Patterson v. Matteson

• Docket Number: 21-cv-07391 BLF (PR)
• Decision Date: 30 August 2022
• Parties: NORMAN E. PATTERSON, Plaintiff, v. G. MATTESON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

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NORMAN E. PATTERSON, Plaintiff, v. G. MATTESON, Defendant.

No. 21-cv-07391 BLF (PR)

United States District Court, N.D. California

August 30, 2022

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCKET NO. 10)

BETH LABSON FREEMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff a state prisoner, filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Warden G. Matteson, for the violation of his right to equal protection. Dkt. No. 1.^[1] Finding the complaint stated cognizable claims, the Honorable Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore ordered service upon Defendant. Dkt. No. 6. Defendant Matteson filed a motion for summary judgment based on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiff's equal protection rights were not violated; (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit; (3) the suit is barred by res judicata; (4) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the Court from reviewing the state court decisions; and (5) Plaintiff's claim is either unripe or barred by the statute of limitations. Dkt. No. 10.^[2]This matter was reassigned to this Court on February 16, 2022. Dkt. No. 12. Plaintiff did not file an opposition although given an opportunity to do so. However, Plaintiff's complaint is verified and therefore may be treated as an opposing affidavit.^[3] Defendant filed a notice of Plaintiff's non-opposition and no further briefing. Dkt No. 14.

For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.

DISCUSSION

I. Statement of Facts^[4]

A. Plaintiff's Allegations

According to the complaint, Plaintiff was arrested and charged for his underlying crimes when he was 19 years old. Dkt. No. 1 at 3. He is serving a term of life without parole. Id. Plaintiff claims the “Youth Offender Parole” process was created by Assembly Bill 1308 in 2018. Id. He claims that California Penal Code § 3501(h)'s exclusion of youthful offenders serving life without parole sentences, such as himself, from the “Youth Offender Parole” process violates the Equal Protection Clause. Id.

Based on the foregoing allegations, Judge Westmore found Plaintiff stated a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Dkt. No. 6 at 2.

B. Background

In 1995, Erica Beeson was murdered. Dkt. No. 10-1 at 10. Plaintiff was 19 years old at the time. Id. In 1998, Plaintiff was convicted of oral copulation, assault, and threatening a witness to the Beeson murder. Id.; Ex. 3, Dkt. No. 10-5 at 9. Plaintiff was sentenced to approximately 9 years. Id. In 2003, Plaintiff was convicted for the murder of Beeson and robbery. Dkt. No. 10-1 at 10; Ex. 4, Dkt. No. 10-5 at 11-12. Plaintiff was sentenced to life without parole. Id.

On January 1, 2018, State Assembly Bill 1308 amended California Penal Code § 3051, to require parole board hearings at either fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five years of incarceration for offenders under the age of twenty-six at the time of the offense. Cal. Penal Code § 3051. However, it carved out two exclusions to the parole hearing requirement: (1) individuals sentenced under the “One Strike” law or Penal Code § 667.61, which relates to violent sex crimes; and (2) life-without-parole sentences imposed for crimes committed between the ages of nineteen and twenty-five, also knows as the young-adult-life-without-parole exclusion. Id. The California Supreme Court is currently considering whether the first exclusion violates the Equal Protection Clause. See In re Woods, 62 Cal.App.5th 740, 276 (Ct. App. 2021) (rev. granted); cf. People v. Williams, 47 Cal.App.5th 475 (Ct. App. 2020). According to Defendant, the second exclusion, which applies to Plaintiff and is challenged in this action, has repeatedly been held constitutional by California appellate courts. In re Murray, 68 Cal.App.5th 456 (Ct. App. 2021), review denied (Nov. 10, 2021); see also In re Jones, 42 Cal.App.5th 477 (Ct. App. 2019).

On August 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Alameda County Superior Court, challenging the young-adult life-without-parole exclusion on equal protection grounds. Dkt. No. 10-1 at 11; Ex. 5, Dkt. No. 10-5 at 17-31. The state superior court denied the writ on procedural and substantive grounds. Id. at 34-39. Plaintiff appealed, and California Appellate Court denied the appeal on November 30, 2020. Ex. 6, Dkt. No. 10-5 at 47.

According to the evidence submitted by Defendant, Plaintiff did not file an inmate grievance regarding parole hearings, State Assembly Bill 1308, or any equal protection violation. Dkt. No. 10-1 at 11; Petty Decl. ¶ 3; Moseley Decl. ¶ 7; Exs. 1-2, Dkt. No. 10-5 at 4, 6-7.

II. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A court will grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law, and a dispute about such a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Generally, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325. If the evidence in opposition to the motion is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted). If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 323.

The Court's function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. V. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 631. It is not the task of the district court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party has the burden of identifying with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to do so, the district court may properly grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party. See id.; see, e.g., Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School District, 237 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2001).

A. Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and no longer left to the discretion of the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). An action must be dismissed unless the prisoner exhausted his available administrative remedies before he or she filed suit, even if the prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is pending.^[5] McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002); see Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (where administrative remedies are not exhausted before the prisoner sends his complaint to the court it will be dismissed even if exhaustion is completed by the time the complaint is actually filed).

Compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is required by the PLRA to “properly exhaust.” Jones v Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217-18 (2007). The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion. Id. at 218. In California,^[6] the regulation requires the prisoner “to lodge his administrative complaint on CDC form 602 and ‘to describe the problem and action requested.'” Morton v. Hall, 599 F.3d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3084.2(a)); Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (claim properly exhausted where inmate described nature of the wrong and identified defendant as a responding officer). California regulations also require that the appeal name “all staff member(s) involved” and “describe their...