Patel v. Dixon
| Decision Date | 23 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:20cv23-MW-HTC |
| Parties | RAKESH K. PATEL, Petitioner, v. RICKY D. DIXON,[1] Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Rakesh K. Patel (“Patel”), through counsel, filed an amended petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a judgment and sentence from the circuit court of Duval County, Florida, for attempted murder. ECF Doc. 16. The matter was referred to the undersigned judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and N.D. Fla Loc. R. 72.2(B). After considering the amended petition, the record, the State's response, ECF Doc. 19, and Patel's reply, ECF Doc. 21, the undersigned recommends the amended petition be DENIED without an evidentiary hearing.
Patel was charged by an Amended Information for Attempted Murder in the First Degree for the September 10, 2009 shooting of Rinku Amin (“Amin”), a man Patel believed was having an affair with his wife and plotting with her and others to murder him. See Case No.: 2009-CF-12020. The state court initially found Patel incompetent to stand trial. Five months later, at a review hearing, the court found Patel had regained competency, released him on bond with certain conditions related to Patel's continued treatment and medication, and Patel proceeded to trial after rejecting a plea deal.
At trial, Patel's counsel admitted Patel shot Amin but argued he met Florida's definition of legal insanity at the time of the offense. The defense offered the testimony of several family members who described Patel as suffering from paranoia, delusions, and extreme religious beliefs, which abruptly began a few months before the shooting. Patel also offered the testimony of three psychiatrists who examined Patel and testified he was legally insane at the time of the shooting. On rebuttal, the prosecution offered the testimony of a psychiatrist who opined that although Patel suffered from a delusional disorder leading up to, and at the time of, the shooting, he did not meet the definition of legal insanity because his actions and statements showed he knew what he was doing, knew that it was wrong, and knew the consequences of his actions. The jury rejected the insanity defense and found Patel guilty of attempted murder; he was sentenced to the minimum mandatory sentence of 25 years.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a petitioner must file a habeas petition within one year of certain trigger dates. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The applicable trigger date here is the date Patel's judgment and conviction became final. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Patel filed a direct appeal (through counsel) to the First District Court of Appeals (“First DCA”), which affirmed, per curiam and without written opinion, on September 2, 2014. ECF Doc. 14-13; First DCA Case No.: 1D13-3038. He did not seek review in the Florida or United States Supreme Court. ECF Doc. 16 at 2-3. The judgment and conviction, therefore, became final on Monday, December 1, 2014.
The one-year deadline is tolled by properly filed postconviction motions until the motions are fully resolved. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Here, Patel filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence under Rule 3.800(a) on July 24, 2015, ECF Doc. 14-14 at 5. That motion was continuously pending until December 12, 2017, when the trial court's denial was affirmed on appeal. ECF Doc. 14-15 at 3; First DCA Case No.: 1D17-3224. Also, on November 30, 2015, Patel filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief under Rule 3.850, which was continuously pending through several amendments,[2] until September 4, 2019, when the First DCA issued its mandate affirming the denial. ECF Doc. 19-20 at 2. Thus, the one-year deadline was tolled from July 24, 2015 to September 4, 2019. Patel filed the original federal petition, ECF Doc. 1, on January 13, 2020, one day before the AEDPA deadline expired. The original petition contained four grounds for relief.
On July 13, 2020, Patel filed an amended petition, containing two additional grounds for relief (Grounds Five and Six). For those grounds to be timely, they must relate back to the original petition. Petitioner argues those grounds relate back to the original petition because they arise out of the same common core of operative facts as Ground One of the original petition. The undersigned agrees. As discussed below, all three grounds are based on whether facts exist in the record showing Patel was not competent shortly before, or at the time of, trial. “So long as the original and amended petitions state claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts, relation back will be in order.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2)). Thus, those claims are also timely.
The AEDPA governs a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under the AEDPA, relief may only be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court if the adjudication:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet. White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014). “Clearly established federal law” consists of the governing legal principles set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court when the state court issued its decision. Id. A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).
A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle, but applies it to the facts of Patel's case in an objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000), or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000)). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fair-minded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).
Also, factual determinations by the state courts are “presumed to be correct, and the petitioner can rebut this presumption only by clear and convincing evidence.” Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926, 930-31 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1130 n.58 (11th Cir. 2000)). The presumption of correctness afforded factual findings extends to both trial and appellate state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Jennings v. Crosby, 392 F.Supp.2d 1312, 1318 (N.D. Fla. 2005), aff'd sub nom. Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2007).
Patel raises several grounds based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel (“IATC”). An IATC claim requires a showing that (1) counsel's performance during representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) prejudice resulted, i.e., that a reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's unprofessional conduct, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). The reasonableness of counsel's performance is to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential. Id. at 689. The petitioner bears the burden of proving counsel's performance was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and the challenged action was not sound strategy. Id. at 688-89.
Strickland's prejudice prong requires a petitioner to allege more than simply that counsel's conduct might have had “some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. Petitioner must show a reasonable probability exists that, “but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Bare allegations of prejudice are not enough. Smith v. White, 815 F.2d 1401, 1406-07 (11th Cir. 1987).
The undersigned will discuss Grounds One, Five, and Six together because they hinge on Patel's competency shortly before and at the time of, trial. In Ground One, Patel argues counsel was ineffective for allowing Patel to reject a favorable plea offer without having his competency re-evaluated. In Ground Five, Patel argues the state court erred in trying an incompetent person, and, in Ground Six, Patel argues the state court erred in failing to have his competency re-evaluated prior to trial. As discussed below, the undersigned finds a lack of evidence in the record to show Patel was incompetent shortly prior to or at trial, as necessary to support any of these three...
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