Patches v. Industrial Com'n of Ariz.

• Decision Date: 24 February 2009
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-IC 08-0027.,1 CA-IC 08-0027.
• Citation: 204 P.3d 437
• Parties: Sharon L. PATCHES, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent, City of Phoenix—Division of Accounts, Respondent Employer, SCF Arizona, Respondent Carrier.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

204 P.3d 437

Sharon L. PATCHES, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent City of Phoenix—Division of Accounts, Respondent Employer SCF Arizona, Respondent Carrier.

No. 1 CA-IC 08-0027.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

February 24, 2009.

Taylor & Associates PLLC, By Richard E. Taylor, Briana E. Chua, Phoenix, Attorneys for Petitioner Employee.

Andrew Wade, Acting Chief Counsel, The Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix, Attorney for Respondent.

James B. Stabler, Chief Counsel, SCF Arizona, By John W. Main, Phoenix, Attorneys for Respondents Employer and Carrier.

OPINION

SWANN, Judge.

¶ 1 This special action presents the question whether housekeeping services are compensable under Arizona's workers' compensation system as a matter of law. Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 23-1062(A) (1995), we conclude such services are not compensable and affirm the award of the administrative law judge ("ALJ").

I. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. sections 12-120.21(A)(2) (2003) and 23-951(A) (1995), and Arizona Rules of Procedure for Special Actions 10. In reviewing findings and awards of the Industrial Commission of Arizona ("ICA"), we defer to the ALJ's factual findings but review questions of law de novo. Young v. Indus. Comm'n, 204 Ariz. 267, 270, ¶ 14, 63 P.3d 298, 301 (App.2003). We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Universal Roofers v. Indus. Comm'n, 187 Ariz. 620, 622, 931 P.2d 1130, 1132 (App.1996).

II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY

¶ 3 On March 10, 2000, the respondent employer, City of Phoenix, employed Claimant as a police lieutenant. Claimant was injured when she caught her foot in an electrical cord and fell on her left knee. She filed a workers' compensation claim, which was accepted for benefits. Claimant's industrial injury necessitated knee and back surgery. Shortly after her injury, Claimant also developed reflex sympathetic dystrophy ("RSD"). As a result of these injuries, Claimant is severely physically restricted and uses either crutches or a wheelchair to ambulate.

¶ 4 Beginning as early as March 2001, Claimant's treating physicians recommended that she be provided with housekeeping services. Claimant sought these benefits from the respondent carrier, SCF Arizona ("SCF"), but SCF denied the claim, contending that housekeeping services are not covered medical expenses under A.R.S. § 23-1062(A). It is undisputed that Claimant's current treating physician continues to recommend that Claimant be provided with housekeeping services. Claimant has since obtained and paid for these services herself.

¶ 5 After her back surgery, Claimant received continued medical care and her industrial injury claim was reopened. Claimant again sought to have SCF pay for housekeeping services, but her request for these services was denied. She then requested and received an ICA hearing. After the hearing, the ALJ entered an award denying her request for relief. On administrative review, the ALJ summarily affirmed the award, and Claimant brought this special action.

III. DISCUSSION

¶ 6 A claimant who suffers an industrial injury is entitled to receive statutorily-defined benefits pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-1062:

A. Promptly, upon notice to the employer, every injured employee shall receive medical, surgical and hospital benefits or other treatment, nursing, medicine, surgical supplies, crutches and other apparatus, including artificial members, reasonably required at the time of the injury, and during the period of disability. Such benefits shall be termed "medical, surgical and hospital benefits."

Whether a particular type of treatment is reasonably required is a medical question and requires expert medical testimony. See generally Bergstresser v. Indus. Comm'n, 118 Ariz. 155, 157, 575 P.2d 354, 356 (App. 1978) (noting the importance of the conflicting testimony of medical experts).

¶ 7 Here, Claimant argues that housekeeping services constitute "other treatment" made medically necessary because of her industrially related physical limitations. SCF disputes Claimant's interpretation of the statute and suggests that Arizona case law already holds that domestic services are not covered. A.R.S. § 23-1062(A) does not expressly mention housekeeping or other domestic services, and no Arizona case has addressed the precise issue presented here.

¶ 8 Claimant acknowledges that this case presents an issue of first impression, and urges us to "extend" the statute to "provide such services." We believe that this position misapprehends the proper role of the courts in our system of divided powers.

¶ 9 Benefits under Arizona's workers' compensation system are limited to those prescribed by statute. They are not coextensive with the common law damages available in a fault-based civil tort action. Entire important categories of damages that might be available in a civil tort action are not compensable under the system. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 111 Ariz. 259, 263, 527 P.2d 1091, 1095 (1974) (pain and suffering and loss of consortium are not compensable). Even compensation for lost wages is subject to strict statutory limits.¹ See A.R.S. § 23-1041 (Supp.2008). The concept underlying the entire system "is a trade of tort rights for an expeditious, no-fault method by which an employee can receive compensation for accidental injuries sustained in work-related accidents." Stoecker v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 194 Ariz. 448, 451, ¶ 11, 984 P.2d 534, 537 (1999). Accordingly, while we are mindful that the workers' compensation statutes are to be construed "liberally," with an eye toward ensuring full compensation, we cannot "extend" compensation beyond that allowed by the Arizona Workers' Compensation Act. See Putz v. Indus. Comm'n, 203 Ariz. 146, 150-51, ¶ 24, 51 P.3d 979, 983-84 (App.2002).

¶ 10 "It is the rule of statutory construction that courts will not read into a statute something which is not within the express manifest intention of the Legislature as gathered from the statute itself, and similarly the court will not inflate, expand, stretch or extend the statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions." Martin v. Althoff, 27 Ariz.App. 588, 591, 557 P.2d 187, 190 (App.1976) (citation omitted). To be sure, a strictly literal reading of a statute does not always do justice to legislative intent. Courts are frequently called upon to determine whether the concepts articulated in statutes apply to situations that may not have been within the specific contemplation of the legislature at the time of passage. And the courts must, where possible, avoid construing statutes in such a manner as to produce absurd or unconstitutional results. See, e.g., Hayes v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 272, 872 P.2d 668, 676 (1994); State v. Flores, 160 Ariz. 235, 239, 772 P.2d 589, 593 (App.1989). Accordingly, while the absence of express language identifying housekeeping services does not itself dispose of Claimant's position, the absence of any statutory language identifying a category of services within which housekeeping could credibly fit ends the inquiry. Any extension of the reach of the statute to achieve a desired outcome must be accomplished by the legislature, not the courts. See, e.g., McPeak v. Indus. Comm'n, 154 Ariz. 232, 235-36, 741 P.2d 699, 702-03 (App.1987).

¶ 11 In Hughes v. Indus. Comm'n, 188 Ariz. 150, 933 P.2d 1218 (App.1996), we considered a type of benefit similar to housekeeping services, and held that the claimant was not entitled to the benefit. The claimant in that case argued that child care was "reasonably required other treatment" under A.R.S. § 23-1062(A). 188 Ariz. at 152, 933 P.2d at 1220. In rejecting the claimant's argument, we recognized:

Claimant concedes that child care generally is not medical treatment. However, she asserts that it should be classified as medical treatment when a doctor recommends it to relieve stress. The difficulty with this argument is that such a theory extends equally to any source of stress. A claimant may experience stress because he or she cannot care for an aging parent or disabled sibling, because he or she cannot meet financial obligations, or because he or she cannot perform a variety of domestic obligations.

Id. at 154, 933 P.2d at 1222.

¶ 12 We recently relied on Hughes to support our decision in Carbajal v. Indus. Comm'n, 218 Ariz. 578, 190 P.3d 737 (App. 2008). In Carbajal, the claimant was severely injured and required attendant care services each day, for eight to ten hours per day. 218 Ariz. at 579, ¶ 4, 190 P.3d at 738. At times when the attendant was not present, the claimant's wife provided these services herself. Id. at 580, ¶ 7, 190 P.3d at 739. The wife sought compensation from the carrier for her services. Id. The carrier refused to reimburse her, and following an ICA hearing, the ALJ agreed. Id. at 580-81, ¶ 10, 190 P.3d at 739-40. We affirmed. Id. at 584, ¶ 24, 190 P.3d at 743. Applying the principle of ejusdem generis, we concluded that the term "other treatment" did not extend to all services that a doctor might recommend after an injury because the specific examples preceding that general term were all medical in nature. Id. at 582, ¶ 17, 190 P.3d at 741 ("[T]he legislature intended the statute to cover treatment or benefits of the "medical" type and not services which would normally be rendered by a spouse during a marriage."). We agreed that the "services provided by Wife to Claimant were more akin to ordinary household duties than services typically provided by skilled attendants." Id. at 584, ¶ 23, 190 P.3d at 743.

¶ 13 Professors Larson have recognized the dichotomy between skilled nursing duties and household duties in their workers' compensation treatise. In their discussion of medical benefits covered by workers' compensation they note: "[w]hile `attendance' in the...