Rodway v. United States Department of Agriculture, 72-1906.

Decision Date10 July 1973
Docket NumberNo. 72-1906.,72-1906.
Citation157 US App. DC 133,482 F.2d 722
PartiesMiriam RODWAY et al., Appellants, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE et al., Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Ronald F. Pollack, New York City, with whom Roger A. Schwartz, New York City, and John R. Kramer, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellants.

David G. Larimer, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Harold H. Titus, Jr., U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and Robert M. Werdig, Jr., Asst., U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before TAMM and WILKEY, Circuit Judges, and JAMESON,* Senior United States District Judge for the District of Montana.

JAMESON, District Judge:

Plaintiffs-appellants, members of nine low-income households, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, together with the City of New York, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the National Welfare Rights Organization and its affiliates brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Secretary of Agriculture and other officials of the Department, for failure to comply with directives of the Food Stamp Act (7 U. S.C. §§ 2011, 2013(a) and 2016(a)) in refusing to establish coupon allotment levels that reflect "the cost of a nutritionally adequate diet". The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the "issues raised in plaintiffs' complaint are now moot" and that there "are now no material facts in dispute."

Appellants seek a reversal of the order of the district court and a remand with instructions to enter summary judgment in their favor. Appellees contend that the district court properly dismissed the action as moot and that apart from the issue of mootness the summary judgment in their favor should be affirmed.

Food Stamp Act

The Food Stamp Program was established by the Food Stamp Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2025), enacted in 19641 and amended in 1971.2 As amended, Section 2013(a) reads:

"The Secretary is authorized to formulate and administer a food stamp program under which, at the request of the State agency, eligible households * * * shall be provided with an opportunity to obtain a nutritionally adequate diet3 through the issuance to them of a coupon allotment which shall have a greater monetary value than the charge to be paid for such allotment by eligible households. The coupons * * * shall be used only to purchase food from retail food stores which have been approved for participation in the food stamp program. Coupons * * * shall be redeemable at face value by the Secretary through the facilities of the Treasury of the United States."

Section 2016(a), as amended, provides:

"The face value of the coupon allotment which State agencies shall be authorized to issue to any households certified as eligible to participate in the food stamp program shall be in such amount as the Secretary determines to be the cost of a nutritionally adequate diet, adjusted annually to reflect changes in the prices of food published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Department of Labor."

Under the Food Stamp Program, an eligible low-income household is issued coupons for the purchase of any food (except alcoholic beverages, tobacco and imported foods) at an approved retail store. §§ 2012(b), 2013(a). The household is required to pay a charge for the stamps, the amount depending upon the monthly net income of the household and may not exceed 30% of the household's income. § 2016 (b).

On July 29, 1971 the USDA issued new regulations pursuant to the 1971 Amendments to the Act.4 The Secretary of Agriculture determined that the "Economy Food Plan",5 one of five standard Department of Agriculture family food plans,6 "will provide a nutritionally adequate diet to participating households."7 The Secretary then determined the average cost of the Economy Food Plan in the United States and established food stamp coupon allotments at that level, taking into account variations in family size and regional price variations for Alaska and Hawaii.

While the new regulations increased the coupon allotments, they also increased the purchase requirements, with the result that for some households there was a net loss of benefits, since the higher purchase requirements decreased the difference between the price paid and the purchasing power of the coupons. On January 26, 1972 the USDA revised the purchase requirement schedule so that no participating household would "receive less net program benefits than it would have received under the regulations in effect prior to July 29, 1971."8

The instant action was filed after the promulgation of the new regulations on July 29, 1971. With the complaint plaintiffs filed a motion for an "immediate preliminary injunction", contending that when the new regulations became effective in February, 1972 the individual plaintiffs would "lose a substantial amount of their food stamp benefits since the food stamp prices will sharply increase while the allotments remain inadequate and virtually unchanged". The request for the preliminary injunction was withdrawn after USDA rolled back its price increases on January 26, 1972. 37 Fed.Reg. 1180.

Issue of Mootness

On April 6, 1972 defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.9 In an order entered July 6, 1972 the court granted "the motion of the defendants for summary judgment" and ordered the action dismissed. In a supporting memorandum, after reciting that plaintiffs had withdrawn their motion for a preliminary injunction, the court concluded:

"In view of this further revision of the food stamp regulations by the Secretary of Agriculture, it appears that the issues raised in plaintiffs\' complaint are now moot. Although plaintiffs now apparently argue, in opposition to defendants\' motion for summary judgment, that even these recent revisions reinstating the earlier food stamp benefit levels fail to fulfill the purpose of the Food Stamp Act, such an argument was not the gravamen of the complaint. The thrust of their complaint was directed against the regulations promulgated on July 29, 1971. Since those regulations have been changed, there are now no material facts in dispute and defendants\' motion for summary judgment should be granted."

The complaint alleges that "the new monthly coupon allotments — established pursuant to the Economy Diet Plan — are violative of the Food Stamp Act since said allotments are considerably lower than the cost of obtaining an adequate nutritional diet." It is clear from an examination of the complaint in its entirety and supporting memoranda that this is the "gravamen" of plaintiffs' complaint.

In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the level of the coupon allotments, plaintiffs alleged that under the new regulations they would be forced to pay "significantly higher prices for their food stamps." While the rollback in the price increases for stamps removed this cause of complaint and rendered this issue moot, it did not alter or render moot the more substantial claim that the allotment levels established by USDA failed to satisfy the requirements of the Act.

Contentions of Parties

Having concluded that the change in regulations promulgated January 26, 1972 did not render the action moot, we turn to the respective contentions regarding the propriety of summary judgment under the evidence presented to the district court.

Appellants now contend that "there are sufficient undisputed material facts to entitle them to judgment as a matter of law" on the ground that the "Food Stamp coupon allotments established by USDA fail to provide recipients with an opportunity to obtain a nutritionally adequate diet". They recognize, however, that "as to some of the facts, particularly the regional cost differences, * * * there may be disputes", and therefore argue in the alternative that there should be a remand for further factual inquiry.

In urging summary judgment in their favor, appellees contend that (1) Congress intended that USDA use the Economy Food Plan to implement the 1971 amendments to the Food Stamp Act; (2) Congress committed the determination of what constitutes a nutritional diet to the sole discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture, precluding judicial review; and (3) alternatively, judicial review is limited to the issue of whether the Secretary had a rational basis for his determination.

Judicial Review

Congress has clearly committed to the Secretary of Agriculture the determination of what constitutes a "nutritionally adequate diet" and the cost of that diet. He is then required to set the allotment levels accordingly. While the Act does not expressly provide for judicial review of the Secretary's determination, neither does it in express or implied terms preclude review.

Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166, 90 S.Ct. 832, 838, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970), held that judicial review of administrative action "is the rule, and nonreviewability an exception which must be demonstrated." The Court quoted Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L. Ed.2d 681 (1967): "Judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress."

There is no persuasive reason to believe that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of administrative action taken under the Food Stamp Act, either in terms of the statute or in the legislative history cited by appellee.10 Accordingly, we conclude that judicial review is proper.

As to the scope of review, "It is well settled that the fact-finding function is within the exclusive province of the administrative agency. * * * `The judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body.'" (...

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