Payne v. Knox
| Decision Date | 09 October 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 8074,8074 |
| Parties | John W. PAYNE, Richard F. O'Clair, Carlos G. Ontiveros, R. E. Finley, Joseph Island, Orville B. Brown and William R. Gragg, Petitioners, v. Robert W. KNOX et al., as members of the Police Pension Board for the City of Phoenix, Respondents. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Charles M. Brewer, Phoenix, for petitioners.
Merle L. Hanson, City Atty., Morris Rozar, Asst. City Atty., Phoenix, for respondents.
Petitioners in this matter are a group of retired police officers of the City of Phoenix, and respondents are members of the City of Phoenix Police Pension Board. Each of the petitioners has a contract with a school district located in Maricopa County. The various contracts are for employment as school teachers, attendance and truant officers, and school bus drivers, all for compensation. Prior to August 29, 1963, the Pension Board had knowledge of and had given consent to similar employment by retired police officers who were also receiving police pensions, based upon a legal opinion given by a former Assistant City Attorney of Phoenix.
On the last mentioned date the Pension Board held a special meeting, at which the city attorney was requested to give an opinion as to whether petitioner Payne (who had a contract of employment with the Tempe Grammar School District) and others similarly situated, could be employed by a school district and still receive a police pension, in accordance with the previous policy of the Pension Board. A legal opinion signed by an assistant city attorney was thereupon issued, stating in effect that payment of benefits under the Police Pension Fund Act to a person while employed by an Arizona school district would be in violation of A.R.S. § 9-928. Thereafter the Pension Board notified petitioners and a number of other retired officers of the legal opinion obtained from the city attorney's office, and when the petitioners presented themselves for their school employment in accordance with their contracts their pensions were discontinued.
Claiming that the action of the respondent Pension Board in withholding the pension benefits from the petitioners was arbitrary, capricious and unlawful, the petitioners sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Pension Board to reinstate their pension benefits. An alternative writ of mandamus was issued, and both parties have filed briefs in support of their respective positions.
The sole question before us is an interpretation of the meaning of A.R.S. § 9-928. This section reads as follows:
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners maintain that they are not prohibited from receiving their pension benefits by this section, because they are not employees of 'the state, county or municipality'. Respondents on the other hand contend that a school district is a political subdivision of a county, and therefore its employees are also employees of a county within the spirit and meaning of the above quoted statute.
In determining the meaning of a statute the cardinal rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Ernst v. Collins, 81 Ariz. 178, 302 P.2d 941 (1956); State v. Airesearch Mfg. Co., 68...
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...to the legislative intent behind the statute. Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Burns, 96 Ariz. 332, 395 P.2d 532 (1964); Payne v. Knox, 94 Ariz. 380, 385 P.2d 514 (1963). In determining the Legislature's intent in enacting a statute, this Court will look to the policy behind the statute and the......
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