M.D. Anderson Hosp. v. Willrich

• Citation: 28 S.W.3d 22
• Decision Date: 24 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-1037,99-1037
• Parties: (Tex. 2000) M. D. Anderson Hospital and Tumor Institute, The University of Texas System Cancer Center, Petitioner v. Harold Gene Willrich, Respondent
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Page 22

28 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. 2000)

M. D. Anderson Hospital and Tumor Institute, The University of Texas System Cancer Center, Petitioner v. Harold Gene Willrich, Respondent

No. 99-1037

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

August 24, 2000

On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas

Per Curiam

The issue we consider here is whether a terminated employee, alleging discrimination, can rely on the employer's summary judgment evidence to contend on appeal that a fact issue exists that the employer's reason for terminating the employee was pretextual. We conclude that the employee can do so, but that here the employee failed to raise a fact issue. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and render judgment that the employee take nothing.

Harold Willrich was a utilities station operator for the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center (UTMDA) from June 1981 until August 1995. Willrich, an African-American, alleges that he was subjected to racial slurs and jokes from co-workers and supervisors. In 1982, Willrich was selected, against his wishes, to replace a retiring maintenance worker for the night-shift. Among employees eligible for the night-shift job, Willrich had the highest job classification and was the only African-American. Willrich considered UTMDA's work environment to be hostile, and over the years he filed several complaints with management about racial incidents.

In June 1995, UTMDA announced a reorganization and reduction-in-force (RIF) for Willrich's Facilities Management Division. UTMDA eliminated existing positions and created a new organization with new positions. UTMDA asked all employees to express their preferences for three positions. Willrich requested only night-shift jobs (which were the least available) and promotions or lateral transfers. UTMDA did not select Willrich for a job in the new organization and terminated him in August 1995, along with thirty-four other employees of various races.

Willrich sued UTMDA under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) and alleged that his termination was racially discriminatory. UTMDA moved for summary judgment, asserting that Willrich was not terminated because of his race, but was terminated because: (1) the reorganization eliminated his former position; (2) he was not the most qualified candidate for the jobs he specified on his preference form; and (3) he only requested night-shift positions. Willrich did not file a response to UTMDA's summary judgment motion. He filed a motion to extend time to file a summary judgment response, which the trial court denied. After the trial court granted UTMDA's summary judgment motion, Willrich filed a motion for new trial alleging that his response to UTMDA's motion for summary judgment would have presented disputed, genuine fact issues. In his court of appeals' brief, Willrich argued that the trial court erred by not granting him an extension of time to respond to UTMDA's motion for summary judgment. He also argued that the trial court erred in ruling that UTMDA showed as a matter of law that Willrich was terminated for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The court of appeals reviewed the attachments to UTMDA's summary judgment motion and concluded that material fact issues existed about UTMDA's reason for terminating Willrich. Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Under Texas summary judgment law, the party moving for summary judgment carries the burden of establishing that no material fact issue exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166 a(c); Rhne-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. 1999); Wornick Co. v. Casis, 856 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. 1993). The nonmovant has no burden to respond to a summary judgment motion unless the movant conclusively establishes its cause of action or defense. See Rhne-Poulenc, Inc., 997 S.W.2d at 222-23; Oram v. General Am. Oil Co., 513 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex. 1974). Summary judgments must stand on their own merits. Accordingly, the nonmovant need not respond to the motion to contend on appeal that the movant's summary judgment proof is insufficient as a matter of law to support summary judgment. See Rhne-Poulenc, Inc., 997 S.W.2d at 223; City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court takes the nonmovant's evidence as true, indulges every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant, and resolves all doubts in favor of the nonmovant. See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).

In enacting the TCHRA, the Legislature intended to correlate state law with federal law in employment discrimination cases. Tex. Lab. Code § 21.001; see NME Hosps., Inc. v. Rennels, 994 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Tex. 1999). Adhering to legislative intent, Texas courts have looked to federal law in interpreting the TCHRA's provisions. See NME Hosps., Inc., 994 S.W.2d at 144; Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. 1996); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Stinnett v. Williamson County Sheriff's Dep't, 858 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex. App.--Austin 1993, writ denied).

In discrimination cases, the United States Supreme Court has established a burden-shifting analysis. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). Because this is a summary judgment motion, the burden remained on UTMDA under Rule 166a(c) to prove as a matter of law a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Willrich's termination. See Rhne-Poulenc, Inc., 997 S.W.2d at 223.

In its motion for summary judgment, UTMDA stated that it instituted the RIF to increase efficiency and to save money. UTMDA's summary judgment evidence showed that a six-member panel devised a reorganization plan eliminating all current positions and creating a new organization. The new organization was staffed according to the existing employees' performance, experience, education, evaluation, and preference forms. The...