Peak v. Cody
| Decision Date | 22 April 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 3,Nos. 41935,41936,s. 41935,3 |
| Citation | 149 S.E.2d 519,113 Ga.App. 674 |
| Parties | C. S. PEAK v. W. B. CODY et al. W. B. CODY et al. v. C. S. PEAK et al |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
The trial court did not err in sustaining special grounds 7 and 8 of the defendant hotel's amended motion for new trial and in granting a new trial to that defendant; the trial court should also have sustained special ground 6 of the amended motion as contended in the cross appeal.
C. Standifer Peak brought an action jointly and severally against the Hotel Georgian Terrace and the Otis Elevator Company to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by him when a hotel elevator which he had boarded at the eighth floor failed to stop at its first floor destination and 'fell' to the bottom of the shaft as the result of the alleged negligence of both defendants. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $36,900 in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant hotel, the jury finding in favor of the defendant elevator company.
The defendant hotel filed a motion for new trial on the general and five special grounds and the trial court entered an order granting a new trial on special grounds 7 and 8 and overruling the general and remaining special grounds. The plaintiff in the main appeal has enumerated as error the grant of a new trial on special grounds 7 and 8 and has enumerated as error the order of the trial court granting the new trial for the reason that it did not specify the grounds upon which the new trial was granted as required by Code Ann. § 6-1608 (Ga.L.1959, pp. 353, 354). The defendant hotel in a cross appeal has enumerated as error the overruling of the general grounds and special grounds 4, 5 and 6 of the amended motion for new trial.
The defendant elevator company which has been named as party appellee in this court in both the main appeal and cross appeal has filed a motion in this court to be dismissed as a party to the appeal on the ground that, having been released by the verdict of the jury, it is unaffected by these proceedings.
Irwin, Anderson, Smith & Pazol, R. Beverly Irwin, Eugene Simons, Atlanta, for appellants.
Hamilton Lokey, Glenn Frick, Ben Weinberg, Jr., A. Gregg Loomis, Atlanta, for appellees.
1. The record in this case discloses that the trial court in its order granting the new trial did specify the grounds of the motion upon which said order was predicated and the plaintiff's contention in this regard is wholly without merit. Attention is called to the fact that the Supreme Court in the recent case of CTC Finance Corp. v. Holden, 221 Ga. 809, 147 S.E.2d 427 has ruled that the Act of 1959, pp. 353, 354 (Code Ann. § 6-1608) which provides that the trial court must specify the grounds upon which a new trial is granted is a complete nullity and that the law as codified in Code § 6-1608 of the Official Code of 1933 is still in effect. This Code section provides as follows: 'First grant of a new trial; disturbance.-The first grant of a new trial shall not be disturbed by the appellate court, unless the plaintiff in error shall show that the judge abused his discretion in granting it, and that the law and facts require the verdict notwithstanding the judgment of the presiding judge.'
2. Special ground 8 of the defendant hotel's amended motion for new trial assigned error on the verdict as being excessive and it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining this ground and granting the motion, this being the first grant of a new trial. Code § 6-1608; Smith v. Maddox-Rucker Banking Co., 135 Ga. 151, 68 S.E. 1031, same case, 8 Ga.App. 288(1), 68 S.E. 1092; City of Jonesboro v. Watterson, ...
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Bennett v. Haley
...ever have any such future expenses.' (p. 818, 198 S.E.2d p. 374). Here the erudite jurist followed the directive of Peak v. Cody, 113 Ga.App. 674, 676(4), 149 S.E.2d 519, 521, that 'the court . . . should clearly inform the jury that the plaintiff can recover only for those items of future ......
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Clayton County Bd. of Ed. v. Hooper
...S.E.2d 340. Of course, prospective medical expenses which are authorized by the evidence are recoverable in this state. Peak v. Cody, 113 Ga.App. 674(4), 149 S.E.2d 519; Daugherty v. Vick, 127 Ga.App. 767, 195 S.E.2d 208. The only testimony remotely touching this subject is found in the doc......
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Cody v. Peak
...Simons, A. Gregg Loomis, Atlanta, for appellees. Syllabus Opinion by the Court JORDAN, Judge. This a companion case to that of Peak v. Cody, ante, 149 S.E.2d 519. In this action Mrs. Mary M. Peak sought to recover damages for the loss of consortium of her husband arising out of the injuries......
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Daugherty v. Vick, 47520
...testimony was too inconclusive and conjectural to form the basis of a claim for future medical expense. It was held in Peak v. Cody, 113 Ga.App. 674(4), 149 S.E.2d 519, that prospective medical expenses, which are authorized by the evidence, are recoverable in this State. But here there was......