Rodgers v. Williamson
| Decision Date | 17 January 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. B--3487,B--3487 |
| Citation | 489 S.W.2d 558 |
| Parties | Ronald Edward RODGERS, Petitioner, v. Lauretta WILLIAMSON and William F. Williamson, Respondents. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Thorne, Thorne & Robertson, Inc., Michael A. Robertson, Grand Prairie, for petitioner.
Mayer & Mayer, R. Lewis Nicholson, Dallas, for respondents.
The primary question here is whether a provision in an Illinois adoption decree regarding visitation rights of the natural father is entitled to any effect before the courts of this State. The lower courts have regarded the visitation provision as being no more than a private agreement, and it has been held that the Illinois court terminated all parental rights of the natural father without decreeing that he was to be allowed to visit the child. Tex.Civ.App., 482 S.W.2d 665. We construe the Illinois judgment to decree visitation for the natural father, and we remand the case to the trial court to determine the matter of visitation as a question of the welfare of the child under present circumstances.
When Lauretta and Ronald Rodgers were divorced in Lubbock County, Texas, in 1965, the custody of their minor son, Scott, was given to the mother, Lauretta. She then married William F. Williamson and moved to Illinois, and in 1969 they sought to adopt Scott by petition filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Ronald Rodgers was notified by mail of the petition and went to Chicago to employ counsel to act and appear on his behalf. Before the court acted on the petition for adoption, Rodgers and the Williamsons, each represented by counsel, entered into an agreement whereby Rodgers agreed to consent to the adoption and the Williamsons agreed to allow Rodgers to visit his son at designated times.
The Illinois court granted the adoption on August 7, 1969 by a decree which specifically incorporated a stipulation of the parties which set out the times and terms of Rodgers' visitation with Scott.
The Williamsons subsequently returned to Texas and now reside in Dallas. Rodgers lives in nearby Arlington. All parties observed the visitation schedule through Christmas of 1970. On April 15, 1971, Rodgers instituted this action by filing a 'petition to enforce visitation' in the Juvenile Court of Dallas County in which he alleged that the Williamsons had refused to allow him to visit Scott and asked the court to order a new schedule for visitation because of the present proximity of the parties. The Williamsons filed a cross-action seeking a declaratory judgment that the alleged visitation rights were unenforceable. The trial court and court of civil appeals have held to this effect and in favor of the Williamsons.
Our disagreement with those courts is upon the construction of the judgment of the Illinois court. We view the visitation provision to be part of the court's order rather than a personal agreement of the natural father and the adoptive parents to which reference is made by that court. The details of the natural father's visitation appear on a separate sheet entitled 'stipulation' attached to the court's order. The order recites that the stipulation is attached 'and made a part hereof.' The language of the 'stipulation' so made a part of the court's order is mandatory rather than recitative. It purports to be more than an agreement by the parties. It declares: 'That Ronald Rodgers Shall have the right of visitation with Randall Scott Rodgers at the following times and places . . ..' (Emphasis added). A judgment, like any other written instrument, is to be construed as a whole and each part harmonized and given effect if possible. Lone Star Cement Corp. v. Fair, 467 S.W.2d 402 (Tex.1971); Larrison v. Walker, 149 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Civ.App.1941, writ ref'd). The construction of the judgment urged by the Williamsons and adopted below deprives Rodgers of all right of visitation even though the contrary is expressly provided by that judgment. We conclude that the Illinois order did decree visitation for the natural father and that this feature of the order is entitled to full faith and credit as would be given a child custody decree of another state. Bukovich v. Bukovich, 399 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.1966).
The contention is made that a decree which orders the adoptive parents to permit the natural father to visit with the child is contrary to public policy and should not be enforced for that reason. This is a decision we are at liberty to make since the Supreme Court of the United States has not held that an equitable decree of one state must be given full faith and credit by a sister state. See, Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 102 Comment c (1971). The Williamsons point to Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 46a § 9 (1969), as evidencing the public policy of this state to be that a natural parent should not be allowed to visit his child after the child has been adopted by another. That section provides in part: 'When a minor child is adopted in accordance with the provisions of this Article, all legal relationship and all rights and duties between such child and its natural parents shall cease and...
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