Ward v. Colom
| Decision Date | 07 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2016–M–01072–SCT,2016–M–01072–SCT |
| Citation | 253 So.3d 265 |
| Parties | Ricky W. WARD v. Dorothy Winston COLOM |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER: THOMAS E. PAYNE, Biloxi
FOR RESPONDENTS: DOROTHY WINSTON COLOM, KENNETH M. BURNS, H. J. DAVIDSON, JR.
EN BANC.
¶ 1. In 2011, the Mississippi Legislature amended Mississippi Code Section 97–37–7, granting enhanced concealed-carry licensees the privilege of carrying a concealed firearm in the courthouses of this state, save for courtrooms, which the Legislature left within the province of judges.1 Litigants, witnesses, and family members who do not have enhanced concealed-carry licenses are subject to the general ban found in Mississippi Code Section 97–37–1 (Rev. 2014), which makes carrying a concealed weapon illegal for persons without enhanced concealed-carry licenses. Nonetheless, the three chancellors of the Fourteenth Chancery District, on their own motion, issued a court order prohibiting enhanced concealed-carry licensees from possessing a firearm in and around courthouse buildings of the Fourteenth District.
¶ 2. Thereafter, Ricky Ward, an enhanced concealed-carry licensee, filed a petition to modify or dismiss the order. The chancellors issued another order denying Ward's petition and reiterated that enhanced concealed-carry licensees would be prohibited from possessing a firearm in all Fourteenth District courthouses. Ward then filed an Extraordinary Writ of Prohibition in this Court, seeking to have the orders vacated as unconstitutional and in direct conflict with state law.
¶ 3. This Court ordered additional briefing, requesting the parties to address the following issues:
¶ 4. The Attorney General, National Rifle Association, Attorney Virgil Gillespie, and Chancellor James Persons2 also filed briefs.
¶ 5. Having considered the law and arguments offered by the aforementioned, the Court finds that the orders are facially unconstitutional. Furthermore, the orders defy existing Mississippi statutory and caselaw. Accordingly, the orders are vacated. They are nullius juris —of no legal force.3
¶ 6. Article 1, Sections 1 and 2 of the Mississippi Constitution establish clear lines of demarcation among the three branches of government. Section 1 establishes that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our state government are separate and co-equal: "The powers of the government of the State of Mississippi shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to-wit: those which are legislative to one, those which are judicial to another, and those which are executive to another." Section 2 provides that no person belonging to one of those departments "shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others." In other words, when the executive branch or legislative branch has been properly delegated a power, the judiciary is without authority to assume that power.
¶ 7. One of the clearest delegations of legislative power in our Constitution is found in Article 3, Section 12. It provides: "The right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, but the Legislature may regulate or forbid carrying concealed weapons." (Emphasis added.) Without equivocation, the Legislature is the branch of government that the citizens of Mississippi chose to regulate or forbid concealed weapons.
¶ 8. A plain reading of these provisions in our Constitution renders the orders unconstitutional on their face, for "no set of circumstances exists under which the [orders] would be valid." U.S. v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2100, 95 L.Ed. 2d 697 (1987). "[T]he key to a successful facial challenge ... is whether [the orders], as [they are] currently written, could never be constitutionally applied and valid." Crook v. City of Madison , 168 So.3d 930, 942 (Miss. 2015) (Coleman, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Applying this standard to the present case, the chancellors' orders, as they currently are written, could never be constitutional. The Mississippi Constitution vests only the Legislature with the authority to regulate or forbid carrying concealed weapons. The orders at issue usurp that power.
¶ 9. Notwithstanding the clarity of our Constitution and the statute, the chancellors urge this Court to approve their actions as an "inherent power," despite the orders reaching beyond the Constitution. The chancellors cite Newell v. State , 308 So.2d 71, 72 (Miss. 1975), and Hosford v. State , 525 So.2d 789 (Miss. 1988).
¶ 10. While Newell establishes Mississippi courts' "inherent power," it clearly holds such power is limited by the Constitution and separation-of-powers doctrine. See Newell , 308 So.2d at 76–77 () (emphasis added). A review of the Mississippi Constitution, the Code, and caselaw reveals that judges do not have "inherent power" to control security beyond their courtrooms or to regulate concealed weapons outside their courtrooms. These powers are nonexistent, for there simply is no language in our Constitution that grants courts such power, and "this Court must declare the Mississippi Constitution as it is written ...." In Re Hooker , 87 So.3d 401, 423 (Miss. 2012) (Randolph, P.J., dissenting). Turning to the separation-of-powers doctrine, the Constitution specifically vests the Legislature with authority to regulate concealed weapons. The judicial branch therefore is without constitutional authority to exercise that power, for it properly belongs to the Legislature, as mandated by our Constitution. Miss. Const. art. 1, § 2.
¶ 11. The chancellors next argue that Hosford provides validity to the orders. Hosford , 525 So.2d at 789. In Hosford , a trial judge petitioned this Court for direction regarding how to handle external noise affecting trial court proceedings. Id. at 797. Examining the Constitution and state law, this Court held that it is the statutory duty of boards of supervisors and the sheriff to provide adequate court facilities and security for each county. Id. The Hosford Court held that if , and only if, either the board of supervisors, sheriff, or the Legislature fail in their constitutional and statutory obligations to enable the judicial branch to operate, then , and only then, can "the Judicial branch [have] the authority as well as the duty to see that courts do not atrophy." Hosford , 525 So.2d at 798. The record reveals that no such claim has been advanced in this case.
¶ 12. In a unanimous4 opinion penned just three years ago by this Court, we expressly rejected a similar attempt by a circuit judge. Lewis v. Hinds Cty. Circuit Court , 158 So.3d 1117, 1119 (Miss. 2015). In Lewis , this Court was presented with a dispute between the Hinds County Sheriff and the Hinds County Circuit Court that arose from another local court order, which attempted to prescribe several requirements on the sheriff, sheriff's deputies, and bailiffs by which to abide in carrying out their statutory duties. Id. at 1125–26. The Hinds County order contained sections which addressed the hours, uniform, discipline, and duties of bailiffs, inter alia . Id. One section of the order stated that "the sheriff must establish a discipline for the security and maintenance of the court that must be approved by the court ...." Id. at 1125 (emphasis added). Applying the aforementioned constitutional separation-of-powers principles, this Court held that, under Article 5, Section 135 of the Mississippi Constitution, "[t]he sheriff is a member of the executive branch of government," and is " ‘the executive officer of the circuit and chancery court of his county.’ " Id. at 1124 (citing multiple authorities). We further held that, under Mississippi Code Section 19–25–69 (Rev. 2012), "the Legislature has given the sheriff the duties of protecting the courthouse." Id. at 1123. Because the order required judges to approve security measures—a statutory duty of the executive branch—this Court found that section "to be void in full" because it completely contradicted statutory law. Id. at 1126.
¶ 13. Lewis established that the judiciary is without "inherent power" to exercise control of security extending beyond the courtroom, as " ‘[n]o ... governmental official[ ] can exercise power beyond their constitutional authority.’ " Id. at 1124–25 (quoting Barbour v. State ex rel. Hood , 974 So.2d 232, 239 (Miss. 2008) ) (citations omitted). By striking the aforementioned section of the Hinds County order, this Court held that the judiciary's authority to control security begins and ends at the courtroom door. Any attempt by the judiciary to assume or exercise control over the statutory responsibilities of the executive branch is void.
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