Parsons v. Parsons, No. 17760

• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota
• Writing for the Court: MILLER; SABERS; WUEST
• Citation: 490 N.W.2d 733
• Parties: Dolores E. PARSONS, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Roger Russell PARSONS, Defendant and Appellant. . Considered on Briefs
• Decision Date: 29 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 17760

Page 733

490 N.W.2d 733 Dolores E. PARSONS, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Roger Russell PARSONS, Defendant and Appellant. No. 17760. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Considered on Briefs May 29, 1992.
Decided Sept. 16, 1992.

Donald H. Breit of Breit and Binger, Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appellee.

Gary P. Thimsen and A. Russell Janklow of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant.

MILLER, Chief Justice.

Roger Parsons (Roger) appeals an award of alimony to his former wife, Dolores Parsons (Dolores). We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

This matter is again before this court after an appeal and remand in Parsons v. Parsons, 469 N.W.2d 581 (S.D.1991) (Parsons I ). To once again outline the pertinent facts, the parties were married on May 25, 1967. Both parties had college educations at the time of the marriage. Roger had a bachelor's degree in business administration and Dolores had a two year nursing degree. Both parties were employed during the marriage and Dolores worked both full and part time at various times throughout the marriage. Both parties also advanced their educations. Roger obtained his master's degree while Dolores obtained her B.S. in nursing. In addition, three children were born during the marriage.

In 1990, the parties stipulated that a divorce could be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Dolores was approximately 55 years of age at the time and Roger was 45. One of the three children was emancipated and the parties were granted joint custody of the other two children, primary custody going to Dolores.

The parties' marital property was divided equally, however, Roger received the marital home and was required to pay Dolores for her half of the parties' equity therein. The balance of the property divided between the parties included personal property, mutual funds, savings accounts and other liquid assets. The trial court also awarded Dolores alimony so she could attend school and obtain her master's degree. It awarded her $13,420 payable at the rate of $500 per month as long as she remained in school. It additionally required Roger to pay $500 per month for a period of two years as alimony because Dolores' income would be reduced due to her poor health and school attendance.

Roger appealed the award of alimony in Parsons I and we found the entire award rehabilitative because it was all related to Dolores' education. We held that the trial court's findings of fact were inadequate to support the award and reversed and remanded for reconsideration. A remand hearing was held on August 16, 1991 and additional evidence and testimony were taken. On October 25, 1991, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order again requiring Roger to pay alimony. Roger now brings this second appeal of the alimony award.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE ALIMONY AWARD TO DOLORES?

The trial court's alimony order provides:

Roger shall] pay the sum of $13,420.00 for the education costs of [Dolores]. Further, [Roger] shall pay the additional sum of $500.00 per month for living expenses for two years. Said sums payable at the rate of $1,000.00 per month until paid[.

As we outlined in Parsons I:

In making an award of alimony, the trial court has to consider and apply several factors: the length of the marriage; the earning capacity of the parties; the financial condition after the property division; the age, health and physical condition of the parties; the parties' station in life or social standing; and fault.

Several additional factors must be considered in making an award of rehabilitative alimony: the supporting spouse's contributions; foregone opportunities to enhance or improve professional or vocational skills; and the duration of the marriage following completion of the non-supporting spouse's professional education.

Page 736

Parsons, 469 N.W.2d at 583 (citations omitted) (emphasis original). This court will not disturb a trial court's ultimate award of alimony unless it clearly appears the trial court abused its discretion in making the award. Wilson v. Wilson, 434 N.W.2d 742 (S.D.1989). Roger asserts the trial court's findings of fact are not supported by, or are contrary to, the evidence and, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in its alimony award.

Our review of the trial court's findings of fact is according to the clearly erroneous standard and we will not overturn the trial court's findings unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See, Hilbrands v. Hilbrands, 429 N.W.2d 750 (S.D.1988). With this standard in mind, the trial court's findings relative to the pertinent factors are outlined below along with the supporting evidence in the record.

Length of the Marriage

There is no dispute that the parties were married for twenty-three years.

Earning Capacity of the Parties

The trial court found that Dolores earns $1,750 per month and that Roger earns $3,282.60 per month. The findings as to Dolores are supported by her testimony that she was employed at a rate of pay of $10.99 per hour. The trial court calculated that if she were employed full time, Dolores would earn approximately $22,000 per year. However, the trial court reduced this amount based upon its further calculation that Dolores would only be working about seventy-five percent of the time while going to school. Thus, the trial court reduced her annual income to $16,500 per year (i.e., $22,000 X 75%) for a monthly income of $1,375 (i.e., $16,500 / 12). The trial court added investment income of $4,500 per year or $375 per month (i.e., $4,500 / 12) to this amount for a monthly gross income of $1,750 (or net income after taxes of $1,448.50 per month).

The figure of $3,282.60 for Roger's monthly income is supported by his trial testimony that his annual salary is $55,200 per year. This yields a monthly gross income of $4,600 (i.e., $55,200 / 12) less taxes for a monthly net income of $3,282.60. Thus, there is ample evidentiary support for the trial court's findings as to Roger's income.

The trial court also found Dolores' earning capacity would substantially increase if she obtained her master's degree because of her previous employment by the Veterans Administration as a nurse; because the degree would allow her to work for the federal government past the age of sixty-five; and, because it would allow Dolores employment at a supervisory level with no lifting. These findings are supported by Dolores' testimony during the remand hearing that she owes the Public Health Service two years of time after graduation to repay an education loan. She also testified that with a master's degree she would be employed at a much higher pay scale than she was with a two year nursing degree. Finally, Dolores also testified she would be able to work for the federal government until she was seventy and that she had a guaranteed job with the federal government after receiving her master's degree. Although Roger makes much of the fact that the trial court ignored the testimony of an expert that Dolores' earning capacity...