In re Woods

• Decision Date: 02 April 2021
• Docket Number: B301891
• Citation: 276 Cal.Rptr.3d 895,62 Cal.App.5th 740
• Parties: IN RE Andre Lamont WOODS, On Habeas Corpus.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

62 Cal.App.5th 740

276 Cal.Rptr.3d 895

IN RE Andre Lamont WOODS, On Habeas Corpus.

B301891

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Filed April 2, 2021

Jennifer Peabody, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Philip J. Lindsay, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Malone and Jennifer O. Cano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

In 1999, a trial court sentenced Andre Lamont Woods to a term of 25 years to life under the "One Strike" law ( Pen. Code,¹ § 667.61 ) plus a term of 57 years 4 months. Woods was 19 years old when he committed his crimes. On October 31, 2019, he filed a habeas corpus petition in this court in which he asserted that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. After we denied the petition, the Supreme Court granted Woods's petition for review and transferred the matter to us with directions to issue an order to show cause (OSC) why Woods should not be entitled to relief on the grounds that the failure to provide him with a youth offender parole hearing violates his federal constitutional rights to equal protection of the laws and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

We vacated our prior order, issued an OSC, and appointed counsel for Woods. The People filed a return to the OSC, and Woods filed a reply.

We agree with Woods that section 3051, subdivision (h), which excludes One Strike offenders from the procedures for youth offender parole hearings, violates his right to equal protection of the laws because such procedures are generally available to similarly situated offenders and no rational basis exists to deny them to One Strike offenders. He is therefore entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration. This determination renders moot Woods's argument that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the night of August 14, 1998, Woods was a passenger in a public transit bus driven by S.H. It appeared to S.H. that Woods was under the influence of alcohol. After all other passengers had left the bus, Woods told S.H. to pull the bus over and "shut it down." He said he had a knife and would kill her. S.H. pulled the bus to the side of the street and turned off the engine, causing the bus's lights to turn off. Woods directed S.H. to the back of the bus where he raped her, forced her to orally copulate him several times, robbed her of jewelry and money, raped her again, bit her breasts, and orally copulated her. When S.H. cried, Woods slapped her head. When S.H. asked if she could get dressed, Woods threw her underwear out a window. Woods made S.H. go to the front of the bus where he directed her to tell him how to start the bus. As he sat in the driver's seat with S.H. standing next to him, he put his fingers in her vagina, then forced his fingers into S.H.’s mouth. He threatened to kill S.H. if she reported the incident to the police. Woods began driving the bus and promptly crashed it into a building. The crash shattered glass on the bus, which cut S.H.’s back. S.H. escaped through a rear door on the bus.

Woods admitted to a police detective that he forced S.H. to engage in multiple sex acts with him and robbed her. At the detective's suggestion, Woods wrote a note in which he apologized to S.H. for "forc[ing] [her] to have sexual intercourse with [him]."

At trial, Woods's defense was that the distance he forced S.H. to move did not satisfy the asportation requirements for kidnapping or the One Strike law. ( § 667.61, subd. (d)(2).)²

A jury convicted Woods of one count of kidnapping to commit rape (count 1; § 209, subd. (b)(1) ), two counts of forcible rape (counts 2 & 8; § 261, subd. (a)(2) ), five counts of forcible oral copulation (counts 3, 4, 6, 7 & 9; former § 288a, subd. (c) ),³ and one count each of forcible sexual penetration with a foreign object (count 10; former § 289, subd. (a) ), first degree robbery (count 5; § 211 ), making terrorist threats (count 11; former § 422 ), and unlawful taking or driving a vehicle (count 12; Veh. Code, former § 10851, subd. (a)). In connection with counts 2 through 4 and counts 6 through 10, the jury found true an allegation under the One Strike law that Woods kidnapped the victim and his movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to her "over and above that level of risk necessarily inherent in the underlying offense." ( § 667.61, subd. (d)(2).)

At the sentencing hearing, Woods requested the court impose the low terms because he lacked a "serious record." The court rejected the request, stating that "the defendant exhibited a baseness and cruelty of human nature that is one of the worst [the court has] heard about. The aggravating circumstances in this case are so numerous, they far outweigh the fact that the defendant does not have a prior record."

Pursuant to the One Strike law, the trial court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life for the conviction on count 2, plus full-term consecutive sentences of eight years on each of counts 3 and 4 and counts 6 through 9. (See former §§ 667.61, subds. (a) & (g), former 667.6, subd. (c).) Under the determinate sentencing law, the court imposed a six-year term on count 5 ( § 213, subd. (a)(1)(B) ), plus a consecutive two-year sentence on count 10 ( § 289, subd. (a)(1)(A) ), and consecutive eight-month sentences on counts 11 and 12 ( §§ 18, former 422, 1170.1, subd. (a); Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a) ). Lastly, the court imposed and stayed a life sentence with the possibility of parole on count 1 ( § 209, subd. (b)(1) ). The total prison term is 82 years 4 months to life.

In February 2000, we affirmed the judgment with directions to correct a sentencing error, which did not affect the length of the total term, and to correct certain misstatements in the abstract of judgment. (People v. Woods (Feb. 16, 2000, B130961) [nonpub. opn.].)

In 2019, Woods petitioned the superior court to hold an evidence preservation proceeding pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053 ( Franklin ). On July 24, 2019, the court denied the petition on the ground that Woods does not qualify for a Franklin proceeding because he was sentenced under the One Strike law. Woods attempted to file a notice of appeal from the court's ruling, but the superior court declined to file it, and no further action was taken. Woods thereafter filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus.

DISCUSSION

Woods contends that his sentence of 82 years 4 months is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and that his statutory ineligibility for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 violates his right to equal protection. We agree with his equal protection argument and conclude that he is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration. As a result, his Eighth Amendment argument is moot.

A. Background

In Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 ( Graham ), the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits the sentence of life without parole (LWOP) for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. ( Graham , supra , at p. 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011.) "As compared to adults," the court explained, "juveniles have a ‘ "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility" ’; they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure’; and their characters are ‘not as well formed.’ [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011.) Juveniles are also "more capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions of adults." ( Ibid. ) Juveniles thus "have lessened culpability [and] are less deserving of the most severe punishments." ( Ibid. ) The court further explained that sentencing juveniles to LWOP—" ‘the second most severe penalty permitted by law’ " ( id . at p. 69, 130 S.Ct. 2011 )—cannot be justified based on legitimate penological goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. ( Id. at pp. 69–71, 130 S.Ct. 2011.)⁴

The high court emphasized that although "the Eighth Amendment prohibits a [s]tate from imposing [an LWOP] sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, it does not require the [s]tate to release that offender during his natural life. Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives. The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does prohibit [s]tates from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society." ( Graham , supra , 560 U.S. at p. 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011.) States must therefore provide juveniles who commit nonhomicide crimes "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." ( Ibid. )

In People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 282 P.3d 291 ( Caballero ), our Supreme Court extended Graham to sentences that are the functional equivalent of LWOP: "[S]entencing a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide offense to a term of years with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender's natural life expectancy constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment." ( Caballero , supra , at p. 268, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 282 P.3d 291.) The court directed sentencing courts to "consider all mitigating circumstances attendant in the juvenile's crime and life, including but not limited to...