Patrick v. Tennessee Department of Public Welfare, Civ. No. 3-74-248.
| Decision Date | 27 December 1974 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 3-74-248. |
| Citation | 386 F. Supp. 944 |
| Parties | Linda Gail PATRICK v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
David M. Kirstein, Jerrold L. Becker, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiffs.
John L. Bowers, Jr., U. S. Atty., Charles N. Stedman, Asst. U. S. Atty., Knoxville, Tenn., Bart Durham, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn., for defendants.
Before the Court are the cross-motions for summary judgment. The Court heard oral argument on the motions, at which time the parties agreed that all issues could be decided by the Court in one opinion. At the hearing the Court received the testimony of Mr. Waldron, who works under the supervision of the Director of the Food Stamp Division of the Food Nutrition Service of the Department of Agriculture and the testimony of Mr. Cheetwood from the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Plaintiffs, Linda Gail Patrick and Louise Compton, seek declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 enjoining defendants from including Department of Housing and Urban Development (H.U.D.) rent subsidy payments in the calculation of plaintiffs' net income for food stamp purposes. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.
The Court's jurisdiction is invoked by plaintiffs under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1337, 1343(3), 1346, 1361 and 5 U.S.C. § 701.1
A brief recital of the background of this case will aid in the clarification of the legal issues.
Pursuant to the statutory directive of the Food Stamp Act, the amount a household must pay for a fixed monetary amount of food stamps is dependent on two factors: (1) the household's net income after allowance for certain living and business expenses and (2) the number of individuals in the household.2 Thus, under this gradient format the greater the household income, the more the household must pay for a fixed amount of food stamps.
Mrs. Patrick, a resident of Knoxville, first received food stamps in April 1972 on the basis of a two person household. At that time and prior to January 1974 the Tennessee Department of Public Welfare, the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the food stamp program at the state level, did not include the H.U.D. rent supplement payments in the calculation of a household's gross income.3 Accordingly, prior to the change in policy, Mrs. Patrick's gross income was approximately $99.00 a month from Aid to Families with Dependent Children, which after allowing the appropriate deductions entitled her to pay $7.00 for $78.00 of food stamps. However, following the change of policy4 the $101.00 rent subsidy payment from H.U.D. was treated as income, and, accordingly, Mrs. Patrick paid $15.00 per month for the same amount of food stamps. Mrs. Patrick secured employment in March 1974 and due to her increased income paid $58.00 for the food stamps; however, the Department of Welfare continued to include the rent subsidy payment. By including the rent supplement in calculating her gross income and forcing her to pay more for the same amount of food stamps, plaintiff argues that her disposable income is effectively reduced, an outcome in disharmony with the Congressional policy of the Food Stamp Act.5
Mrs. Louise Compton, also a resident of Knoxville, receives $146.00 a month disability and social security insurance in addition to $44.00 a month from her son who lives with her. She lives in the same apartment complex as Mrs. Patrick and pays $55.00 a month for rent which is supplemented by a H.U.D. payment in the amount of $127.00 a month remitted by the Department directly to the project owner. Before the change in policy Mrs. Compton paid $29.00 for a fixed value of food stamps. Following the inclusion of the rental supplement, she was informed that she no longer qualified for participation in the program as her monthly income was in excess of the stamp program's schedule of needs. Thus, in her case the change in policy resulted in denial of the benefits of the food stamp program.
The Food Stamp Act of 1964, as amended,6 in delegating the day to day administration of the Act's program to the Administrator and state agencies, states:
Under the Act, an eligible household pays for stamps at a reduced rate of the coupon's face value, this fractional rate of the face value being dependent upon the household size and net monthly income. The household may in turn use the coupons to purchase food items at participating stores. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2012(b), 2013(a). In promulgating regulations pursuant to the delegation contained in 7 U.S.C. § 2013 the Secretary at 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(1)7 set forth those items that are to be included in calculating a household's net income.
The pertinent parts of this provision are set forth:
Section 271.3(c)(1)(ii) excludes certain items from income:
Finally, Section 271.3(c)(1)(iii) allows certain deductions to be made for various expenses:
Plaintiffs contend that the policy of the Tennessee Department of Public Welfare of including rent supplement payments in the household income is defective because (1) the policy is in conflict with Agriculture's own regulations, specifically, 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(e)(1)(ii) (c) — "gain or benefit which is not in money (e. g. free use of a house)" shall be excluded from income, (2) the policy creates a conclusive presumption that a tenant participating in the rent supplement program is not needy and an arbitrary classification unrelated to the Act's statutory scheme, and (3) the policy unjustifiably distinguishes rent subsidy tenants in HUD 221(d)(3) and 236 housing programs from tenants in public housing under the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.
The State of Tennessee has made no appearance before the Court except to state that it has only followed Agriculture's directives and that it will abide by any disposition of the lawsuit.
Defendant Department of Agriculture has made a motion to dismiss this action or in the alternative for summary judgment principally on the ground that the "determination of what is and what is not income for the purposes of the Food Stamp Act is committed to agency discretion by law within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, Section 701(a)(2), and is therefore not subject to judicial review."8 In placing the determination of what items are to be included and excluded from income beyond the scope of judicial review, defendant contends that the agency action in this case meets the admittedly rigorous test for invoking the exception recently set forth in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). However, the Court cannot conclude that in this instance the Food Stamp Act was "drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply." 401 U.S. at 410, 91 S.Ct. at 821, quoting S.Rep.No.752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945). A general delegation of authority to promulgate regulations and enforcement procedures in the furtherance of an act's administration such as that contained at 7 U.S. C. § 2013(c) cannot be construed automatically to be tantamount to placing the agency's action outside the scope of judicial review. Factually analogous to the instant case is Rodway v. United States Department of Agriculture, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 482 F.2d 722 (1973), where plaintiffs sought review of USDA's establishment of allotment levels for food stamps contending that the agency allotment failed to satisfy the statutory directive that the allotment insure a nutritionally adequate diet. 7 U. S.C. § 2016(a). In the face of the contention by USDA that Congress committed the determination of what constitutes a nutritional diet to the sole discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture, precluding judicial review, the Court, citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 90 S.Ct. 832, 838, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970) for the proposition that judicial review of administrative action "is the rule," stated:
There is no persuasive reason to believe that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of administrative action taken under the Food Stamp Act, either in terms of the statute or in...
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Hein v. Burns
...of the regulations in "cash-out" states and "non cash-out" states and are not factually applicable. Patrick v. Tennessee Department of Public Welfare (E.D.Tenn., 1974), 386 F.Supp. 944, raised equal protection objections to the inclusion of rent subsidy payments in calculating net income fo......
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Compton v. Tennessee Dept. of Public Welfare
...calculation of income under the Food Stamp Act of 1964 as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. In a carefully written opinion reported at 386 F.Supp. 944, District Judge Robert L. Taylor held that the policy did not offend the purposes of the Food Stamp Act, was not in excess of the Secretary's......
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Anderson v. Butz, Civ. No. S-75-401.
...moreover, that several of these issues were disposed of adversely to plaintiffs' present contentions in Patrick v. Tennessee Department of Public Welfare, 386 F.Supp. 944 (E.D.Tenn.1974). One issue, however, which does not involve factual issues and apparently was not raised in the Patrick ......
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Ashley v. Butz, Civ. A. No. 75-0333-R.
...here has been dealt with by other Courts in cases involving the same principle. These cases are: Patrick v. Tennessee Department of Public Welfare et al., 386 F.Supp. 944 (E.D.Tenn., 1974); McInnis v. Weinberger et al., 388 F.Supp. 381 (D.Mass., There being no binding authority in the Fourt......