Pathfinder Coach Division of Superior Coach Corp. v. Cottrell

• Decision Date: 26 January 1953
• Docket Number: No. 38536,38536
• Citation: 62 So.2d 383,216 Miss. 358
• Parties: PATHFINDER COACH DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COACH CORP. et al. v. COTTRELL et al.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 383

62 So.2d 383

216 Miss. 358

PATHFINDER COACH DIVISION OF SUPERIOR COACH CORP. et al. v. COTTRELL et al.

No. 38536.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Jan. 26, 1953.

Lipscomb & Ray, Jackson, for appellants.

Crawley & Brooks, Kosciusko, for appellees.

ARRINGTON, Justice.

This is an appeal by Pathfinder Coach Division of Superior Coach Corporation and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Attala County affirming an order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission awarding compensation to Claudie Dotson Cottrell, as the widow, and Lyda Pearl Scott, as the child of Andy Cottrell.

The undisputed facts reveal that the appellee, Claudie Dotson Cottrell, was married to one Charles Scott on April 24, 1932. To this union was born one child, Lyda Pearl Scott, one of the appellees herein. In 1936, the Scotts separated permanently, there being some talk of a divorce, but no divorce was ever obtained by either party. Charles Scott was living at the time of the death of the deceased, Andy Cottrell. On March 14, 1939, Claudie Dotson Scott entered into a ceremonial marriage with Andy Cottrell. From that date, Claudie Scott and Andy Cottrell lived together in Attala County, Mississippi, as husband and wife, until the death of Andy Cottrell on May 18 1951. During that period Lyda Pearl Scott lived with her mother and Andy Cottrell, being wholly dependent upon him for her support, and from the evidence it is clear that Andy Cottrell treated her in every way as if she were his own child.

It is stipulated in the record that Andy Cottrell's death occurred while he was an employee of Pathfinder Coach Division of Superior Coach Corporation, and that his death arose out of and was in the course of his employment.

The appellant argues on this appeal that the provisions of Sec. 2(12) and Sec. 2(14) of the Workmen's Compensation Law, Chap. 354 of the Laws of Miss. 1948, as amended by Chap. 412 of the Laws of Miss. 1950, are unconstitutional. Sec. 2(12) defines 'child' as follows: "Child' shall include a posthumous child, a child legally adopted prior to the injury of the employee, a child in relation to whom the deceased employee stood in the place of a parent for at least one year prior to the time of injury, and a stepchild or acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased, but does not include married children unless wholly dependent on him. * * *'

Sec. 2(14) defines widow as follows: 'The term 'widow' includes the decedent's legal wife, living with him or dependent for support upon him at the time of his death, or living apart for justifiable cause, or by reason of his desertion at such time, provided, however, such separation had not existed for more than 3 years without an award for separate maintenance or alimony or the filing of a suit for separate maintenance or alimony in the proper court in this state. The term 'widow' shall likewise include one not a legal wife, but who had entered into a ceremonial marriage with the decedent at least one year prior to his death, and who on the date of the decedent's death stood in the relationship of a wife, provided there was no living legal spouse who had protected her rights for support by affirmative action as hereinabove required. The term 'widow' or 'widower' as contemplated in this act shall not apply to any person who has since his or her separation from decedent entered into a ceremonial marriage or lived in open adultery with another.'

The appellant concedes that Claudie Dotson Scott Cottrell comes within the purview of Sec. 2(14) and that she would be entitled to the death benefits authorized by the act if the above quoted provision is valid. However, appellant contends that the said provision is unconstitutional as it is in conflict with the public policy of the state in that it allows a bigamous wife to receive benefits.

Counsel points out the fact that he is not attacking the constitutionality of the workmen's compensation law as a whole, but only Secs. 2(12) and 2(14), as set out above. Though citing no specific provision of the Constitution prohibiting such legislation, counsel for appellant would have this Court draw from Secs. 18, 201, and 241 of the Constitution of 1890, a paramount public policy prohibiting legislation which would allow a bigamous wife to recover benefits under the workmen's compensation law. We are of the opinion that these sections do not announce such policy. Sec. 18, which provides enjoyment of all religious freedom, but does not justify acts of licentiousness injurious to morals, and Sec. 201, which requires the legislature to encourage the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral and agricultural improvement by establishing free public schools, cannot be stretched out of context so as to proclaim a public policy prohibiting the provisions which we have before us. Sec. 241, which disfranchises a person convicted of bigamy, even if otherwise qualified to vote, announces no broad public policy in regard to bigamous relationships, but only constitutes a specific restriction on the legislature.

It is almost universally held that a workmen's compensation law is authorized under the police power of the state as furthering a sound public policy. 58 Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 9. The Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Law regulating the responsibility of employers for the injury or death of employees bears so close a relationship to the protection of the lives and safety of those concerned as to be a proper exercise of the police powers reserved to the state.

In the instant case, we have been urged by counsel for appellant to declare the above quoted provision of the workmen's compensation law unconstitutional for the reason that it is opposed to the public policy of this state in that it allows a bigamous wife to receive death benefits under it for the death of her putative husband, despite the legislature's enactment of said provision which constitutes an announcement by that body that the public policy of this state is that all such persons as are embraced by its provisions are entitled to the benefits of the law. One of the fundamental principles of judicial review is that in the determination of public policy the acts of the legislative body shall be looked to because the legislative act, if otherwise constitutional, declares the policy of the state and is final so far as the courts are concerned. 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Sec. 139.

In the case of Miss. State Tax Commission v. Flora Drug Co., 167 Miss. 1, 148 So. 373, 376, the court quoted with approval from Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Vol. I, Sec. 65, 2d ed., as follows: 'Statutes cannot be declared invalid on the ground that they are unwise, unjust, unreasonable, or immoral, or because opposed to public policy, or the spirit of the Constitution.' And in Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, 803, 115 A.L.R. 1436, the Court said: 'In determining whether an act of the Legislature violates the Constitution, the courts are without the right to substitute their judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom and policy of the act and must enforce it, unless it appears beyond all reasonable doubt to violate the Constitution. 'Nor are the courts at liberty to declare an Act (of the legislature) void, because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution, but not expressed in words.' 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed. at page 351, quoted with approval in Mississippi State Tax Commission v. Flora Drug Co., 167 Miss. 1, at page 20, 148 So. 373, at page 376.' See also Russell Investment Corp. v. Russell, 182 Miss. 385, 386, 178 So. 815, 182 So. 102; Drummond v. State, 184 Miss. 738, 185 So. 207.

In Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 40 S.Ct. 499, 502, 64 L.Ed. 878, the United States Supreme Court said there, as we do here: 'Questions of policy are not submitted to judicial determination, and the courts have no general authority of supervision over the exercise of discretion which under our system is reposed in the people or other departments of government. * * * With the wisdom of such legislation, and the soundness of the economic policy involved we are not concerned. Whether it will result in ultimate good or harm it is not within our province to inquire.' Albritton v. City of Winona, supra.

The provisions in Secs. 2(12) and (14) represent a legislative attempt to protect an acknowledged illegitimate child who is dependent upon a deceased laborer, and a putative widow who has entered into a ceremonial marriage with decedent and who stood in the relationship of a wife at his death, provided no living legal spouse had protected her rights by affirmative action as set forth in the statute. The essential basis of the latter classification is dependency under a ceremonial marriage, and not the legality of the marriage itself. We can not say that economic dependency under these circumstances, both as to the wife and...