In re Murray
Decision Date | 31 August 2021 |
Docket Number | A161687 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | IN RE Paul MURRAY on Habeas Corpus. |
Under Appointment of the Court of Appeal, Law Offices of John F. Schuck, John F. Schuck, for Petitioner.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of California, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Rene A. Chacon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
In 2008, petitioner Paul Murray was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole for a first degree special circumstance murder he committed when he was 22 years old. In 2020, he sought a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053 on the ground that he was eligible for a Penal Code section 3051 youth offender parole hearing. The trial court denied his request because the terms of section 3051 expressly exclude LWOP offenders who were 18 years old or older at the time of their offense.
Petitioner has filed a petition for habeas corpus, contending that section 3051 violates his constitutional right to equal protection by affording juvenile LWOP offenders a youth offender parole hearing but denying such a hearing to youthful LWOP offenders. In conformity with an order from our Supreme Court, we issued an order to show cause why petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought. Respondent filed a return, petitioner a traverse, and neither side requested oral argument. We now deny the petition, concluding there is a rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile and youthful LWOP offenders in this context.
In 2008, petitioner was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole (LWOP) for a first degree special circumstance murder he committed when he was 22 years old.1 In 2010, we affirmed his judgment of conviction. (People v. Murray , supra , A121746.)
On March 16, 2020, petitioner filed a motion for a Franklin hearing,2 contending he was eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051.3 The trial court denied his motion because under the terms of section 3051, subdivision (h), "people sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes committed when they were at least 18 years of age but no more than ‘25 years of age or younger’ are not eligible for youth offender parole hearings." Petitioner appealed, arguing he was not in fact sentenced to LWOP. Because the record confirmed he did receive an LWOP sentence, we affirmed the trial court's order.4 ( People v. Murray (Mar. 15, 2021, A160981, 2021 WL 960496 ) [nonpub. opn.].)
Meanwhile, on December 30, 2020, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus asserting an equal protection violation. The alleged violation is based on section 3051, subdivision (h), which excludes from the benefits of the statute individuals sentenced to LWOP who were 18 years of age or older at the time of their offense. According to petitioner, the statute violates his right to equal protection by affording juvenile LWOP offenders (those under 18 at the time of their offense) a youth offender parole hearing while denying youthful LWOP offenders (those 18 to 25 years old at the time of their offense) a hearing.5
The origin and evolution of section 3051 have been well and thoroughly summarized by a number of courts. (See, e.g., People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 194–195, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 396 ( Jackson ); People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 775–777, 275 Cal.Rptr.3d 110 ( Acosta ); In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 431–433, 271 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 ; In re Jones (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 477, 484–485, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 (conc. opn. of Pollak, J.).) We quote one such summary at length here, that from Acosta :
Equal Protection Principles
"The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution guarantee all persons the equal protection of the laws." ( People v....
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