Patrick v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 12 April 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 14-1687 (RC)
• Parties: Tambu Patrick, Plaintiff, v. District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

179 F.Supp.3d 82

Tambu Patrick, Plaintiff,

v.District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 14-1687 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed April 12, 2016

Donald Frank Rosendorf, Law Office of Donald F. Rosendorf, Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiff.

Ali Naini, Jonathan Hale Pittman, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

Re Document Nos.: 34, 35

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT I; GRANTING DEFENDANT-OFFICERS' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS II AND V

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

In this action, Plaintiff Tambu Patrick has brought suit against Defendants District of Columbia (the “District”) and Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) Officers Tony Covington, Kristopher Plumley, Ursula Tutt, James Chastanet, Seth Anderson, and Sean Hodges (the “Officers”) for damages resulting from injuries he sustained from a physical confrontation with the Officers on April 10, 2013. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 31. The Court's previous decision granted the District's motion to dismiss Mr. Patrick's original complaint, but granted him leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the law set forth in Monell v. Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)

. See

Patrick v. District of Columbia , 126 F.Supp.3d 132, 139–40 (D.D.C.2015). The District now moves to dismiss Mr. Patrick's claim made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I of the Amended Complaint) and alleges that the amended complaint fails to establish the municipal custom or policy Monell requires. See Mem. Supp. District of Columbia's Mot. Dismiss Count 1 Am. Compl., at 3–7, ECF No. 34-1 [hereinafter D.C.'s Mem. Supp.]. Meanwhile, the Officers move to dismiss some of Mr. Patrick's false imprisonment and abuse of process claims (Counts II and V of the Amended Complaint) and allege that Mr. Patrick failed to bring those claims within the applicable limitations period. See Mem. Supp. MPD Officers' Mot. Dismiss Counts 2 & 5 Am. Compl., at 3–5, ECF No. 35-1 [hereinafter Officers' Mem. Supp.].

The Court will grant the District's motion to dismiss Mr. Patrick's § 1983

claim because the amended complaint does not contain the factual allegations required to survive a motion to dismiss under the standard set by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court will also grant the Officers' motion to dismiss Mr. Patrick's false imprisonment and abuse of process claims because Mr. Patrick failed to bring those claims within the applicable limitations period.

II. BACKGROUND¹

According to the Amended Complaint, an altercation happened on April 10, 2013, between Mr. Patrick and the Officers in the parking lot of his residence in Southeast Washington, D.C. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10–15. Mr. Patrick contends that the Officers searched and beat him without cause. See id. ¶¶ 12–15. Mr. Patrick suffered injuries to his face and back. See id. ¶¶ 12–18. The Officers then arrested Mr. Patrick and charged him with illegal possession of a firearm, possession of PCP,² and possession of heroin with intent to distribute. See id. ¶¶ 17, 20.

Mr. Patrick was held in jail until May 3, 2013, when the criminal charges against him were dismissed. Id. ¶ 21. Three days later, on May 6, 2013, he was arrested and incarcerated for violating parole. Id. ¶ 22. He was released on December 4, 2014. Id.

While incarcerated, Mr. Patrick filed the complaint triggering this lawsuit on October 8, 2014. Compl., at 1, ECF No. 1 (showing that Mr. Patrick filed suit while still incarcerated). This Court granted the District's motion to dismiss that complaint, but also granted Mr. Patrick's motion for leave to file an amended complaint that would better assert his Fourth Amendment claim. See Patrick v. District of Columbia , 126 F.Supp.3d 132, 134–43 (D.D.C.2015)

. After Mr. Patrick filed his amended complaint, the District and the Officers filed motions to dismiss, which are before the Court now. See District of Columbia's Mot. Dismiss Count 1 Am. Compl., ECF No. 34; Officers' Mot. Dismiss Counts 2 & 5 Am. Compl., ECF No. 35. The District argues that Mr. Patrick's § 1983 claim (Count I of the Amended Complaint) should be dismissed because his amended complaint fails to show the requisite causal link between the injuries he sustained and a District custom or policy, which Monell v. Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 694–95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), requires. See D.C.'s Mem. Supp., at 3–7. The Officers argue that Mr. Patrick's false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims (Counts II and V of the Amended Complaint) are barred by a one-year statute of limitations. See Officers' Mem. Supp., at 3–5.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim” in order to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)

; accord

Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff's ultimate likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes , 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)

, abrogated on other grounds by

Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ; Brewer v. District of Columbia , 891 F.Supp.2d 126, 130 (D.D.C.2012). A court considering such a motion presumes that the complaint's factual allegations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g. , United States v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.D.C.2000).

Nevertheless, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). This means that a plaintiff's factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations and footnote omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, see

id. nor must a court presume the veracity of legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations, see

Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Count I: Municipal Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983

provides a private cause of action against municipalities, such as the District, for the deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; Mitchum v. Foster , 407 U.S. 225, 239, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972). To hold a municipality liable for the constitutionally objectionable actions of its employees under § 1983, however, a plaintiff must show how that municipality's policy or custom was the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation. See

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 694–95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ; Baker v. District of Columbia , 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C.Cir.2003) (setting forth the two-part test for determining whether a local government may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell ). First, the plaintiff's complaint must state a claim for a predicate constitutional violation. Baker , 326 F.3d at 1306. Second, the plaintiff must state a claim that the municipality's policy or custom caused the constitutional violation. Id.

The D.C. Circuit has further explained that

[t]here are a number of ways in which a “policy” can be set by a municipality to cause it to be liable under § 1983

: [1] the explicit setting of a policy by the government that violates the Constitution; [2] the action of a policy maker within the government; [3] the adoption through a knowing failure to act by a policy maker of actions by his subordinates that are so consistent that they have become “custom”; or [4] the failure of the government to respond to a need ... in such a manner as to show “deliberate indifference” to the risk that not addressing the need will result in constitutional violations.

Id. at 1306

(citations omitted).

Mr. Patrick's amended complaint seems to assert the fourth basis for liability—that the District was deliberately “indifferen[t]” to MPD officers' “excessive use of force.”

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27. However, as discussed below, Mr. Patrick's amended complaint fails to supply the necessary factual content to meet the pleading requirements prescribed by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)

and Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Twombly

and Iqbal require the plaintiff to allege facts that allow the court to find his claim plausible. See

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (applying Twombly's pleading standard outside of the antitrust context). Mere conclusory statements or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action do not suffice. See

Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (“[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' for his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions ....” (alteration in original) (quoting Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932...