Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 04-0121.,1 CA-CV 04-0121.
• Citation: 210 Ariz. 143,108 P.3d 922
• Parties: Bill PARROT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

108 P.3d 922

210 Ariz. 143

Bill PARROT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. -0121.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department C.

February 24, 2005.

Krohn & Moss, Ltd., Phoenix, By Marshall Meyers, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Bowman and Brooke, L.L.P., Phoenix, By Negatu Molla and Nicole M. Seder, for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

EHRLICH, J.

¶ 1 Bill Parrot appeals from the summary judgment for the DaimlerChrysler Corporation ("Chrysler") that precluded him from pursuing his claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1998) ("Magnuson-Moss Act" or "Act"), and the Arizona Motor Vehicle Warranties Act ("Lemon Law"), Ariz.Rev.Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 44-1261 et seq. (2003). For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment and remand this matter for appropriate further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Parrot¹ leased a 2000 Jeep Cherokee ("Jeep" or "vehicle") manufactured by Chrysler from Pitre Chrysler Plymouth Jeep Eagle ("Pitre") in Scottsdale, Arizona. When Pitre executed its lease with Parrot, it simultaneously assigned the lease to the lender, Chrysler Financial Company, L.L.C. ("Chrysler Financial"), but Pitre remained the legal titleholder of the vehicle.

¶ 3 The lease declared that the Jeep would be subject to a "New Vehicle Written Warranty Provided by the Manufacturer." Accordingly, Parrot was given a warranty booklet that stated that the vehicle had a three-year/36,000-mile manufacturer's warranty and explained:

[t]he Basic Limited Warranty covers the cost of all parts and labor needed to repair any defective item on your vehicle that was supplied by DaimlerChrysler Motors Corporation — that is, defective in material, workmanship, or factory preparation. There is no list of covered parts since the only exception is tires. You pay nothing for these repairs. These warranty repairs or adjustments — including all parts and labor connected with them — will be made by your dealer at no charge, using new or remanufactured parts.

Parrot was directed to take the Jeep to any authorized Chrysler dealer for any warranty repairs.

¶ 4 Soon thereafter, the Jeep developed multiple problems, primarily a noise in the rear of the vehicle, that prompted Parrot to take it to authorized dealers for repair six times within two years of executing the lease. During that time, Parrot gave Chrysler one "final opportunity" to cure the Jeep's problems, but a Chrysler representative inspected the vehicle and deemed the noise to be normal.

¶ 5 Parrot hired a certified American Society of Engineers Master Automotive Technician to inspect the Jeep; the technician found significant problems with the vehicle. When the problems then continued and were not repaired by Chrysler dealers to Parrot's satisfaction, Parrot filed suit, alleging breaches of written warranties pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Act and the Lemon Law.

¶ 6 Parrot also continued to attempt to get the vehicle repaired. When he was unsuccessful, he returned the vehicle.

¶ 7 Each party filed a motion for summary judgment. As he had stated in his complaint, Parrot argued that he was a "consumer" within the meaning of prongs two and three of the Magnuson-Moss Act and the Lemon Law. Chrysler insisted that neither the Act nor the Lemon Law applied to a leased vehicle. The superior court agreed with Chrysler and granted its motion. It later denied Parrot's motion for reconsideration, and, ultimately, a final judgment granting Chrysler summary judgment and denying Parrot's motions for summary judgment and for reconsideration was entered. Parrot appealed, presenting the following issues:

1. Whether the superior court erred in ruling that the Magnuson-Moss Act does not apply to a leased vehicle;

2. Whether the superior court erred in ruling that the Lemon Law does not apply to a leased vehicle; and

3. Whether the superior court erred in denying Parrot's motion for summary judgment on his Lemon Law claim.

DISCUSSION

¶ 8 A summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Great Am. Mortgage, Inc. v. Statewide Ins. Co., 189 Ariz. 123, 124-25, 938 P.2d 1124, 1125-26 (App.1997). We affirm the judgment if there are no genuine, factual issues in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

¶ 9 Additionally, an issue of statutory interpretation is one of law decided de novo by this court. Zamora v. Reinstein, 185 Ariz. 272, 275, 915 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1996); Great Am. Mortgage, Inc., 189 Ariz. at 125, 938 P.2d at 1126. In interpreting a statute, our task is to follow the intent of the legislature. Mail Boxes, etc. U.S.A., v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz., 181 Ariz. 119, 121, 888 P.2d 777, 779 (1995); State v. McDermott, 208 Ariz. 332, 334 ¶ 5, 93 P.3d 532, 534 (App.2004); see Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th Cir.2002)

. If the statute is "clear and unambiguous," our interpretation goes no farther than the text; we do not use other rules of statutory construction. McDermott, 208 Ariz. at 334 ¶ 5, 93 P.3d at 534. See Canon School Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S Constr. Co., Inc., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994) (noting that, when a statute's "language is plain and unambiguous, courts generally must follow the text as written"); Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471, 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991) (expecting the statute's own language to be "the best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning"). Rather, "we consider the statutory scheme as a whole and presume that the legislature does not include statutory provisions which are redundant, void, inert, trivial, superfluous, or contradictory." Id. (citations omitted). If, however, a statute is ambiguous, "we consider the statute's context, subject matter, historical context, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose" as well as its legislative history. J.L.F. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 208 Ariz. 159, 162 ¶ 15, 91 P.3d 1002, 1005 (App.2004) (citations omitted); see BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 186, 124 S.Ct. at 1595.

A. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

¶ 10 Under the Magnuson-Moss Act, a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty ... may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief[.]

15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). While the Act then uses three "prongs" to define a "consumer," a plaintiff need only meet one definition to qualify and make a claim. DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 97 N.Y.2d 463, 742 N.Y.S.2d 182, 768 N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (2002); Mangold v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 347 Ill.App.3d 1008, 284 Ill.Dec. 129, 809 N.E.2d 251, 253 (2004); see Voelker v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 353 F.3d 516, 523-24 (7th Cir.2003)

(analyzing the three categories of "consumer" under the Magnuson-Moss Act, a lessee qualifies under prong three).

¶ 11 Prong one defines "consumer" as "a buyer (other than for purposes of resale) of any consumer product." 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (1998). Parrot has never made this claim.

¶ 12 Prong two defines a "consumer" as

any person to whom such product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written warranty (or service contract) applicable to the product

and prong three defines a "consumer" as

any other person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty (or service contract) or under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or service contract).

There is a split among the courts of various jurisdictions interpreting prongs two and three. Some courts have looked at the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") to define the Magnuson-Moss Act's undefined terms because it was "enacted against the backdrop of the UCC." DiCintio, 742 N.Y.S.2d 182, 768 N.E.2d at 1124; Voelker, 353 F.3d at 523. For example, the court in DiCintio held that a lessee cannot be a "transferee" under prong two because the UCC defines "transfer" as the "passing of title" and a lessee does not receive title when he leases a vehicle. 742 N.Y.S.2d 182, 768 N.E.2d at 1124. Likewise, some courts have held that a lessee cannot have a "written warranty" under prong two or prong three because that would require a "sale" and the UCC definition of "sale" requires a transfer of title to the lessee. See id.; Sellers v. Frank Griffin AMC Jeep, Inc., 526 So.2d 147, 155 (Fla.App.1988)

. Other courts have held that it is unnecessary to look at the UCC to define the Magnuson-Moss Act's terms because the statute is clear on its face. See Mangold, 284 Ill.Dec. 129,

809 N.E.2d at 253 (deciding that nothing in the statute implies that "transfer" means that title must pass); Cohen v. AM Gen. Corp., 264 F.Supp.2d 616, 620 (N.D.Ill.2003) (holding that the plain language of the Act "does not require [the court] to look at the bundle of rights acquired by the purchaser and the lessee" to determine if the lessee is a "consumer").

¶ 13 The plain language of the Magnuson-Moss Act's prong two defines "consumer" as "any person to whom such product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written warranty (or service contract) applicable to the product." The phrase "such product" necessarily refers to "product" as used in prong one, i.e., "any consumer product." Thus, under prong two, a party is a "consumer" if "any consumer product" is transferred to that party during the warranty's duration, regardless of the purpose of the original sale. In other words, the consumer product need not be a result of a sale to a buyer "other than for purposes of resale" as required by prong one.

¶ 14 Chrysler asserts that Parrot cannot be a prong two consumer because the word "transferred" refers to a legal transfer of title and Parrot never had legal title. The Magnuson-Moss Act does not define "transferred," but we agree with the courts that have held that the Act's use of the word "transfer" plainly refers to the physical transfer of a...