Parrish v. Ault
Decision Date | 07 September 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 31168,31168 |
Citation | 228 S.E.2d 808,237 Ga. 401 |
Parties | John R. PARRISH v. Allen AULT. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
James C. Bonner, Jr., Jackson, for appellant.
John R. Strother, Jr., Atlanta, for appellee.
This appeal is from a judgment that denied appellant's application to the court for a judgment that would compel the appellee to recompute appellant's imposed sentence or sentences in accordance with Code Ann. Sec. 77-320. Having been denied the relief sought in the trial court, the appellant has come here for review.
Appellant was originally sentenced on four felony counts. On the first count he received a sentence of five years, three to be served in prison and two on probation. On the other three counts, three five-year concurrent sentences were imposed, but the three concurrent sentences were consecutive to the sentence imposed on count one. This meant that the appellant received a sentence or sentences totaling ten years, the first three years to be served in prison, the next two years to be served on probation, and the final five years on probation. Whether this be considered one sentence or four sentences is immaterial for practical purposes. The ten years was imposed by the same trial judge at the same time.
During the two-year probationary period, the appellant violated the conditions of his probation; a hearing was held before the trial court that imposed the ten years; and appellant's probation was revoked by the trial court.
Appellant now contends that only his two-year probation was revoked, that his five-year probation period was not revoked, and that the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke the five-year sentence of probation because the time for the beginning of that sentence had not been reached at the time of the entry of the revocation judgment.
In addition to relying on the language used in the sentencing judgment and the revocation judgment, the appellant relies on Todd v. State, 107 Ga.App. 771, 131 S.E.2d 201 (1963) and Todd v. The State, 108 Ga.App. 615, 134 S.E.2d 56 (1963). Those two cases held that a trial court was without authority to revoke a probated sentence until the time for the probated sentence to begin had actually arrived. The Court of Appeals held there that a trial court could not revoke a probated sentence that was to commence at some time in the future.
In 1974 the legislature provided for judge-imposed sentences and said: ...
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U.S. v. Cartwright
...4th 1978); State v. Morris, 98 Idaho 328, 563 P.2d 52 (1977); Brown v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 21 (Ky.1977); Parrish v. Ault, 237 Ga. 401, 228 S.E.2d 808 (1976); Wright v. United States, 315 A.2d 839 (D.C.1974); Martin v. State, 243 So.2d 189 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 4th 1971); Coffey v. Commonwe......
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Postell v. Humphrey, S04A1253.
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