Pater v. Pater

• Citation: 63 Ohio St.3d 393,588 N.E.2d 794
• Decision Date: 15 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-2447,90-2447
• Parties: PATER, Appellee, v. PATER, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Page 393

63 Ohio St.3d 393

588 N.E.2d 794

PATER, Appellee, v. PATER, Appellant.

No. 90-2447.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Dec. 10, 1991.

Decided April 15, 1992.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. A parent may not be denied custody of a child on the basis of the parent's religious practices unless there is probative evidence that those practices will adversely affect the mental or physical health of the child. Evidence that the child will not be permitted to participate in certain social or patriotic activities is not sufficient to prove possible harm.

2. A court may not restrict a non-custodial parent's right to expose his or her child to religious beliefs, unless the conflict between the parents' religious beliefs is affecting the child's general welfare.

On January 19, 1988, Robert A. Pater, plaintiff-appellee, filed an action to divorce Jennifer M. Pater, defendant-appellant, in the Domestic Relations Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County. Plaintiff's complaint included a request for custody of the couple's son, Bobby Pater. Bobby was born on July 9, 1985 and was three years old when the court awarded custody.

The court held the custody hearing on August 8 and August 17, 1988. There was no dispute that both parties were conscientious and loving parents. Jennifer had quit her job to care for Bobby when he was born and had recently resumed working as a dental technician for approximately twenty hours a week. She testified that her sister lived nearby and would be able to watch Bobby while she (Jennifer) was at work. Robert Pater worked full-time and testified that his mother and sister-in-law would be available to watch Bobby while he (Robert) was at work.

The record demonstrates that the major issue in this case was the effect that Jennifer's religious practices would have on Bobby if the court granted custody to her. Jennifer had recently converted to the Jehovah's Witnesses religion, while her husband remained a member of the Roman Catholic church. Early in the hearing, the judge stated that he "would not make a decision based purely on the religeous [sic ] aspects of this case." On the second day of the hearing, the judge stated that the issue was whether the mother would indoctrinate her child in her religion, and was "that going to in some way adversely affect the moral, mental, and physical health and judgement [sic ] of this child adversely, so as not to be in the child's best interests." The hearing proceeded as follows.

Several family members, neighbors, and friends testified that Robert was an affectionate and competent father. The remainder of plaintiff's case concerned Jennifer's religious beliefs. Plaintiff's counsel called Jennifer as a hostile witness, and questioned her at great length about whether Jehovah's Witnesses celebrate holidays, associate with non-members, participate in extracurricular activities and social organizations, salute the flag, and sing the national anthem.

Counsel also called two expert witnesses to prove that the child would be harmed if he were raised as a Jehovah's Witness. Dr. Gerald Bergman, Ph.D., a former Jehovah's Witness, testified about religious doctrine and his experiences growing up as a Jehovah's Witness. He also concluded, on the basis of his dissertation, that mental illness occurs more frequently among the Jehovah's Witnesses than it does in the general population. Dr. Cynthia Denber, a clinical psychologist, who had not interviewed Bobby, stated that extracurricular activities and exposure to different cultural and religious beliefs are beneficial to a child's development. She stated that conflict between the parents' religious beliefs can upset a child. Robert testified that on one occasion Bobby said that "church is bad," then cried and said that he was confused.

In addition to the extensive discussion of Jennifer's religion in her own and Dr. Bergman's testimony, other witnesses made repeated references to the fact that she no longer celebrated holidays or attended the Catholic church. During closing argument, plaintiff's counsel frequently read from Jehovah's Witnesses' publications and interjected his own interpretation of the text.

Defense counsel called several of Jennifer's relatives and associates to testify on her behalf. In addition to testifying about Jennifer's close relationship with Bobby, these witnesses rebutted plaintiff's case by testifying in detail about the Jehovah's Witnesses. Donald Swartley, an elder at the Kingdom Hall where Jennifer attended services, testified exclusively about the Witnesses' beliefs and was questioned briefly by the court about those beliefs on two separate occasions. Steve Lambers, the son of a Roman Catholic father and a Jehovah's Witness mother, testified about his experiences growing up with parents of different religions. On cross-examination, plaintiff's counsel asked each Jehovah's Witness who testified whether he believed that all information in the Witnesses' publications was absolutely true.

The trial court awarded custody to Robert on September 26, 1988. Jennifer filed a Motion for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 7, 1988. On November 7, 1988, Robert moved to strike that motion because it was not filed timely. The court never took any action on either motion.

The court heard Jennifer's request for visitation on December 8, 1988. At that hearing, the judge told Jennifer that he would not grant visitation rights if she was going to teach the child her religion or take the child to Kingdom Hall. After being assured that she would follow the court's instructions, the judge set a visitation schedule which included the restriction that "[d]efendant shall not teach or expose the child to the Jehovah[']s Witnesses' beliefs in any form."

The court of appeals affirmed the domestic court's custody and visitation orders and found no abuse of discretion by the trial court because "the child would be less likely to receive proper medical attention, ¹ obtain a college education, or participate in social activities" if Jennifer were to be granted custody.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Bolsinger & Brinkman, Don C. Bolsinger and Karen R. Brinkman, Cincinnati, for appellee.

Wilma B. Mesaros, Loveland, Thomas J. Mirras, Columbus, and Carolyn R. Wah, New York City, for appellant.

WRIGHT, Justice.

Today we reaffirm that a domestic relations court may consider the religious practices of the parents in order to protect the best interests of a child. Birch v. Birch (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 85, 11 OBR 327, 463 N.E.2d 1254. However, the United States Constitution flatly prohibits a trial court from ever evaluating the merits of religious doctrine or defining the contents of that doctrine. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div. (1981), 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624. Furthermore, custody may not be denied to a parent solely because she will not encourage her child to salute the flag, celebrate holidays, or participate in extracurricular activities. We reverse the trial court's custody and visitation orders because these decisions were improperly based on Jennifer Pater's religious beliefs.

Our analysis of this case begins with the child custody statute and our standard of review in custody disputes. Former R.C. 3109.04(C) (now 3109.04[F][c], [d] and [e] ) provided that to determine the best interests of a child, a domestic court judge must consider all relevant factors, including:

" * * *

"(3) The child's interaction and interrelationship with his parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;

"(4) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and community;

"(5) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation."

The statutory standard is written broadly and requires the domestic relations judge to consider all factors that are relevant to the best interests of the child. The purpose of a far-reaching inquiry is to allow the judge to make a fully informed decision on an issue as important as which parent will raise the child. "The discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody matters should be accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court's determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned. The knowledge a trial court gains through observing the witnesses and the parties in a custody proceeding cannot be conveyed to a reviewing court by a printed record." (Citations omitted.) Miller v. Miller (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 523 N.E.2d 846, 849. A reviewing court will not overturn a custody determination unless the trial court has acted in a manner that is arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. Id.

It is against this standard of broad discretion that we must review the scope of a trial court's inquiry into the parents' religious practices. The other starting point for our analysis is that a court may well violate the parent's constitutional rights if its decision is improperly based on religious bias. See Palmore v. Sidoti (1984), 466 U.S. 429, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (courts cannot implement private prejudices, even if they are widely held by the population). The United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution forbid state action which interferes with the religious freedom of its citizens or prefers one religion over another. ² To the extent that a court refuses to award custody to a parent because of her religious beliefs, the court burdens her choice of a religion in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution. See Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1218 (religious beliefs are absolutely protected); Employment Division v. Smith (1990), 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (state discrimination based on religious beliefs is prohibited, although a state...