Pearce v. Tucker

• Decision Date: 20 June 2016
• Docket Number: S15G1310
• Citation: 787 S.E.2d 749,299 Ga. 224
• Parties: Pearce et al. v. Tucker.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

299 Ga. 224

787 S.E.2d 749

Pearce et al.

v.Tucker.

S15G1310

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: June 20, 2016

Paul Wain Painter, III, Bowen Painter, William Richard Dekle, Sr., Brannen, Wasden & Painter, for Appellants.

Steven Gary Blackerby, Richard Keith Strickland, Brown, Readdick, Bumgartner, Carter, Strickland & Watkins, Aaron Wylie Mumford, for Appellee.

HUNSTEIN

, Justice.

This matter arises out of a wrongful death suit filed by Tammy Pearce (“Appellant”), individually and as administrator of the estate of her husband, Christopher Pearce (“Pearce”), against Glynn County Police Officer Henry Tucker after Pearce committed suicide while in custody. The trial court denied Officer Tucker's motion for summary judgment; the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that any negligent act by Officer Tucker proximately caused Pearce's death, and this Court subsequently granted certiorari to review that decision. We now hold as a threshold matter that Officer Tucker is entitled to qualified immunity, and we therefore need not address the merits of Appellant's negligence claim. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals under our right-for-any-reason rule.

On the day of his suicide, Pearce—who suffered from major depressive disorder

—arrived unexpectedly at his pastor's house carrying a pistol in his hand; the pastor and his wife summoned help while Pearce remained outside. Officers Henry Tucker and William Tomlinson, Jr., arrived at the residence and observed Pearce with a gun tucked in his waistband. Pearce, a convicted felon, was subsequently handcuffed, relieved of the firearm, and placed in a patrol car. Officer Tucker transported Pearce to the Glynn County Police Department headquarters. Once at the headquarters, Pearce was placed in a holding cell with a monitored video feed. Pursuant to police department policy, Officer Tucker had Pearce remove his shoes, belt, tie, and the contents of his pockets. Approximately 15–20 minutes after being placed in the holding cell, Pearce ended his life by hanging himself with his socks.

It is undisputed that Officer Tucker failed to comply with Glynn County Police Department Policy 22.16.3 (E) before placing Pearce in the holding cell.¹ That policy states as follows:

Officers detaining a person must complete a screening form on the person before they are placed in the temporary holding cell and before they are transferred to another agency. The purpose of the screening is to determine whether medical attention is required of the person to be detained.

The officer must fill out the screening form, noting and inquiring as to:

1. The current health of the detainee

2. Medications taken by the detainee

3. Behavior, including state of consciousness and mental status, and

4. Body deformities, trauma markings, bruises, lesions, ease of movement, etc.

Blank forms will be kept in the fingerprinting room. Completed forms will be submitted to the on-duty supervisor who will review and then forward them to the Patrol Division Commander who will review and file the forms in the Records Section to be kept for a period of two years.

The “screening form” referenced in the department policy is styled “Holding Cell Medical Information,” and, pursuant to the policy, it provides spaces for an officer to record details regarding a detainee's “health condition,” medications, behavior, and “body (cuts, bruises, etc.).”

In her complaint, Appellant alleged, inter alia, that Officer Tucker negligently failed to have Pearce remove his socks before placing him in the holding cell.² Officer Tucker subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to immunity with respect to his failure to have Pearce remove his socks. He also asserted that any possible negligence claim arising out of his failure to complete the medical form—if not barred by immunity—would be unavailing owing to the fact that the incomplete medical form did not proximately cause Pearce's suicide. In response to Officer Tucker's motion for summary judgment, Appellant's theory of negligence shifted. While acknowledging that Officer Tucker was entitled to qualified immunity—and, thus, summary judgment—with respect to her original claim, Appellant asserted that a claim related to Officer Tucker's failure to “screen” Pearce remained viable. Appellant contended that Officer Tucker was not entitled to immunity with respect to the screening claim and that there existed a question of fact as to whether Officer Tucker could have prevented Pearce's suicide by having completed the “medical screening.” In a brief opposing summary judgment, Appellant clarified her position, specifying that she was not claiming that “a properly completed [screening] form would have prevented Pearce's death,” but, instead, that a “medical screening” would have revealed Pearce's suicidal intentions and that the screening form was “merely a record of the screening.” The trial court agreed, concluding that Officer Tucker was not entitled to immunity with respect to the screening claim and that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether Pearce's suicide could have been prevented had Officer Tucker completed “a proper medical screening.” Officer Tucker appealed.

The Court of Appeals, without resolving the issue of immunity, addressed the substance of Appellant's claim and reversed the trial court. After recognizing the general rule regarding suicide—that it is an unforeseeable intervening cause of death which absolves the tortfeasor of liability except where the tortfeasor's wrongful act causes the injured party to kill himself during a rage or frenzy, or in response to an uncontrollable impulse³ —the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no evidence that Pearce was in a rage or frenzy or had an uncontrollable impulse when he took his life and, thus, that Pearce's final act was an unforeseeable intervening cause of death which absolved Officer Tucker of liability. Tucker v. Pearce , 332 Ga.App. 187, 771 S.E.2d 495 (2015)

. This Court granted certiorari to address two questions: first, whether the general rule regarding suicide—on which the Court of Appeals' decision rests—applies in prisoner suicide cases, as was held in this case and in Harvey , even though other decisions of that court hold that the general rule does not apply where there is a special relationship between the decedent and the defendant, see Brandvain v. Ridgeview Institute, Inc. , 188 Ga.App. 106, 112–118, 372 S.E.2d 265 (1988), and that such a special relationship exists between an officer and his prisoner, see Thomas v. Williams , 105 Ga.App. 321, 326, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962) ; and second, whether the Court of Appeals otherwise correctly reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment with respect to the medical-form claim. We conclude that Officer Tucker is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the screening claim and, for this reason, that the Court of Appeals properly reversed the denial of summary judgment; we therefore need not address the first question, and we leave it to future cases for this Court or the Court of Appeals to reconcile the tension in the appellate case law that we have identified.

The issue of Officer Tucker's immunity is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. See Cameron v. Lang , 274 Ga. 122, 549 S.E.2d 341 (2001)

.

Qualified immunity, also known as official immunity, “ ‘protects individual public agents from personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority, and done without wilfulness, malice, or corruption.’ ” (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.) Cameron , 274 Ga. at 123, 549 S.E.2d 341

. On the other hand, “a public officer or employee may be personally liable ... for ministerial acts negligently performed or acts performed with malice or an intent to injure.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 123, 549 S.E.2d 341. Because there is no evidence that Officer Tucker “acted or failed to act with malice, wilfulness, or an intent to injure,” the question before us is whether Officer Tucker's nonobservance of Department Policy 22.16.3 (E) was a failure to perform a ministerial or discretionary act. Grammens v. Dollar , 287 Ga. 618, 620, 697 S.E.2d 775 (2010).

A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty. A discretionary act, however, calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.

(Citations omitted). Murphy v. Bajjani , 282 Ga. 197, 199, 647 S.E.2d 54 (2007)

. “ ‘The determination of whether an action is discretionary or ministerial depends on the character of the specific actions complained of, not the general nature of the job, and is to be made on a case-by-case basis.’ ” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McDowell v. Smith , 285 Ga. 592, 594–595, 678 S.E.2d 922 (2009). “The single overriding factor is whether the specific act from which liability allegedly arises is discretionary or ministerial.” (Emphasis supplied.) Golden v. Vickery , 285 Ga.App. 216, 218, 645 S.E.2d 695 (2007).

Policy 22.16.3 (E) required Officer Tucker to complete a screening form; arguably, compliance with the policy and completion of the screening form was ministerial in nature. See, e.g., Meagher v. Quick , 264 Ga.App. 639, 594 S.E.2d 182 (2003)

(responsibility of officers to complete a Family Violence Report as required by OCGA § 17–4–20.1 was ministerial duty). Here, however, is where Appellant's shifting theory of negligence muddles our analysis. While Appellant relies on the definite nature of the screening-form policy to argue that Officer Tucker neglected a ministerial duty—and, thus, is not entitled to immunity—Appellant affirmatively stated in the...