Pawlowski v. NE. Il. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp.

• Decision Date: 09 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-4287,98-4287
• Citation: 186 F.3d 997
• Parties: (7th Cir. 1999) Raymond E. Pawlowski, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 997

186 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 1999)

Raymond E. Pawlowski, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 98-4287

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

Argued May 19, 1999

Decided August 9, 1999

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 98 C 1893--Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

Before Harlington Wood, Jr., Flaum, and Manion, Circuit Judges.

Flaum, Circuit Judge.

Raymond E. Pawlowski, a former railroad police officer, asks us to determine whether the Railway Labor Act ("RLA" or "Act"), 45 U.S.C. sec.151 et seq., entitled him to union representation at an investigative interview conducted by his former employer, the Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation d/b/a Metra ("Metra"). The district court dismissed Pawlowski's claim, holding that because the RLA conferred no right to representation at initial hearings, and because the RLA appeal process pre-empted consideration of any right that might have been conferred by the applicable collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), the court had no jurisdiction over this aspect of the claim. We affirm.

Background

In early 1997, Raymond Pawlowski left his job as a railroad police officer for Amtrak and went to work for Metra in the same capacity. On July 25, 1997, Pawlowski was called into Metra police headquarters and questioned at length by his supervisors about a gun they suspected he had received from another employee and was holding in violation of company regulations. Although Pawlowski requested union or attorney representation during this questioning, Metra supervisors refused to allow either and threatened that if he left the headquarters he would be fired immediately. Pawlowski stayed and answered the questions. On July 28, 1997, Metra sent him a letter announcing his termination, which Pawlowski alleges, was based on statements he made during the interview. Through the Railroad Special Agents & Police Officers Section, Allied Services Division/TCU, AFL-CIO ("Union"), Pawlowski's union and designated collective bargaining representative, Pawlowski appealed the firing to Metra's Manager of Labor Relations, who ultimately upheld the termination decision.

Pawlowski did not pursue his appeal to the National Railroad Adjustment Board ("Adjustment Board"), an entity set up by the RLA to resolve work-related disputes between railroads and their employees. Instead, he sued Metra for damages and reinstatement, claiming that the denial of his request for union representation during the questioning on July 25, 1997, violated his rights under the RLA. After Metra moved to dismiss the claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the district court held that, although the RLA provided for representation of an employee's choice during Adjustment Board proceedings, see 45 U.S.C. sec.153, the statute did not create similar rights for employees at informal proceedings on the employer's property. The court reasoned that if Pawlowski possessed such a right, it sprang from the CBA between Metra and the Union, not the RLA itself. Because the interpretation of railroad CBAs is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board, see 45 U.S.C. sec.153, the court concluded that it would have no jurisdiction over this aspect of Pawlowski's claim. See Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 322 (1972) (where the source of railroad employee's claimed right not to be discharged was a provision in CBA, employee who had not pursued his administrative remedies under RLA could not bring court action against railroad); Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 328 (1969).

Discussion

On appeal, Pawlowski argues that the district court construed the representational rights conferred by the RLA too narrowly in dismissing his claim. We review dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, keeping in mind that such a grant is appropriate only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for relief." Craigs, Inc. v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical School, 167 F.3d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir. 1999) (in reviewing 12(b)(6) decision we assume all well-pleaded facts as true looking at them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff). If the statute under which the plaintiff sued provides no relief in the circumstances alleged, the district court's decision was appropriate. Therefore, the sole issue on appeal is whether the RLA affords a railroad employee the statutory right to union representation during initial investigative questioning by the employer concerning a possible violation of company regulations.¹

To answer this question, some understanding of the RLA's structure is required. Congress enacted the statute in 1926 to provide an administrative framework for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes in the railroad industry. See Kulavic v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway Co., 1 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 1993). Under the Act, disputes are categorized as either major or minor depending on the subject matter. See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722 (1945) ("Burley I"). Major disputes involve the formation or alteration of collective bargaining agreements, while minor disputes concern grievances arising from, or covered by, existing agreements. Id.; see Kulavic, 1 F.3d at 512 (defining minor disputes as "grievances that arise daily between employers and carriers regarding rates of pay, rules, and working conditions").² The RLA contains distinct procedural avenues for the resolution of each type of dispute. Because the subject of Pawlowski's claim cannot be categorized as major, we focus only on the framework relevant to minor disputes.

Parties can appeal unresolved minor disputes to the Adjustment Board for binding arbitration. See Kulavic, 1 F.3d at 512. Section 153 First describes the Adjustment Board review process and specifies that employees are entitled to the representation of their choice at Board proceedings. See 45 U.S.C. sec.153 First (j). Prior to appeal, however, the RLA does not prescribe any specific procedures for dealing with disputes at the company level. Instead, Section 153 First (j) states:

The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions, . . . shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes[.]

45 U.S.C. sec.153 First (i). The "usual manner" has been interpreted to mean that minor disputes are handled at the company level according to procedures established by the railroad and the union through the CBA rather than by the RLA. See Kulavic, 1 F.3d at 513; Edwards v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad Co., 361 F.2d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 1966); Broady v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 191 F.2d 73, 77 (7th Cir. 1951); see also Landers v. National Railroad Passenger Co., 814 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1987) (aff'd, 485 U.S. 652 (1988)) ("In investigations, conferences or hearings by or before officers of the carrier an existing legal contract [CBA] controls, whereas the procedure before the Board is controlled by the statute.") (quotation omitted).

In this case, although the CBA between Metra and the Union provided that police officers were entitled to the presence of Union representatives at certain disciplinary hearings, it is not clear whether that right extends to initial investigative questioning. Also, it applies only to officers who have been with the railroad for over a year but says nothing about the representational rights of employees like Pawlowski, who had been with the company for less than a year when he was fired.

Pawlowski maintains that the RLA itself, not the CBA, guaranteed him the representational rights he seeks to vindicate, and he points to the language of sec.152 Second for support. That provision states:

All disputes between a carrier or carriers and its employees shall be considered, and, if possible, decided with all expedition, in conference between the representatives designated and authorized so to confer, respectively, by the carrier or carriers and by the employees thereof interested in the dispute.

45 U.S.C. sec.152 Second.³ Pawlowski asserts that this language clearly establishes that employees are entitled to union representation ("representatives designated") whenever they are in conflict with the railroad ("all disputes"). He insists that this necessarily includes the procedural right to the presence of the Union during Metra's questioning about a potential work rule violation. That the CBA does not also provide him with such a right is irrelevant, he concludes, because the terms of a CBA may not deprive railroad employees of their statutory rights. See Burley I, 325 U.S. at 740 n.39 ("[T]he individual employees's [statutory] rights cannot be nullified merely by agreement between the carrier and the union.").

Pawlowski concedes that he was represented by the Union when he challenged the termination decision, and that Metra considered--but ultimately denied--his request to have it overturned. We also note that although Pawlowski chose not to appeal Metra's decision to the Adjustment Board, he has alleged nothing that suggests he would not have received his full representational rights before the Board. See 45 U.S.C. sec.153 First(j). Instead, Pawlowski's claim is that his right to representation under sec.152 Second arose immediately upon being called into Metra headquarters for questioning; that the right was violated when the railroad refused to suspend the questioning or allow him to call the Union; and that the RLA affords him a statutory remedy for this...