Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–879.,10–879.
• Parties: Gloria Gail KURNS, Executrix of the Estate of George M. Corson, Deceased, et al., Petitioners v. RAILROAD FRICTION PRODUCTS CORPORATION et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

132 S.Ct. 1261

182 L.Ed.2d 116

Gloria Gail KURNS, Executrix of the Estate of George M. Corson, Deceased, et al., Petitioners

v.RAILROAD FRICTION PRODUCTS CORPORATION et al.

No. 10–879.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 9, 2011.

Decided Feb. 29, 2012.

David C. Frederick, Washington, DC, for Petitioners.

Sarah E. Harrington, for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Petitioners.

Jonathan D. Hacker, Washington, DC, for Respondents.

Richard P. Myers, Robert E. Paul, Alan I. Reich, Mary Gilbertson, Paul, Reich & Myers, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, David C. Frederick, Counsel of Record, Brendan J. Crimmins, Emily T.P. Rosen, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, for Petitioners.

Daniel Markewich, Ellen G. Margolis, Amy Kallal, Mound Cotton Wollan & Greengrass, New York, NY, Walter Dellinger, Jonathan D. Hacker (Counsel of Record), Anton Metlitsky, Joanna Nairn, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, DC, for Viad Corp.

James C. Martin, John L. Vitsas, Courtney C.T. Horrigan, David J. Bird, Robert H. Owen, Reed Smith LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, for Railroad Friction Products Corp.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to determine whether petitioners' state-law tort claims for defective design and failure to warn are pre-empted by the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq . The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that petitioners' claims fall within the field pre-empted by that Act, as that field was defined by this Court's decision in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432 (1926). We agree.

I

George Corson was employed as a welder and machinist by the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad from 1947 until 1974. Corson worked in locomotive repair and maintenance facilities, where his duties included installing brakeshoes on locomotives and stripping insulation from locomotive boilers. In 2005, Corson was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma.

In 2007, Corson and his wife filed suit in Pennsylvania state court against 59 defendants, including respondents Railroad Friction Products Corporation (RFPC) and Viad Corp (Viad). According to the complaint, RFPC distributed locomotive brakeshoes containing asbestos, and Viad was the successor-in-interest to a company that manufactured and sold locomotives and locomotive engine valves containing asbestos. Corson alleged that he handled this equipment and that he was injured by exposure to asbestos. The complaint asserted state-law claims that the equipment was defectively designed because it contained asbestos, and that respondents failed to warn of the dangers of asbestos or to provide instructions regarding its safe use. After the complaint was filed, Corson passed away, and the executrix of his estate, Gloria Kurns, was substituted as a party. Corson's widow and the executrix are petitioners here.

Respondents removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and moved for summary judgment. Respondents argued that petitioners' state-law claims were pre-empted by the LIA. The District Court agreed and granted summary judgment for respondents. See Kurns v. A.W. Chesterton, Civ. Action No. 08–2216, 2009 WL 249769 (ED Pa., Feb. 3, 2009), App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. The Third Circuit affirmed. See Kurns v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., 620 F.3d 392 (2010). We granted certiorari. 563 U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2959, 180 L.Ed.2d 244 (2011).

II

Congress enacted the predecessor to the LIA, the Boiler Inspection Act (BIA), in 1911. The BIA made it unlawful to use a steam locomotive "unless the boiler of said locomotive and appurtenances thereof are in proper condition and safe to operate ... without unnecessary peril to life or limb." Act of Feb. 17, 1911, ch. 103, § 2, 36 Stat. 913–914. In 1915, Congress amended the BIA to apply to "the entire locomotive and tender and all parts and appurtenances thereof."¹ Act of Mar. 4, 1915, ch. 169, § 1, 38 Stat. 1192. The BIA as amended became commonly known as the Locomotive Inspection Act. As relevant here, the LIA provides:

"A railroad carrier may use or allow to be used a locomotive or tender on its railroad line only when the locomotive or tender and its parts and appurtenances—

"(1) are in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury;

"(2) have been inspected as required under this chapter and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation under this chapter; and

"(3) can withstand every test prescribed by the Secretary under this chapter." 49 U.S.C. § 20701.²

The issue presented in this case is whether the LIA pre-empts petitioners' state-law claims that respondents defectively designed locomotive parts and failed to warn Corson of dangers associated with those parts. In light of this Court's prior decision in Napier, supra, we conclude that petitioners' claims are pre-empted.

III

A

The Supremacy Clause provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Pre-emption of state law thus occurs through the "direct operation of the Supremacy Clause." Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U.S. 491, 501, 104 S.Ct. 3179, 82 L.Ed.2d 373 (1984). Congress may, of course, expressly pre-empt state law, but "[e]ven without an express provision for preemption, we have found that state law must yield to a congressional Act in at least two circumstances."

Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000). First, "state law is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute." Ibid. Second, we have deemed state law pre-empted "when the scope of a [federal] statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively." Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995). We deal here only with the latter, so-called field pre-emption.

B

We do not, however, address the LIA's pre-emptive effect on a clean slate, because this Court addressed that issue 85 years ago in Napier . In that case, railroads challenged two state laws that "prohibit[ed] use within the State of locomotives not equipped with" certain prescribed devices, on the ground that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the agency then vested with the authority to carry out the LIA's requirements, had not required the devices in question.³ 272 U.S., at 607, 609, 47 S.Ct. 207. In response, the States argued that their requirements were not pre-empted because they were directed at a different objective than the LIA. Id., at 612, 47 S.Ct. 207. According to the States, their regulations were intended to protect railroad workers from sickness and disease, whereas "the federal regulation endeavors solely to prevent accidental injury in the operation of trains." Ibid.

To determine whether the state requirements were pre-empted, this Court asked whether the LIA "manifest[s] the intention to occupy the entire field of regulating locomotive equipment[.]" Id., at 611, 47 S.Ct. 207. The Court answered that question in the affirmative, stating that "[t]he broad scope of the authority conferred upon the [ICC]" by Congress in the LIA led to that conclusion. Id., at 613, 47 S.Ct. 207. The power delegated to the ICC, the Court explained, was a "general one" that "extends to the design, the construction and the material of every part of the locomotive and tender and of all appurtenances." Id., at 611, 47 S.Ct. 207.

The Court rejected the States' contention that the scope of the pre-empted field was to "be determined by the object sought through the legislation, rather than the physical elements affected by it." Id., at 612, 47 S.Ct. 207. The Court found it dispositive that "[t]he federal and the state statutes are directed to the same subject—the equipment of locomotives." Ibid. Because the States' requirements operated upon the same physical elements as the LIA, the Court held that the state laws, " however commendable or however different their purpose," id., at 613, 47 S.Ct. 207, fell within the LIA's pre-empted field.

IV

Against the backdrop of Napier, petitioners advance two arguments in support of their position that their state-law claims related to the use of asbestos in locomotive equipment do not fall within the LIA's pre-empted field. Petitioners first contend that Napier no longer defines the scope of the LIA's pre-empted field because that field has been narrowed by a subsequently enacted federal statute. Alternatively, petitioners argue that their claims do not fall within the LIA's pre-empted field, even as that field was defined by Napier. We address each of petitioners' arguments in turn.

A

First, petitioners suggest that the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), 84 Stat. 971 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20102 et seq. ), altered the LIA's pre-emptive scope. The FRSA grants the Secretary of Transportation broad regulatory authority over railroad safety. See § 20103(a). Petitioners point to the FRSA's pre-emption provision, which provides in part that "[a] State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety ... until the Secretary of Transportation ... prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement." § 20106(a)(2) (2006 ed., Supp. III). According to petitioners, the FRSA's pre-emption provision supplanted the LIA's pre-emption of the field, with the result that petitioners' claims are not pre-empted because the Secretary has not issued a regulation or order addressing the use of asbestos in locomotives or locomotive parts.

Petitioners' reliance on the FRSA is misplaced. The FRSA instructs that "[t]he Secretary of Transportation, as necessary, shall prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area...