to which conditional release did not apply. The trial court denied the petition, finding that case I fell within the Act because the sentence in that case was concurrent with the sentences to which the Act did apply.
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. The district court concluded that, although the sentences for cases I and II were to be served concurrently, they were distinct sentences for purposes of eligibility under the Act. It further concluded that, once Cooper was released in case I due to his gain-time award, the remaining period of his sentence for that case was extinguished. Consequently, the court held that Cooper should have been released on May 30, 1996, the date he completed the sentences under case II in full, without being subjected to conditional release supervision. In so holding, the district court certified the aforementioned question of great public importance.
Both parties argue that the plain language of the Act supports their position. In its reply brief, the Commission alters this position, arguing that the Act is ambiguous and that we must look to a recent...
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