Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Burns, 8076
| Decision Date | 30 September 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 8076,8076 |
| Citation | 395 P.2d 532,96 Ariz. 332 |
| Parties | PHOENIX TITLE & TRUST COMPANY, an Arizona corporation, as Trustee, Appellant, v. B. W. BURNS, Ruth A. O'Neil, and L. Alton Riggs, as Members of the Board of Supervisors of Maricopa County, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, Appellee. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Murphy, Posner & Franks, Phoenix, for appellant.
Charles N. Ronan, Maricopa County Atty., and Courtney L. Varner, Deputy County Atty., for appellee.
This is an appeal by the Phoenix Title and Trust Company, Hereinafter referred to as the appellant, from the Superior Court judgment quashing the alternative writ of mandamus sought by the appellant to direct the members of the Board of Supervisors of Maricopa County to set a hearing on a petition filed by the appellant for the establishment of an improvement district.
On May 3, 1963, the appellant filed a petition with the Board of Supervisors of Maricopa County requesting the formation of an improvement district known as 'Holiday Gardens Improvement District No. 1,' pursuant to A.R.S. Sections 11-702 (1956) and 11-703 (1956), for the purpose, inter alia, of acquiring by gift and maintaining a park, swimming pool, and other recreational facilities. On May 6, 1963, the Board of Supervisors refused to set a hearing regarding the formation of the improvement district, as required by A.R.S. Section 11-705(A) (1959), for the reason that, in the opinion of the Board, the proposed purpose of the improvement district, as indicated by te allegations contained in the petition is illegal as being beyond the purview of the County Improvement District statute. The specific objection by the Board went to the construction or maintenance of a park, swimming pool, and other recreational facilities.
On May 8, 1963, the appellant sought an alternative writ of mandamus which was issued directing the Board members to appear and show cause why they refused to set the hearing on the petition for the improvement district.
The Superior Court entered judgment quashing the alternative writ of mandamus, sustaining the Board's contention that the proposed purpose of the improvement district was beyond the purview of Title 11, Chapter 5, Article I of Arizona Revised Statutes authorizing the creation of county improvement districts.
After an unsuccessful motion to vacate the judgment, the appellant brought this appeal. The sole issue on this appeal involves the interpretation of the meaning of the language 'other local improvements' as it is used in A.R.S. Section 11-702(A) (1956). This statute provides:
'An improvement district may be established in any unincorporated area by the board of supervisors of the county in which the prosposed district is located, for the purpose of making street, sewer and other local improvements, through special assessments in such districts, or the issuing of bonds for improvements, and levying taxes for the operation and maintenance of such improvements and of streets within the district.' (emphasis added).
The appellant contends that the words 'other local improvements' in the statute authorize the formation of an improvement district for the purpose of acquiring by gift and maintaining a park with a swimming pool and other recreational facilities. It should be noted here that the appellant is merely seeking to require the board of supervisors to set a hearing on the proposed improvement pursuant to A.R.S. Section 11-705 (1959). Upon the hearing, the board in its discretion may dismiss the proceedings pursuant to A.R.S. Section 11-706 (1956), if it finds that the public convenience, necessity of welfare will not be promoted by the establishment of the district.
Thus, the question narrows to whether a park, in the first instance, is the proper subject of a county improvement district as authorized by Title 11, Chapter 5, Article I of Arizona Revised Statutes.
In determining the meaning of a statute, the cardinal rule is of course to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Payne v. Knox, 94 Ariz. 380, 385 P.2d 514 (1963). In determining the intent of the legislature the Court will take into consideration the meaning naturally attaching to the words used and wil adopt that meaning of words which best harmonizes with the...
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Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona, 17675-PR
...of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent behind the statute. Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Burns, 96 Ariz. 332, 395 P.2d 532 (1964); Payne v. Knox, 94 Ariz. 380, 385 P.2d 514 (1963). In determining the Legislature's intent in enacting a statute, t......
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Camerena v. Department of Public Welfare
...of statutes a cardinal rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. Phoenix Title & Trust Company v. Burns, 96 Ariz. 332, 395 P.2d 532 (1964). While (1) courts are not controlled by the literal language of a statute if this leads to an absurdity and (2) the spir......
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Patterson v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Office
...the statute." Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona, 144 Ariz. 291, 294, 697 P.2d 684, 687 (1985) (citing Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Burns, 96 Ariz. 332, 395 P.2d 532 (1964) and Payne v. Knox, 94 Ariz. 380, 385 P.2d 514 (1963)). In determining legislative purpose, we look to the policy b......
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