Patton v. Shamburger, B--248
| Decision Date | 29 May 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. B--248,B--248 |
| Parties | J. C. PATTON et ux., Petitioners, v. Alice M. SHAMBURGER, Guardian, Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Huff & Bowers, Broadus A. Spivey, Lubbock, for petitioner.
Scarborough, Black, Tarpley & Scarborough, Frank Scarborough, Abilene, for respondent.
The only question in this workmen's compensation case is to whom the death benefits are to be paid. The money has been tendered into court by the insurer. The contest is between the parents of the deceased workman and his children. The children, however, had been adopted by another man. The effect of the legal adoption is before us. The courts below held that notwithstanding the adoption, the children remained 'the minor children' of the workman. Tex.Civ.App., 413 S.W.2d 155. The parents of the workman contend that the adoption terminated the relationship of parent and child, pursuant to the provisions of Article 46a, Section 9, 1 which will be discussed below.
The facts are undisputed. The workman, Jack Patton, was married in 1945. Two children were born of the marriage. Thereafter, Patton and his wife were divorced, and the children went with their mother. The mother remarried, and in 1963 the second husband legally adopted the two children. In 1965, Patton was killed in the course of his employment. The question: are the children still Patton's minor children and entitled to the benefits within the meaning of Section 8a of Article 8306, or have their rights to the compensation benefits been terminated by the provisions of the adoption statute, Article 46a, Section 9?
The adoption statute, Section 9 of Article 46a, provides in part that when a child is adopted, 'all legal relationship and all rights and duties between such child and its natural parents shall cease and determine, and such child shall thereafter be deemed and held to be For every purpose the child of its parent or parents by adoption as fully as though naturally born to them in lawful wedlock.'
Under this statute, if the adopting father had been covered by workmen's compensation, the children would have been entitled to benefits. The question is whether they are also entitled to the benefits arising out of the death of their natural father from whom, under Article 46a set out above, 'all legal relationship and rights' had ceased. Clearly not, unless other portions of Article 46a or other statutes prevail to continue that right.
Section 9 of Article 46a further provides that children adopted by another shall nevertheless inherit from their natural parents. So if the rights of the minor children were acquired by inheritance, the money belongs to them. In this regard, the provisions of the workmen's compensation statute, Section 8a of Article 8306, provide in part, 'Such compensation shall Not pass to the estate of the deceased to be administered upon, but shall be paid directly to said beneficiaries * * *.' It is our opinion that rights to workmen's compensation benefits are not obtained through inheritance but are conferred by statute. Hence the portions of the adoption statute ralating to inheritance are not applicable.
Section 8a also provides that benefits 'shall be distributed among the Beneficiaries as may be entitled to the same as hereinbefore provided according to the laws of descent and distribution of this State; * * *.' This does not simply say that benefits shall be payable according to the laws of descent and distribution. It says that benefits shall be payable To the beneficiaries named above. Before the laws of descent and distribution may be used for the determination of the priority of payment among the beneficiaries, the identity of the Beneficiaries must be established. Among those beneficiaries named are 'the minor children' of the deceased. Whether the children are still 'the minor children' of the deceased workman after their adoption by another is the problem.
It is contended further that the compensation statute says that the compensation provided for shall be for the benefit 'of the minor children' (as well as parents) without regard to the question of dependency. The words 'minor children' are not defined. The fact that the children are now being provided for by their adoptive parents is therefore immaterial. The fact that Patton was no longer responsible for the care and upkeep of the children may be persuasive of the legislative intent when construed in the light of the adoption statute set out above. And the fact that the parents of the deceased workman may not have actually been dependent upon him is also immaterial under the statute.
It is asserted that the compensation statute plainly says that the benefits are to be received by 'minor children'; and that if the Legislature had intended to exclude children which had been adopted by others, it could and would have said so. On the other hand, the adoption statute says that upon adoption, All legal relationship shall cease; and if the Legislature had intended to say 'all relationships except those provided under the workmen's compensation statute,' it could easily have said so.
Other jurisdictions have been confronted with similar or related situations, but their holdings are not uniform. We are of the opinion that the matter must be resolved under the particular wording of our own statutes.
It is our opinion that the provisions of the adoption statute, Article 46a, are controlling. They create a new relationship of parent and child upon adoption. Old legal ties are completely severed except for inheritance by the child. The adopted child looks to his new parents for support and benefits. As the adoption statute says, the adopted child shall thereafter be deemed For every purpose the child of the adoptive parent. If the adopting parents also have natural children, they may look for compensation benefits only to their own parents. If the law were that the adopted children could look not only to their adoptive parents but to their natural father for compensation benefits, they would be in a superior position to that of the children of the natural parents. On the other hand, if the natural father had adopted other children who legally looked to him and needed him for support, under the other construction, the adopted children of the deceased workman would have to share the benefits with his natural children who had been adopted by others.
Upon legal adoption, the family relationship between the natural parent and the adopted children cease and determine. Our holding is that they are no longer 'minor children' of the natural father under the workmen's compensation statute but are the minor children of the adoptive father and his wife, the natural mother of the children.
The judgments of the courts below are reversed and judgment is here rendered for the Petitioners, the parents of the deceased workman.
The holding of the Court is that minor children adopted by another are no longer 'minor children' of the natural father save only for inheritance purposes. This holding gives an entirely too literal interpretation to the Adoption Act and reaches a result which I think is contrary to the Legislature's intent in drafting the Adoption Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act. The fact that the Adoption Act states that all Legal relationship and All rights and duties between the adopted child and its natural parents cease and determine does not mean that the minor child ceases to be a 'minor child' of the natural parents. The case law of Texas supports the proposition that a child adopted by another continues to have some relationship to its natural parent. In Thompson v. Doyal, 209 S.W.2d 425 (Tex.Civ.App.--1948, writ ref'd., n.r.e.), the court of civil appeals was faced with the question of whether a natural father, after his children had been adopted, had any claim of custody to the children. In that case, the natural parents of the children were divorced and custody of the children was awarded to the mother. Thereafter, the mother remarred and, with permission of the natural father, the children were adopted by their stepfather. The mother and stepfather were killed in an automobile accident and a suit developed over custody of the children between the children's maternal grandfather and the children's natural father. The grandfather argued that by the terms of the Adoption Act all legal relationship and all rights and duties between the children and their natural father ceased and determined upon adoption; consequently, the natural father should have no claim whatsoever to obtain custody of the children. The court of civil appeals held that '(t)his (the Adoption Act) does not and could not mean that a natural parent ceases to be a natural parent.' The court affirmed the trial court's award of custody of the children to their natural father.
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