Patskin v. Board of Educ. of Webster Cent. School

• Decision Date: 30 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07-CV-6321L.,07-CV-6321L.
• Citation: 583 F.Supp.2d 422
• Parties: Barbara PATSKIN, William Patskin, parents of a disabled student, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF WEBSTER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

583 F.Supp.2d 422

Barbara PATSKIN, William Patskin, parents of a disabled student, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF WEBSTER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

No. 07-CV-6321L.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

October 30, 2008.

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Joyce B. Berkowitz, Fairport, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Susan T. Johns, Ferrara, Fiorenza, Larrison, Barrett & Reitz, P.C., East Syracuse, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

DAVID G. LARIMER, District Judge.

This action is brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq., seeking judicial review of the decision of a State Review Officer ("SRO") regarding whether the individualized education program ("IEP") adopted and implemented by the Webster Central School District (the "District") provided sufficient services to S.P., a disabled student, during the 2006-07 school year. Defendant has moved for summary judgment dismissing the action (Dkt. # 13), and plaintiffs have cross-moved for summary judgment (Dkt. # 16).

For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion is granted, and plaintiffs' cross-motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

S.P. is a student residing in the Webster Central School District. He is classified by the District's Committee on Special Education ("CSE") as a student with a disability.

Until the third grade, S.P. was enrolled in regular education classes, and receiving remedial instruction in reading and math. During his fourth grade year (2005-2006), S.P.'s IEP called for an increase in services to: daily 15:1 (a maximum of fifteen students in a class with one teacher) special education classes for math and reading, and daily consultant teacher services for English language arts. S.P. participated in regular education classes for all other subjects.

Implementation of S.P.'s IEP during the 2005-2006 school year resulted in S.P.'s participating in special education reading and math classes comprised of three students each, and receiving writing instruction from a teacher in a group of five students. For the remainder of his school day, he remained with his non-disabled peers in regular fourth grade classes, special area courses, lunch and recess.

According to the District's reports, S.P. benefitted from special education instruction during his fourth grade year, and demonstrated measurable improvements in reading, writing and math. He performed math problems at grade level. His performance in regular education science and social studies classes, however, declined. His teachers reported that S.P. appeared overwhelmed, confused and reluctant to work, performed below grade level and required individual support to complete science and social studies assignments. S.P.'s parents reported that homework had become a problem, and that he was throwing tantrums at home.

In March 2006, S.P.'s parents arranged for him to be evaluated by Dr. Katherine Vullo, a clinical psychologist. She diagnosed him with an adjustment disorder, and opined that pulling S.P. in and out of regular education classes was disruptive and frustrating for him. She recommended that enrollment in the Norman Howard School ("NHS"), an independent day school which exclusively provides special education to students with learning disabilities, would "maximize" S.P.'s academic and personal success.

The CSE convened in April 2006 to develop S.P.'s 2006-2007 school year IEP. At the meeting, plaintiffs presented testimony from Dr. Vullo, including her recommendation that S.P. attend NHS. Plaintiffs' attorney also appeared and advocated for S.P.'s placement at NHS.

The CSE examined S.P.'s emotional state, noting that although he demonstrated immaturity, he appeared happy at school and exhibited none of the tantrum behaviors his parents had noticed at home. District staff described S.P. as happy, well-adjusted and making progress within the special education setting. His progress in special education English and math classes was noted, along with developing difficulties with science and social studies. The CSE concluded that it would be beneficial for S.P. to receive special education classes in science and social studies in addition to reading and math, which would permit a single special education teacher to provide a consistent program and teaching methodology throughout his school day.

The CSE weighed placement of S.P. in 15:1 special education classes at the District's State Road School for core academic subjects, with continued participation in the regular education environment for the remainder of the school day, as opposed to placement at NHS. Ultimately, the CSE determined that the District's 15:1 special education classes were capable of addressing S.P.'s needs in the least restrictive environment ("LRE"), and recommended placement in that setting for the 2006-2007 school year.

Plaintiffs contested the CSE's determination, alleging that the District had not provided S.P. with a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE"). Specifically, plaintiffs contended that the District failed: (1) to sufficiently assess S.P.'s "emotional and social status"; (2) to obtain consent to administer the Woodcock Reading Mastery Test and a Developmental Reading Assessment in March 2006; (3) to conduct an assistive technology evaluation; (4) to give "proper weight" to plaintiffs' concerns about S.P.'s emotional state; (5) to add counseling services to the IEP; (6) to consider whether the related service of parent counseling and training was appropriate; and (7) to place S.P. at NHS for the 2006-2007 school year.

In response to plaintiffs' challenge, an impartial hearing was held over four days in September 2006, before hearing officer Joan B. Alexander. On November 20, 2006 IHO Alexander issued her decision. On November 30, 2006, the IHO issued an order annulling the disputed IEP, and instructed the CSE to convene and immediately place S.P. at NHS.

The District appealed to the New York State Review Officer ("SRO"). By decision and order dated February 26, 2007, the SRO annulled the IHO's decision and order in all respects. He determined that: (1) there were no procedural irregularities sufficient to deny S.P. a FAPE; and (2) the placement recommended by the District provides S.P. with a FAPE, and therefore, the District had no obligation to place S.P. at NHS.

Plaintiffs now appeal from that decision.

DISCUSSION

I. Judicial Review

The IDEA provides that, "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision" of an IHO or SRO may bring a civil action in federal district court (or a state court of competent jurisdiction). 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). Then, the district court "(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). See also Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 380 (2d Cir.2003); J.N. v. Depew Union Free Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 4501940 at *3-*4, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76285 at *7-*8 (W.D.N.Y.2008).

However, despite the district court's duty to provide independent judicial review, it "is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review." Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). "While federal courts do not simply rubber stamp administrative decisions, they are expected to give `due weight' to these proceedings, mindful that the judiciary generally `lacks the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.'" Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir.1998), quoting (Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 at 206, 208, 102 S.Ct. 3034).

While "[t]he proposition that the courts must give `due weight' raises the question of how much weight is due," Schied v. Board of Educ. of the Penfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 2927875 at *3, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74332 at *10 (W.D.N.Y.2006), it is well settled that "deference is particularly appropriate when . . . the state hearing officers' review has been thorough and careful." Walczak, 142 F.3d 119 at 129. Nonetheless, the "due weight" to be accorded to the state administrative proceedings extends solely to issues of fact, and "is not implicated with respect to . . . issue[s] of law," Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1122 (2d Cir.1997), since "[s]tate hearing officers are not more experienced or expert than courts in interpreting federal statutes or the federal constitution . . ." Lillbask v. Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir.2005).

The court's inquiry is two-fold. The court "must assess: (1) whether the state complied with the procedural requirements of the IDEA, and (2) whether the challenged IEP was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits—in particular, whether the IEP complied with the IDEA's statutory mandate that [a student] be educated in the least restrictive environment." Mr. and Mrs. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-119 (2d Cir.2008) quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d 119 at 130 (internal quotations omitted). In determining whether the IEP was IDEA-compliant, the state is not obligated to "`maximize the potential of handicapped children,'" but the door of public education must be opened in a "meaningful way," and the IEP must provide the opportunity for more than only "`trivial advancement.'" Id. It is also clear that school districts are not required to accede to whatever educational program is preferred by the child or the parents.

II. Mootness

Initially, the District argues that the matter should be dismissed on mootness grounds, because the 2006-2007 school year has passed, and...