Partners v. Collazo Enters., LLC
| Decision Date | 21 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-16-00346-CV,11-16-00346-CV |
| Parties | SOUTHSIDE PARTNERS, Appellant v. COLLAZO ENTERPRISES, LLC, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 35th District Court Brown County, Texas
Appellant, Southside Partners (Southside)1, appeals the trial court's grant of traditional summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Collazo Enterprises, LLC (Collazo). In three issues, Southside asserts that the trial court erred by (1) granting summary judgment based on Collazo's bona-fide-purchaser-for-value affirmativedefense when a fact issue existed; (2) granting summary judgment before allowing Southside to obtain additional discovery; and (3) granting summary judgment when Collazo was on notice of a fraudulent deed transfer that was outside the chain of title. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
This dispute involves the transfer of approximately 26 acres in Brown County (the Property). William W. Ruth originally purchased the property in July 2002 at a tax sale. In September 2002, Ruth executed a Warranty Deed conveying the property to William, Colby, and Tanner Crow, the minor children of James and Donna Crow.2 Southside claims that Ruth reserved fifty percent of the ownership in the property despite the absence of any reservation in his deed to the Crow children. In 2006, James A. Crow filed suit against his minor children claiming that title to the property was improperly placed in his children's names. Ruth was unaware of this litigation. The trial court granted judgment in James Crow's favor and title to the property was placed in his name. Subsequently, James Crow was indicted and convicted of health care fraud resulting in the forfeiture of his personal and real property, including the Property. In April 2013 the federal court entered an order of forfeiture against James Crow, and the United States acquired title to the Property. On June 9, 2014, the United States of America conveyed the property to Collazo by Special Warranty Deed in consideration of $25,000.
Southside filed suit against Collazo and others seeking to set aside the sale of the Property from the United States of America to Collazo. In July 2015, Collazo filed a traditional motion for summary judgment based on its affirmative defense ofbona fide purchaser for value. Southside filed its response on August 3, 2015. The motion was heard on August 14, 2015. The trial court ruled on April 3, 2016, and entered its order granting Collazo's motion for summary judgment on July 7, 2016. This court's review is complicated by the number of pleadings and evidence submitted, without leave of court, after the summary judgment hearing and both before and after the summary judgment was entered. The claims between Southside and Collazo were ultimately severed into a separate cause which is the subject of this appeal.
We review the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). In our de novo review of the trial court's judgment, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). The movant has the burden to establish that no material fact issue exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009); M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam).
For a defendant to prevail on a traditional summary judgment, he must show there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning one or more essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action or establish each element of an affirmative defense as a matter of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Black v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co., 797 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex. 1990). Once the movant produces sufficient evidence conclusively establishing its right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to thenonmovant to present evidence sufficient to raise a fact issue. Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 215; Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995),
In addition to Collazo's motion for traditional summary judgment, Southside's response, and Collazo's reply, the parties filed numerous pleadings and affidavits relating to the summary judgment that were late under TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). Both Southside and Collazo filed these late pleadings without leave, but the trial court's order granting summary judgment identifies the following documents as those it considered:
In addition to the foregoing pleadings considered by the trial court, the parties filed additional pleadings before and after the entry of the summary judgment that were not specifically referenced by the trial court, including:
Collazo contends that Southside's late arguments and the evidence submitted in the late pleadings should be disregarded because Southside failed to request leave of court for its arguments and evidence to be considered. According to Texas Ruleof Civil Procedure 166a(c), the nonmovant must file its summary judgment response and evidence at least seven days before the summary judgment hearing, unless the nonmovant gets permission to file it later. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). If the trial court allows the late filing of evidence, the trial court must affirmatively indicate in the record acceptance of the late filing. See Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex. 1996); Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 490 n.1 (Tex. 1988). Absent any indication that leave was granted, such as an order granting leave to late file, appellate courts must presume the trial court did not consider the late-filed evidence. See Fertic v. Spencer, 247 S.W.3d 242, 250-51 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, pet. denied); see also Benchmark Bank, 919 S.W.2d at 663.
Although there is no record that Southside requested leave to submit its filings, the court's Order Granting Defendant Collazo Enterprises, LLC's Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment specifically identifies the pleadings it "considered." including the untimely filed Southside pleadings referenced above that were submitted before the trial court ruled on the summary judgment. Thus, the presumption that the trial court did not consider the untimely filed Southside evidence vanishes by virtue of the court's admonition that it considered such documents. Such is not the case, however, for the Southside pleadings and evidence submitted after the trial court ruled on the Summary Judgment. There is nothing in the record to indicate these filings were considered or reviewed for purposes of the summary judgment, and the court was not obligated to review the filings. After granting summary judgment, the trial court generally has no obligation to consider further motions on issues adjudicated by the summary judgment. Brookshire Katy Drainage Dist. v. Lily Gardens LLC, 333 S.W.3d 301, 307 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g) (citing Macy v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 294 S.W.3d 638, 650-51 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)).Therefore, this court's scope of review is limited to timely filed documents and those documents that the trial court stated were considered in its order granting summary judgment.
Southside contends that there were material fact issues surrounding whether Collazo was a bona fide purchaser for value because there was evidence of actual and constructive notice, as well as a lack of evidence to support whether the amount paid for the property was of sufficient value. Collazo responds that it submitted sufficient evidence on the required elements of its affirmative defense and that Southside failed to submit evidence sufficient to raise a fact issue.
"Status as a bona fide purchaser is an affirmative defense to a title dispute." Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001) (citing Cooksey v. Sinder, 682 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam)). Under Texas law, an unrecorded conveyance of an interest in real property is void as to a subsequent purchaser who purchases the property for valuable consideration and without notice. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001(a) (West 2014). However, the unrecorded instrument is binding on a subsequent purchaser who does not pay a valuable consideration or who has notice of the instrument. Id. § 13.001(b); City of Richland Hills v. Bertelsen, 724 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, no writ). Thus, to receive the bona fide purchaser protection, a party must acquire the property in good faith, for value, and without notice of any third-party claim or interest. Madison, 39 S.W.3d at 606; ...
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