Payne v. Carver
Decision Date | 13 May 1988 |
Citation | 534 So.2d 566 |
Parties | Ferris PAYNE and Lora D. Payne v. Marjorie Payne CARVER. 87-78. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
William H. Mills of Redden, Mills & Clark, Birmingham, for appellants.
Bryant A. Whitmire, Jr., Birmingham, for appellee.
Because we remand this cause to the trial court for clarification of its order and judgment, we set out only those facts necessary to our order.
The plaintiffs, Ferris Payne and Lora D. Payne, filed a declaratory judgment action to quiet title to 40 acres of land alleged by the plaintiffs to have been deeded to Ferris by his father and mother. The trial court, sitting without a jury, held that there had not been a legally effective delivery of the deed upon which the plaintiffs relied, and that the defendant, Ferris's sister Marjorie Payne Carver, was "a tenant in common owning an undivided one-sixth interest in and to the [subject] property."
When reviewing the judgment of a trial court entered after a non-jury trial, an appellate court in this state will not alter the findings or reverse the judgment of the trial court unless the reviewing court finds the judgment to be plainly and palpably wrong. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery v. Adams, 382 So.2d 1104 (Ala.1980); and Menefee v. Lowery, 375 So.2d 793 (Ala.1979). Our cases specifically denote as reversible error in these cases both an erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case and a judgment that is contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Smith v. Style Advertising, Inc., 470 So.2d 1194 (Ala.1985); Kelly v. Smith, 454 So.2d 1315 (Ala.1984); and Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523 (Ala.1979).
Here, we are asked to review the judgment of a trial court that is based upon findings set out in a lengthy and detailed order. We can not say, however, whether the trial court was or was not correct in its application of the law to the evidence proffered by the parties or whether the judgment entered by the trial court is against the great weight of the evidence.
In a post-judgment motion, the plaintiffs asked that the foregoing statements be deleted and that statements supplied in the motion be substituted therefor. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion, except for a slight amendment:
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is impossible to ascertain, from a reading of the trial court's order, whether the testimony of Ferris Payne (that he accepted the deed from his father and then gave the deed to his mother for safekeeping) was accepted or rejected by the trial court. Indeed, while the trial court reaches the conclusion that there was no "legally effective delivery of the deed," we can not determine from the order whether that conclusion was based on the trial court's rejection of Ferris's testimony as untrue; whether the judgment was based on an acceptance of Ferris's testimony as true but as being outweighed by other evidence tending to prove lack of delivery; or whether the judgment was based on the trial court's determination that the testimony of Ferris, even if believed, was insufficient as a matter of law to establish delivery.
Therefore, because we are unable to determine the basis for the findings set out in the trial court's order or for the judgment of lack of delivery of the deed, we remand this cause to the trial court for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
On return to Remand
This case is before us for the second time. In the first appeal, Payne v. Carver, 534 So.2d 566 (Ala.1988), we held that we were "unable to determine the basis for the findings set out in the trial court's order or for the judgment of lack of delivery of the deed" and we remanded the cause to the trial court for the entry of an order consistent with our opinion.
On June 3, 1988, the trial court filed an "ORDER CLARIFYING [ITS] ORDER AND JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA," in which it wrote:
It is from this judgment--that there was no effective or valid delivery of the deed from Bart Payne to Ferris Payne--that the instant appeal is brought. We reverse and remand.
We will not disturb the judgment of the trial court in a non-jury trial unless that judgment is clearly wrong or unjust or is unsupported by the evidence. CRW, Inc. v. Twin Lakes Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 521 So.2d 939 (Ala.1988). However, "this rule has never precluded this Court from reversing a case where the trial court erroneously applies the principles of law involved." Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523, 526 (Ala.1979). It is our opinion that the trial court has misapplied the law in this case.
In support of its conclusion that the deed was either not delivered to Ferris Payne or that it was delivered to him on the condition that he return it to the custody and control of the grantors, the trial court refers to specific facts it found from the evidence. We will consider each separately.
First, the trial court found that the deed of an easement across the subject property from Bart and Lucy Payne to Jefferson County, after the execution of the 1957 deed to Ferris, was proof that Bart Payne still considered himself the owner of the property. However, the trial court also held, and the defendant Marjorie Payne Carver does not dispute, that the effect of the language of the deed was to reserve in Bart Payne a life estate in the property (see Stephens v. Stephens, 280 Ala. 312, 193 So.2d 755 (1966)), which conclusion is consistent with a holding both that the deed containing the reservation was effectively delivered to the grantee during the lifetime of the grantor and that the deed took effect at the moment of delivery.
The owner of a life estate does not act in derogation of the rights of the remainderman by granting an easement or right-of-way across the property--an act consistent with the interest reserved by the instant grantors. See, generally, 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 162, pp. 186-87 (1983). Indeed, that a grantor reserves a life estate in the property is evidence "that an immediate conveyance of title was contemplated, on the theory that the reservation indicates an intent that title should immediately vest in the grantee." 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 167, p. 189 (1983).
Another "fact" cited by the trial court is that the deed to Ferris Payne was not recorded until after the death of grantor Bart Payne. It is a familiar rule of law in Alabama, however, that, as between the parties, a deed is valid even though it is not recorded. White v. White, 350 So.2d 326 (Ala.1977); Murphree v. Smith, 291 Ala. 20, 277 So.2d 327 (1973); Watson v. Watson, 283 Ala. 214, 215 So.2d 290 (1968). Further, Ferris testified that despite urging from his father, he had simply neglected to have the deed recorded during his fathe...
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