Paxton v. Crabtree
| Decision Date | 06 December 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 19615,19615 |
| Citation | 400 S.E.2d 245,184 W.Va. 237 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Patricia Ann PAXTON v. Paul CRABTREE, Administrative Director, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, State of West Virginia, Velt King, Magistrate of Clay County. |
1. The West Virginia Human Rights Act "shall be liberally construed to accomplish its objective and purpose." W.Va.Code, 5-11-15 (1967). This construction applies to both its substantive and procedural provisions, and is consonant with this Court's view that administrative proceedings should not be constrained by undue technicalities.
2. Ordinarily, a judgment of reversal rendered by an intermediate appellate court which remands a cause for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of the court is not final and, therefore, not appealable to a higher appellate court, so long as judicial action in the lower court is required.
3. "Unless a wrongful discharge is malicious, the wrongfully discharged employee has a duty to mitigate damages by accepting similar employment to that contemplated by his or her contract if it is available in the local area, and the actual wages received, or the wages the employee could have received at comparable employment where it is locally available, will be deducted from any back pay award; however, the burden of raising the issue of mitigation is on the employer." Syllabus Point 2, Mason County Bd. of Educ. v. State Sup't of Schools, 170 W.Va. 632, 295 S.E.2d 719 (1982).
4. Once a claimant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination and presents evidence on the issue of damages, the burden of producing sufficient evidence to establish the amount of interim earnings or lack of diligence shifts to the defendant. The defendant may satisfy his burden only if he establishes that: (1) there were substantially equivalent positions which were available; and (2) the claimant failed to use 5. There are four general factors which bear upon whether a master-servant relationship exists for purposes of the doctrine of respondeat superior: (1) Selection and engagement of the servant; (2) Payment of compensation; (3) Power of dismissal; and (4) Power of control. The first three factors are not essential to the existence of the relationship; the fourth, the power of control, is determinative.
[184 W.Va. 240] reasonable care and diligence in seeking such positions.
6. In a civil rights discrimination case, an employer is ordinarily not automatically or vicariously liable for the misconduct of its employees.
7. If a discriminatory act has been committed by an officer or a supervisory employee, an employer may be held liable without showing that the employer knew or reasonably should have known of the misconduct, except where the supervisory employee was acting outside the scope of his employment.
8. An employer will not be liable for discriminatory acts of its employee unless he knew or reasonably should have known of the discriminatory acts and did nothing to correct them, or expressly or impliedly authorized or ratified them.
9. If a public employee is acting as a final policymaker for an agency in an area which gives rise to a discriminatory act, the employer-agency will be liable for the judgment.
Carter Zerbe, Charleston, for Patricia Ann Paxton.
Frank Venezia, Sterl F. Shinaberry & Assoc., L.C., Charleston, for Paul Crabtree.
Michael T. Clifford, Clifford & Mann, L.C., Charleston, for Velt King.
Roger W. Tompkins, Atty. Gen., Mike Kelly, Deputy Atty. Gen., Civil Rights Div., Charleston, for State.
On October 7, 1981, Patricia Ann Paxton was fired from her job as a magistrate assistant for Magistrate Velt King of Clay County (the Magistrate), ostensibly pursuant to W.Va.Code, 50-1-9 (1981). 1 On December 19, 1981, Mrs. Paxton, asserting that she was unlawfully discharged because she was pregnant, filed a complaint with the Human Rights Commission (HRC) against the Magistrate and Paul Crabtree, in his capacity as the Administrative Director of the Courts (the Administrative Director). 2
In 1985, the HRC found that Mrs. Paxton had been discriminated against, but did not award her back pay. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County affirmed the HRC's finding of unlawful discrimination, but dismissed the Administrative Director from the case because he did not participate in the decision to terminate Mrs. Paxton's employment. The circuit court remanded the case to the HRC with instructions to award Mrs. Paxton back wages. In a supplemental order, dated March 16, 1988, the circuit court ordered Mrs. Paxton reinstated within thirty days. Mrs. Paxton was not reinstated.
After hearings before the HRC, Mrs. Paxton was awarded $41,167.99 in back pay and benefits, $29,765.63 in prejudgment interest, $12,978.07 in attorney's fees and costs, and $2,500 for incidental damages. This appeal followed.
The parties make the following assignments of error:
(1) Mrs. Paxton asserts that the HRC did not properly compute her wage loss when it gave her nothing for lost wages after the reinstatement order.
(2) The Magistrate argues that he was not properly made a defendant in the case, and that the $2,500 incidental damage (3) The Administrative Director argues:
[184 W.Va. 241] award should be paid by the judicial system and not by him personally.
(a) The HRC erred in holding that the Magistrate is an employee of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals;
(b) Even if the Magistrate is an employee of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, the judicial system should not have to pay the judgment rendered against him unless a superior in the system directed or ratified his acts; and
(c) The HRC erred in finding Mrs. Paxton had mitigated her damages by attempting to find alternative employment.
(4) The HRC argues that the Administrative Director's appeal was untimely filed.
None of the parties attack the HRC's central finding that Mrs. Paxton was a victim of discrimination. 3
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
We reject the Magistrate's contention that he was not properly made a defendant in the case because Mrs. Paxton initially filed suit against the "Clay County Office of the Magistrate," but failed to name him personally. In November, 1983, Mrs. Paxton amended her complaint to name the Magistrate. The Magistrate demonstrates no specific prejudice arising from the delay in naming him in the proceedings. He was aware of the amended complaint and participated through counsel in all relevant hearings. This is not a case where substantial procedural defects occurred such as those we outlined in Syllabus Point 4 of McJunkin Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 417, 369 S.E.2d 720 (1988):
"Where an issue is not raised by the complainant in a complaint to the West Virginia Human Rights Commission, the Commission's hearing examiner is precluded from independently raising the issue and deciding it on the merits where the respondent has not received adequate notice of the issue in the form of a complaint or an amendment thereto nor had an opportunity to defend his or her position, provided that the issue not raised in the complaint or an amendment thereto is not heard by the express or implied consent of the parties."
Cf. Greyhound Lines-East v. Geiger, 179 W.Va. 174, 366 S.E.2d 135 (1988).
The Human Rights Act "shall be liberally construed to accomplish its objective and purposes." W.Va.Code, 5-11-15 (1967). This construction applies to both its substantive and procedural provisions, and is consonant with this Court's view that administrative proceedings should not be constrained by undue technicalities. See Spahr v. Preston County Bd. of Educ., 182 W.Va. 726, 391 S.E.2d 739 (1990).
We also reject the HRC's argument that the Administrative Director's appeal period has expired and that he therefore cannot challenge either the back pay award or the court's holding that it was payable from the judicial budget. The circuit court acted as an appellate court in reviewing the HRC's order of October 4, 1985. It reversed the HRC and remanded the case for a back pay award to Mrs. Paxton. The HRC argues that at this point the Administrative Director knew that the case had been remanded for a back pay award payable from the judicial budget. Consequently, the HRC argues that the Administrative Director should have appealed these adverse rulings to this Court.
Because the circuit court remanded the case for further factual development, the Administrative Director was not required to appeal immediately. The authorities relied upon by the HRC relate to appeals "Ordinarily a judgment of reversal rendered by an intermediate appellate court which remands the cause for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of the appellate court is not final and, therefore, not appealable to the higher appellate court, so long as judicial action in the lower court is required." 4 Am.Jur.2d Appeal & Error § 59 at 580 (1962).
[184 W.Va. 242] of final orders of a trial court. 4 By remanding, the circuit court issued an interlocutory, rather than a final, order. Where an intermediate appeals court remands for further proceedings, its order, in the absence of some specific statute, is ordinarily not appealable: 5
See City & Borough of Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979); Cory Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 403 Ill. 409, 86 N.E.2d 363 (1949); Kitchen & Kutchin, Inc. v. Jarry Elecs., Ltd., 382 Mass. 689, 414 N.E.2d 1004 (1981); Southern Saw & Mower Distribs., Inc. v. Dolmar N. Am. Corp., 317 So.2d 400 (Miss.1975); Martin v. Zweygardt, 199 Neb. 770, 261 N.W.2d 379 (1978); New York State Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 260 N.Y. 32, 182 N.E. 237 (1932); Barker v. Daniels, 195 Okla. 690, 161 P.2d 854 (1945).
This rule, however, is limited to those situations where the intermediate appellate court finds that there are disputed issues of fact or law that have not...
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