Patterson v. Precythe
| Decision Date | 08 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:15-CV-1956 NAB |
| Parties | RYAN PATTERSON, Petitioner, v. ANNE L. PRECYTHE, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Ryan Patterson's ("Patterson") Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [Doc. 3.] Respondent filed a response to the Amended Petition. [Doc. 11.] Petitioner filed a reply. [Doc. 12.] The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). [Doc. 4]. For the reasons set forth below, Patterson's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus will be denied.
The state appellate court found the following facts to be true.2 Patterson lived with his girlfriend Michelle Lawrence ("Michelle"), who was in the process of divorcing John Lawrence ("John"). John lived with his current girlfriend, Jamie Orman ("Orman"), who was seven months pregnant. Orman also had three children with her ex-husband who were all present on the night of the incident, D.O, J.O, and T.O. Patterson and Michelle plotted to kill John before the divorce was final so that Michelle could obtain the proceeds of John's insurance policies: $250,000 for John's life insurance policy and $150,000 for John's home owner's insurance policy. Patterson enlisted the help of Samuel Hughes ("Ray Ray") on the night of the incident, planning to kill John and then burn his house down.
Patterson and Ray Ray went to John's house and broke in through the back door around 5:00 in the morning. Patterson shot D.O. and Orman, thus resulting in the deaths of both D.O. and Orman, along with the death of Orman's seven month old fetus from lack of oxygen due to Orman's death. The other two children in the home were not injured.
Patterson was later charged with three counts of first-degree murder and convicted by a jury of all three counts of first-degree murder under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.020 (2000). Patterson was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Patterson's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Patterson, 382 S.W.3d 262, 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). Thereafter, Patterson filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief which was denied by the motion court and the denial was affirmed on appeal. Patterson, 467 S.W.3d at 406.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 91 (2011). "In general, if a convicted state criminal defendant can show a federal habeas court that his conviction rests upon a violation of the Federal Constitution, he may well obtain a writ of habeas corpus that requires a new trial, a new sentence, or release." Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S.413, 421 (2013). The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (AEDPA) applies to all petitions for habeas relief filed by state prisoners after this statute's effective date of April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-29 (1997). In conducting habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings "(1) resulted in a decision that is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct unless the petitioner successfully rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 US.C. § 2254(e)(1).
For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), the phrase "clearly established Federal law" "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). "In other words, 'clearly established federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id. at 71-72. To obtain habeas relief, a habeas petitioner must be able to point to the Supreme Court precedent which he thinks the state courts acted contrary to or unreasonably applied. Buchheit v. Norris, 459 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 2006).
A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court either 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases' or 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of[the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the] precedent.'" Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)).
A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case. Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08). "[A] federal habeas court making the 'unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 793 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 409). "A state court decision involves 'an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings,' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record." Evanstad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 2006). A "readiness to attribute error is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). AEDPA's highly deferential standard demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt. Id.
Patterson presents four claims for review. Patterson first asserts that the trial court erred in admitting an audiotaped statement and transcript into evidence over his objection. Patterson then asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for consenting to a jury being selected from Pemiscot County. Next, Patterson asserts that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim on direct appeal regarding a juror who was struck after a challenge based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Finally, Patterson asserts that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the trial court's decision denying defendant's motion to cross-examine a witness about a polygraph test.
In his first claim, Patterson asserts that the trial court erred in admitting Exhibits 102 and 103, which were the audiotape and transcript of one of his statements to the police. The record at trial indicates that Patterson was interviewed three times by Sergeant William Cooper ("Sgt. Cooper"). Patterson filed a motion to suppress all of the statements given to the police. [Doc. 11-4 at 107-35.] The trial court denied the motion before trial and the renewed motions during trial. Patterson's appeal to the Missouri appellate courts and this court focuses on the third statement to police.
The Missouri Court of Appeals found the following facts, in the light most favorable to the verdict3. Sgt. Cooper spoke with Patterson and Michelle at their apartment around 9:30 a.m. on October 17, 2009 regarding the shooting deaths of Jamie Orman, her unborn child, and her son D.O. in the early hours of the morning. At that time, Patterson claimed he was at home with Michelle all night. Sgt. Cooper returned to Patterson's apartment later that night and told Patterson that he had reason to believe Patterson had not been with Michelle all night. Following a twenty or thirty minute conversation, Patterson agreed to go to the police station with Sgt. Cooper. While in the police car, Sgt. Cooper attempted to read Patterson his Miranda rights, though lighting in the car was bad, and Patterson interrupted numerous times.
The following exchange in the car, as outlined by the Missouri Court of Appeals, is the basis of Patterson's request for relief.
Upon arriving at the police station, Sgt. Cooper read Patterson his Miranda rights once more. Patterson stated he understood his rights, including his right to have an attorney present. Sgt. Cooper interviewed Patterson for about two hours, during which time,...
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