Smith v. Maddox-rucker Banking Co

• Decision Date: 23 September 1910
• Citation: 135 Ga. 151,68 S.E. 1031
• Parties: SMITH v. MADDOX-RUCKER BANKING CO.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

68 S.E. 1031

135 Ga. 151

SMITH

v.MADDOX-RUCKER BANKING CO.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 23, 1910.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Appeal and Error (§ 977^*) — Review — New Trial.

Where the verdict was not demanded by the law and evidence, the Supreme Court will not disturb the first grant of a new trial, though it was upon a single ground, nor will it determine whether the trial court was right in granting the motion on a special ground. This is a rule without an exception.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3863; Dec. Dig. § 977.*]

(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)

2. New Trial (§ 76*)—Grounds—Excessiveness of Verdict.

The trial judge, upon motion for a new trial containing the usual grounds, and a further general ground that the verdict is excessive, may set aside the verdict in a case of libel, slander, or other similar cases where the sole measure of damage is for the jury, when in his opinion the verdict is unreasonably large, though there is nothing in the record to show that it is the result of gross mistake or undue bias, and the rule applies in an action by a depositor against a bank for dishonoring a check drawn by him upon the bank against adequate funds out of which the bank should have paid it; the bank's refusal not being willful or malicious, but merely the result of mistake or negligence, " and no special damages being shown.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see New Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 153-156; Dec. Dig. § 76.*]

Certified Question by Court of Appeals.

Action by N. K. Smith against the Maddox-Rucker Banking Company. A verdict for plaintiff was set aside, and plaintiff brought error to the Court of Civil Appeals. On certified questions. Questions answered.

The Court of Appeals certified to the Supreme Court the following questions:

"(1) Has the judge of a trial court, upon a motion for a new trial containing the usual grounds of a further general ground that the verdict is excessive, the power to set aside the verdict in a case of libel, slander, or In other similar cases in which the sole measure of the damage is the enlightened conscience of the jury, when in his opinion the verdict is unreasonably too large, and there is nothing in the record to show that the verdict is the result of gross mistake or undue bias?

"(2) Where the jury returns a verdict in a case of the kind mentioned above, and the trial judge sets it aside on the ground that in his opinion it is excessive, and it is the opinion of this court that the verdict is not so large as to raise the inference that it was the result of gross mistake or bias or prejudice, is it proper that this court reverse the judgment of the trial court awarding the first grant of a new trial on this ground alone, there being...