Payton v. State

• Decision Date: 06 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2001-KA-01658-SCT.,2001-KA-01658-SCT.
• Citation: 897 So.2d 921
• Parties: Henry Clay PAYTON v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

897 So.2d 921

Henry Clay PAYTON v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 2001-KA-01658-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

November 6, 2003.

Imhotep Alkebu-Lan, Chokwe Lumumba, attorneys for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Scott Stuart, attorneys for appellee.

EN BANC.

SMITH, Presiding Justice, for the Court.

s 1. Henry Clay Payton (Payton) was convicted in the Circuit Court of Leake County of armed robbery and arson and sentenced to serve consecutive terms of thirty-eight years for armed robbery and ten years for arson. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, Payton appeals, in forma pauperis, presenting the following issues, edited for clarity, for the Court's resolution:

I. WHETHER PAYTON WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE HE WAS BROUGHT INTO THE COURTROOM WHERE THE JURY WAS SEATED WEARING SHACKLES AND CHAINS.

II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE INTRODUCTION OF PAYTON'S STATEMENT WHEN HE HAD BEEN DENIED HIS MIRANDA WARNINGS.

III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED PAYTON'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE A MISTRIAL.

IV. WHETHER TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY REFUSING TO RECUSE HIMSELF.¹

a. Whether the evidence showed that the judge had an interest in the case.

b. Whether the trial judge harbored animosity toward Payton's counsel and was no longer impartial.

c. Whether the trial judge improperly enhanced Payton's sentence because he continued to assert his innocence and because the court was vindictive.

d. Whether the trial court erred in sentencing Payton to a term of years that is not reasonably expected to be less than his life expectancy.

e. Whether the trial judge committed reversible error in overruling Payton's motion of recusal on post-conviction motions.

V. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HEARING TESTIMONY FROM JURORS WHO PROVIDED AFFIDAVITS ABOUT MATTERS OUTSIDE JURY DELIBERATION THAT AFFECTED THEIR VERDICT.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

s 2. On September 29, 1995 in Leake County a commercial building was completely burned, the Bank of Walnut Grove was robbed, and the bank president, Ray Britt, was taken hostage. Investigation and testimony at trial revealed that four men were involved in this series of events â Cleon Graves, Cornelius Belmer, Dedrick Marshall, and the appellant, Henry Clay Payton. According to his accomplices, Payton was the mastermind behind the crimes. They each testified that it was Payton's idea to burn the building in order to divert attention from the bank and then to have them rob the bank at gunpoint while Payton waited outside in the getaway car. Payton also allegedly suggested that, if something should go wrong in the bank, the men should take a hostage.

s 3. Graves, Belmer, and Marshall then robbed the bank. When they got the money and were ready to leave, they looked outside for Payton. They realized that Payton had abandoned them and remembered Payton's advice to take a hostage. They decided on Ray Britt, the bank president, so they took Britt and his car and fled the bank, with Britt driving at gunpoint. Heavily pursued by law enforcement officials, the men forced Britt to drive south to Interstate 20 and then west toward Jackson. According to Britt, the three men continually cursed Henry Payton during the high speed chase for leaving them at the bank. The vehicle went through a roadblock in Forest, and according to Officer Joe Nelson, there was a shot fired from the window of the car at Nelson's patrol vehicle. Unable to stop the men, Nelson radioed two semi-trucks on the interstate via C.B. and asked them for help in apprehending the men. The trucks slowed down and rode side-by-side to prevent the men from passing. When the men were unable to pass the trucks, they ordered Britt to exit the interstate at Morton. Britt then grabbed the gun that had been pointed at him throughout the chase and ran the car into a concrete traffic island. Finally, the car came to a stop, the police closed in, the three men were arrested, and Britt was freed. After learning of Payton's involvement in the crimes, law enforcement officials located and arrested him and charged him with armed robbery, kidnapping, and arson in the second degree. Payton was tried and found guilty as charged. The jury recommended a life sentence for both the armed robbery and kidnaping. Payton was so sentenced, and said life sentences were imposed consecutively in addition to five years for the arson charge. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, Payton appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and we granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' judgment.

s 4. This Court found error in the trial court's refusal to sever Payton's trial from that of a co-defendant, and in the prosecutor's use of the improper "send a message" argument during closing argument. Payton v. State, 785 So.2d 267 (Miss.1999). The case was remanded, and on September 7, 2001, Payton was again convicted of armed robbery and arson. He was acquitted on the kidnaping charge. The court sentenced Payton to serve thirty-eight years for armed robbery and ten years for arson, with the terms to run consecutively. Payton filed a timely notice of appeal s 5. Finding no reversible error in Payton's convictions, we affirm his convictions and reverse and remand for resentencing on the armed robbery conviction.

ANALYSIS

I. WHETHER PAYTON WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE HE WAS BROUGHT INTO THE COURTROOM WHERE THE JURY WAS SEATED WEARING SHACKLES AND CHAINS.

s 6. Payton claims he was denied a fair and impartial trial because he was brought before the jury wearing cuffs around his ankles and his waist. He argues the prejudice was so great that a continuance and a new jury were the only sufficient remedies. Payton concludes that the trial judge's failure to grant these remedies denied him a fair trial.

s 7. The record indicates that Payton was brought into the courtroom, in the presence of the jury pool at 9:20 a.m. There was a chain around his waist and cuffs on his ankles. After preliminary matters, constituting 21 lines of transcript, the court granted Payton and his counsel a conference. Court resumed at 10:02 a.m., with the jury pool excused. Payton informed the trial judge of the restraints and requested a continuance and a new jury pool.

s 8. The trial judge stated that he did not notice the restraints when Payton entered the courtroom. The judge took notice that the jury was seated approximately twenty-five feet from Payton and that their view would have been obstructed by the rail, the lectern, the counsel table, and by the attorneys seated at the table. The judge said he had no way of knowing if the jury saw the restraints. Payton claims that the judge was distracted when Payton entered the courtroom and argues that his investigator, Ervin Bradley, seated in the back of the courtroom, clearly observed the restraints.

s 9. Payton was granted additional time during voir dire to question the jurors on this point. The judge told Payton he would rule on any prejudice at that time, but denied his motion for a continuance. The trial judge ordered the restraints removed.

s 10. Payton did not ask the potential jurors whether they noticed the restraints. He argued that he forgot because he was not given sufficient time for voir dire. Payton again moved for a continuance and/or a new venire. The trial judge denied these requests, finding that Payton improperly utilized the adequate time he was allowed by inquiring into irrelevant matters.

s 11. The standard of review to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be grounds for reversal unless shown to have resulted in manifest injustice. Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 780 (Miss.1997). Also, the decision to quash the venire is a matter likewise entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. Kolberg v. State, 829 So.2d 29, 83 (Miss.2002). "Where ... the evidence is conflicting on the question of whether or not the defendant could receive a fair and impartial trial, this Court will generally defer to the considered opinion of the trial judge." Burrell v. State, 613 So.2d 1186, 1190 (Miss.1993).

s 12. Restraints should be used only in exceptional cases where there is evident danger of escape or in order to protect others from an attack by the prisoner. Rush v. State, 301 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss.1974). Permitting the jury to see the defendant bound and shackled improperly encroaches on the defendant's presumption of innocence. Hickson v. State, 472 So.2d 379, 383 (Miss.1985). If this right of the accused is violated, it may be ground for the reversal of conviction. Rush, 301 So.2d at 300. However, the failure, through an oversight, to remove handcuffs from a prisoner for a short time or any technical violation of the rule prohibiting shackling, not prejudicial to him, is not ground for reversal. Id.

s 13. In Hickson, the defendant was brought into the courtroom in handcuffs. He sat, so restrained, in view of the unselected jurors between thirty minutes and an hour. He was then led out of the courtroom to have the handcuffs removed. Though Hickson was reversed on other grounds, this Court found that this level of juror observation improperly eroded the presumption of innocence to which the defendant was entitled. This Court ordered that Hickson's rights be respected on remand. Hickson, 472 So.2d at 382-83.

s 14. In Rush, the deputy sheriff brought the defendant into the courtroom in handcuffs in the presence of members of the special venire. The handcuffs were immediately removed at the request of defendant's counsel. Finding no prejudice to the accused, this Court held the technical violation of the rule against shackling to be harmless error. Rush, 301 So.2d at 300.

s 15. Unlike the defendants in Hickson and Rush, Payton's hands were not restrained. He had a chain around his waist and cuffs on his ankles. He was seated at...