Patterson v. State

• Decision Date: 15 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2-98-602-CR,2-98-602-CR
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001) CLETUS SCHWANA PATTERSON APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 294

46 S.W.3d 294 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001)

CLETUS SCHWANA PATTERSON APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

No. 2-98-602-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

February 15, 2001

FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] DAY and LIVINGSTON, JJ.; and DAVID L. RICHARDS, J., Sitting by Assignment.

OPINION

DAVID L. RICHARDS, JUSTICE(Assigned)

Introduction

Appellant Cletus Schwana Patterson is the mother of two children, Sarah, age 11, and James,¹ age 9. Sometime during the early morning hours of April 30, 1997, appellant's former boyfriend, Bobby Woods, entered appellant's residence through a window and kidnapped both children. Woods drove them a distance, seriously wounded and abandoned James in a graveyard, and killed Sarah at another location.

Woods was later tried and convicted for his crimes.² Appellant was prosecuted for two counts of the felony offense of injury to a child by omission under the theory that she failed to aid her children during the kidnapping and failed to notify law enforcement authorities. The jury found appellant guilty and assessed her punishment at 23 years' confinement on each count to be served concurrently.

Eight points are presented on appeal. We will reverse and vacate appellant's convictions for the first degree offense of injury to a child and render judgment of conviction for two counts of the lesser included offense of reckless injury to a child by omission, resulting in serious bodily injury. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 22.04(a)(1), 22.04(e) (Vernon Supp. 2001).

The Indictment

Appellant was charged by indictment with two counts of intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to Sarah and James by failing to provide aid and protection as they were being kidnapped, by failing to summon aid when she knew they had been kidnapped, and for failing to notify and report to law enforcement her knowledge that Woods was the perpetrator of the offenses.

Complaints on Appeal

In eight points on appeal, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient, that she was denied effective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court's jury instructions were defective in three respects. We begin by addressing appellant's sufficiency complaints.

Legal Sufficiency

A. The Standard of Review

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 423 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975 (1993). The standard for review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 158-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The critical inquiry is whether, after so viewing the evidence, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 844 (1997). This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979).

The legal sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. The issue on appeal is not whether we as a court believe the State's evidence or believe that the defense's evidence outweighs the State's evidence. Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984). Our duty is not to reweigh the evidence from reading a cold record but to act as a due process safeguard ensuring only the rationality of the fact finder. Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The verdict may not be overturned unless it is irrational or unsupported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Matson, 819 S.W.2d at 846.

Where the jury is authorized to convict on any one of several theories or methods of commission of the same offense (e.g., two different statutory definitions of the same offense) and returns a general verdict of guilt, it does not matter that evidence is insufficient to sustain one or more of the theories, so long as evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction under at least one theory. Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (plurality op.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 958 (1992).

In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence to show appellant's intent, and faced with a record that supports conflicting inferences, we "must presume -- even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record -- that the trier of fact resolved any such conflict in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." Matson, 819 S.W.2d at 846.

B. Application

In points one and two, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to prove she knowingly, by omission, caused serious bodily injury to Sarah or James as required by section 22.04(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 22.04(a)(1). Appellant limits her complaint to the proof that she "knowingly" committed the offenses. Specifically, she argues there is no evidence that she was aware with reasonable certainty that serious bodily injury would result to either Sarah or James as a result of her omissions.

The circumstances surrounding the kidnapping were hotly disputed at trial. Appellant testified that on the night of the offense, she took the children shopping and to a restaurant for dinner. After returning home, they talked. Sometime after midnight, the children retired to a bedroom they shared. Appellant slept alone in her bedroom. When she awoke about 6:20 a.m. the following morning, she discovered that the children were missing. After searching her residence, she drove to her mother's nearby house, thinking the children might have arisen earlier and walked there. Appellant's oldest daughter, Rebecca, answered the door. She testified appellant was crying and told her the children were missing. Rebecca rode with appellant back to the house to search for them. Appellant's residence did not have phone service, so after being unable to locate the children, Rebecca returned to appellant's mother's residence and phoned 911.

James' testimony was equivocal on the issue of whether appellant knew of the kidnapping:

[Prosecutor:] . . . . [James], do you think your momma heard Sarah screaming?

A. I don't know if she heard.

[Prosecutor:] Did you ask her about that?

A. No. I asked her if she -- in the hospital when I was in there, but she didn't answer me.

[Prosecutor:] Okay. Now, [James], you have told us before that you asked your momma if she heard you. Do you remember that?

A. (Nodding).

[Prosecutor:] What did you tell us she said?

A. I think she said, "I did not hear y'all."

[Prosecutor:] Okay. Did you tell us, [James], that your momma had said that she didn't come in there because Bobby was too tough?

A. (Nodding).

[Prosecutor:] Did you tell us that?

A. (Nodding).

[Prosecutor:] Is that the truth?

A. (Nodding). I think so, that's the truth.

[Prosecutor:] Okay. Is that what you told us all along?

A. (Nodding).

Appellant's friend and a former boyfriend testified that appellant was a heavy sleeper and, at times, could be so difficult to wake that she had to be physically shaken. Appellant testified she did not hear the children being abducted because she was sleeping with her radio, a fan, and the clothes dryer turned on. The State, however, painted a very different scenario. The State noted that, at times, James related that his mother had heard the abduction but was too frightened to come to their aid. Evidence was produced that given the particular design of appellant's residence and the materials used in its construction, appellant must have heard the assault and must have known that Woods was the perpetrator. The State also produced evidence that, had appellant phoned 911 immediately after the abduction, law enforcement could have sealed off the entire area within seven minutes.

Because this is a legal sufficiency challenge, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Therefore, we overlook all evidence favorable to appellant and, giving the State the benefit of all the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the inculpatory testimony introduced, determine whether the evidence is sufficient to prove appellant knowingly injured the children by omission. Viewed in this light, the evidence demonstrates that appellant not only heard the assault on her children, but after making her belated 911 call, failed to advise law enforcement authorities that Woods was the perpetrator.

Section 22.04 of the Texas Penal Code defines the offense of injury to a child. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 22.04(a). It provides in relevant part that a person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly, by act or omission, causes bodily injury to a child. Id. An omission that causes injury to a child is conduct constituting an offense if the person has care, custody and control of the child or a legal or statutory duty to act. Id. 22.04(b).

Injury to a child is a result-oriented or "result of conduct" crime. That is, the culpable mental state relates not to the nature of or circumstances surrounding the charged conduct, but to the result of the defendant's conduct. Haggins v. State, 785 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Alvarado v. State, 704 S.W.2d 36, 38-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Beggs v. State, 597 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Put another way, the conduct must be done with the required culpability to effect the result. Alvarado, 704 S.W.2d at 39. Here, appellant was found guilty of "knowingly" causing serious bodily injury to a child.

A...