Patch v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.

• Decision Date: 21 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. DA 10–0051.,DA 10–0051.
• Citation: 257 P.3d 383,2011 MT 175,361 Mont. 241
• Parties: Debbie PATCH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Brandon Patch, Deceased, and Debbie and Duane Patch, Plaintiffs and Appellees,v.HILLERICH & BRADSBY CO., d/b/a Louisville Slugger, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

361 Mont. 241

257 P.3d 383

2011 MT 175

Debbie PATCH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Brandon Patch, Deceased, and Debbie and Duane Patch, Plaintiffs and Appellees,

v.HILLERICH & BRADSBY CO., d/b/a Louisville Slugger, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 10–0051.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 26, 2011.Decided July 21, 2011.

For Appellant: Kyle Anne Gray (argued), Robert L. Sterup, and W. Scott Mitchell, Holland & Hart, LLP, Billings, Montana.For Appellees: Curt Drake (argued) and Michael A. Kauffman, Drake Law Firm, Helena, Montana.Justice MICHAEL E. WHEAT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

[361 Mont. 242] ¶ 1 A jury in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, found Hillerich & Bradsby Company (“H & B”) liable in strict products liability for failing to warn Brandon Patch (Brandon) and his parents of the risks associated with its model CB–13 aluminum baseball bat. H & B appeals.

¶ 2 We address the following issues on appeal:

¶ 3 Issue 1: Did the District Court properly deny H & B's summary judgment motion on Patches' failure to warn claim?

¶ 4 Issue 2: Did the District Court properly deny H & B's Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law?

¶ 5 Issue 3: Did the District Court properly grant Patches' motion in limine regarding H & B's assumption of the risk defense?

¶ 6 Issue 4: Did the District Court properly instruct the jury?

¶ 7 Issue 5: Should the verdict be set aside and a new trial granted?

BACKGROUND

¶ 8 While pitching in an American Legion baseball game on July 25, 2003, eighteen-year-old Brandon was struck in the head by a batted ball that was hit using H & B's model CB–13 aluminum bat. Tragically, Brandon died from his injuries.

[361 Mont. 243] ¶ 9 In 2006, Brandon's parents, individually and as representatives of Brandon's estate, sued H & B in strict products liability¹ for survivorship and wrongful death damages, asserting manufacturing and design defect and failure to warn claims. Patches claimed H & B's model CB–13 aluminum bat was in a defective condition because of the enhanced risks associated with its use: It increased the velocity speed of a batted ball when it left the bat, thus decreasing infielders' reaction times,² and resulted in a greater number of high energy batted balls in the infield.

¶ 10 Before trial, the District Court granted H & B's motion for summary judgment on Patches' manufacturing defect claim, but denied summary judgment on Patches' design defect and failure to warn claims. The District Court granted Patches' motion in limine, excluding H & B's assumption of the risk defense. The matter was tried in October 2009, and Patches' design defect and failure to warn claims were submitted to the jury. The jury concluded the model CB–13 aluminum bat was not designed defectively, but determined the bat was in a defective condition due to H & B's failure to warn of the enhanced risks associated with its use and awarded Patches an $850,000 verdict on their failure to warn claim. Post-trial, the District Court denied H & B's Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 11 We review an order granting or denying summary judgment de novo, using the same Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 56 criteria that the district court used. Summary judgment is not appropriate where any genuine issue of material fact exists. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence should be drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Wood v. Old Trapper Taxi, 286 Mont. 18, 23–24, 952 P.2d 1375, 1378–79 (1997). We review de novo a district court's grant or denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Johnson v. Costco Wholesale, 2007 MT 43, ¶ 18, 336 Mont. 105, 152 P.3d 727.

¶ 12 A district court's grant or denial of a motion in limine is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Malcolm v. Evenflo Co., 2009 MT 285, ¶ 29, 352 Mont. 325, 217 P.3d 514. We also review a district court's decision regarding jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. Goles v. Neumann, 2011 MT 11, ¶ 9, 359 Mont. 132, 247 P.3d 1089. A court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or so exceeds the bounds of reason as to work a substantial injustice. Malcolm, ¶ 29.

DISCUSSION

¶ 13 Issue 1: Did the District Court properly deny H & B's summary judgment motion on Patches' failure to warn claim?

¶ 14 The District Court denied H & B's motion for summary judgment on the basis that failure to warn claims are available to bystanders, such as Brandon.³ H & B concedes that users and consumers may bring failure to warn claims, but argues it is entitled to summary judgment because failure to warn claims are not available to bystanders.⁴ In other words, H & B asserts that only the individual batting (actual user) and the individual who purchased the bat (actual consumer) can assert a failure to warn claim in this case. H & B's narrow interpretation of the terms user and consumer is contrary to the definition of the terms as contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A ⁵ and is incongruent with this Court's products liability jurisprudence.

¶ 15 In Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973), this Court adopted the theory of strict products liability contained in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which provides that “[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer ...” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1) (1965). Although the drafters did not determine whether § 402A applied to bystanders,⁶ they broadly defined the terms consumer and user. For example, they defined the term consumer to “ include not only those who in fact consume the product, but also those who prepare it for consumption....” Id. at § 402A cmt. 1. They reasoned that a consumer does not necessarily have to purchase the product. “He may be a member of the family of the final purchaser, or his employee, or a guest at his table, or a mere donee from the purchaser.” Id. They also stated that the term user “includes those who are passively enjoying the benefit of the product, as in the case of passengers in automobiles or airplanes, as well as those who are utilizing it for the purpose of doing work upon it, as in the case of an employee....” Id.

¶ 16 This Court's products liability jurisprudence recognizes that a failure to warn claim may be brought by persons who are not actual purchasers or users of a product. For example, in Streich v. Hilton–Davis, defendant Hilton–Davis sold a chemical to Streich, a potato farmer, who applied the product to his seed potatoes. Streich later sold some of his seed potatoes to Williamson and Boorman. All three farmers suffered crop damage and sued Hilton–Davis in products liability for failure to warn. Streich v. Hilton–Davis, 214 Mont. 44, 47–48, 692 P.2d 440, 442 (1984). Although Williamson and Boorman had not purchased or used the chemical, they were treated no differently than Streich, and this Court affirmed the jury's damage award on their failure to warn claims. Id. at 57–58, 692 P.2d at 447; see also Hagen v. Dow Chem. Co., 261 Mont. 487, 863 P.2d 413 (1993).

¶ 17 The realities of the game of baseball support the District Court's decision to submit Patches' failure to warn claim to the jury. The bat is an indispensible part of the game. The risk of harm accompanying the bat's use extends beyond the player who holds the bat in his or her hands. A warning of the bat's risks to only the batter standing at the plate inadequately communicates the potential risk of harm posed by the bat's increased exit speed. In this context, all of the players, including Brandon, were users or consumers placed at risk by the increased exit speed caused by H & B's bat. H & B is subject to liability to all players in the game, including Brandon, for the physical harm caused by its bat's increased exit speed. We conclude the District Court did not err in denying H & B summary judgment and submitting Patches' failure to warn claim to the jury.

¶ 18 In addition, H & B argues that summary judgment is appropriate because (1) providing a warning to bystanders is “unworkable,” and (2) Patches could not produce causation evidence establishing that they could have seen, read, and heeded a warning on the bat in a manner to prevent Brandon's death.

¶ 19 H & B's first argument fails because the “workability” of providing a warning is a jury question. See Macrie v. SDS Biotech Corp., 267 N.J.Super. 34, 630 A.2d 805 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1993). In Macrie, employees of a produce broker were seriously injured after being exposed to a toxic fungicide while they unpacked produce that had been treated with the fungicide by a farmer who had sold the produce to their employer. The employees brought a failure to warn claim against the manufacturer of the fungicide. Id. at 807–08. As H & B does here, the manufacturer argued that it was not feasible, i.e., “workable,” to warn the employees of the risks associated with the fungicide. Id. at 808. The Macrie court rejected the manufacturer's argument and concluded that the feasibility of providing warnings is a jury question:

[W]here a jury could find that plaintiff's foreseeable exposure [to the fungicide] would threaten them with serious physical harm, the jury could also determine that minimizing the danger warranted unusually strenuous efforts to provide them with warnings and instructions.

Id. at 810.

¶ 20 H & B's second argument incorrectly limits the scope of the warning by erroneously assuming that placing a warning directly on the bat is the only method to provide a warning. While placing a warning directly on a product is one method of warning, other...