Patterson v. People

• Decision Date: 17 March 1969
• Docket Number: No. 22755,22755
• Citation: Patterson v. People, 451 P.2d 445, 168 Colo. 417 (Colo. 1969)
• Parties: Stephen Brent PATTERSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 445

451 P.2d 445

168 Colo. 417

Stephen Brent PATTERSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error.

No. 22755.

Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department.

March 17, 1969.

Theodore J. Soja, Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., George E. DeRoos, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error.

PRINGLE, Justice.

A jury convicted Stephen Patterson of grand larceny, and he was sentenced to a term of three to five years in the state penitentiary. The principal exhibits received in evidence, a stolen aircraft radio and accessories, were seized after Patterson was arrested by a deputy sheriff who was invited into Patterson's motel apartment by posing as a potential buyer. The sheriff had no warrant. A motion to suppress the evidence was denied. Patterson contends here that the evidence should have been suppressed on the grounds that his arrest and the seizure of the evidence were illegal. We find no error and affirm.

I.

Patterson contends that because the sheriff used 'trickery' to gain admission to his apartment, his constitutionally guaranteed right of privacy was violated. We do not agree. In search and seizure cases decided after Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, the United States Supreme Court has not restricted police activities at the investigative stages of criminal law enforcement to the same degree as it has imposed restrictions on police activity after arrest. The decoy or undercover agent is one weapon in the police 'arsenal,' for example, which has received judicial sanction. So long as the agent's conduct falls short of actual instigation of a crime, which raises the defense of entrapment, the Court has refused to set aside convictions because evidence was obtained by means of undercover work by law enforcement agents. See, E.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374; Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312. See, also, for a more detailed discussion, Pringle and Garfield, The Expanding Power of Police to Search and Seize: Effect of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Investigations, 40 U.Colo.L.Rev. 491, 500--504.

In Lewis, an undercover federal narcotics agent telephoned the defendant's home, stated that a mutual friend had told him that defendant might be able to supply marijuana, and drove to his home to make the purchase. A similar transaction occurred about two weeks later. Several months after that, the defendant was arrested. The defendant argued unsuccessfully to the Court that, since the invitation to his home was induced by fraud and deception, the official intrusion upon the privacy of his home constituted a violation of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.

In the present case, several months after the theft of certain aircraft radios from Columbine Airport in Jefferson County, Patterson tried to sell an aircraft radio to a flight instructor at another airport. The latter person had no use for it, but said that he would refer other potential buyers to Patterson. During the course of his investigation of the airport theft, the sheriff received this information and arranged to meet Patterson at his apartment on the pretense that he wanted to buy an aircraft radio. As in Lewis, the sheriff was invited to Patterson's apartment for the purpose of transacting an illegal sale.

Patterson voluntarily admitted the sheriff. After a brief conversation, he took an aircraft radio from inside a television set, and put it on a table near the sheriff. At that point, the sheriff saw a power supply unit. Within a few feet of the radio, Patterson also placed what appeared to be a prepared bill of sale with the sheriff's name on it. Then Patterson left the apartment, and returned about five minutes later with an 'earpiece' or headset and a microphone. A few minutes later, three officers appeared at the door, and Patterson was arrested. All of the evidence just noted was the subject of the motion to suppress.

The evidence clearly demonstrates that the sheriff was invited into Patterson's apartment for the sole purpose of purchasing a stolen radio. In the same manner as a private person, an investigating officer may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant. It is true that the fourth amendment to the Constitution protects against governmental intrusion upon the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of his life. But when one opens his home to the transaction of business and invites another to come in and trade with him, he 'break(s) the seal of sanctity and waive(s) his right to privacy in the premises,' with relation to the person who accepts that invitation to trade. When the customer turns out to be a government agent, the seller cannot then...